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3ABSTRACT
The objective of this thesis is to answer the question, “does the ethics
committee review process in Malaysia provide meaningful protection to
mentally incapacitated adults who enrol in clinical research trials?”
This question is answered by examining three important aspects of the
ethics review process. First, the quality of the deliberations of ethics
committees is examined by looking at the underlying principles that
are meant to guide ethics decision-making. Second, the thesis looks at
the current regulatory framework under which ethics committees
operate and considers the adequacy of these guidelines in protecting
human subjects. Finally, this thesis considers the notion of conflicts of
interests in the clinical trials arena and calls into question the
independence of the ethics review process and how this impacts on the
interests of human subjects in general and mentally incapacitated
adults in particular.
The conclusion reached at the end of this thesis is that the ethics
review process in Malaysia fails adequately to provide meaningful
protection to mentally incapacitated adults. While the reasons for this
are many, several factors are particularly significant, namely, the
creation of a globalised clinical trials market, the lack of formal and
systematic training of ethics committee members and the institutional
structures of ethics committees.
Although the main focus of this thesis is the Malaysian ethics review
process, many of the comments and discussions put forward in this
thesis are highly relevant to the ethics review processes in other
jurisdictions given the international regulatory scheme that currently
governs the conduct of clinical trials in many parts of the world.
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81 Chapter One
Introduction
The objective of this research is to analyse and evaluate the adequacy
of the ethics review process in providing an adequate level of protection
to mentally incapacitated adults who participate in clinical trials in
Malaysia.
Clinical Trials
Advances in medical science are largely achieved by way of medical
research projects. To highlight a few examples, there would be no
organ transplants, vaccinations or chemotherapy drugs if it were not
for research. Medical research covers a broad range of activities aimed
at improving or maintaining human health. Research activities range
from basic research in areas such as animal studies, psychology,
statistics, economics, physics, chemistry, etc; to clinical research, which
involves research on human participants.1
The clinical research trial is medical research that is carried out on
human participants and is the last leg of a long journey. The American
National Institutes of Health defines a clinical research trial2 as a
prospective biomedical or behavioural research study of human
subjects that is designed to answer specific questions about biomedical
or behavioural interventions (drugs, treatments, devices, or new ways
of using known drugs, treatments, or devices).
Clinical research trials can be described in several ways. They may be
1 See the U.K. Medical Research Council description of clinical trials at
http://www.mrc.ac.uk/Achievementsimpact/Clinicaltrials/Whatareclinicaltrials/index.htm
accessed August 17, 2010
2 At http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/info/glossary accessed on August 17, 2010
9described as being therapeutic or non-therapeutic in nature.3
Therapeutic trials are run on subjects with not only a view of proving a
particular hypothesis, but also of providing a curative therapy for a
particular condition. To this end, all research participants are
necessarily patients suffering from the particular illness, condition or
disability being studied. A therapeutic clinical trial is carried out at a
point at which a drug or therapy has shown enough promise and is
deemed sufficiently safe to be tested on human subjects. It is usually
the last step before a drug or therapy is introduced to the general
population. Non-therapeutic trials on the other hand, are usually run
to test the safety profiles of drugs or are bio-equivalency studies and
trial subjects are usually healthy volunteers.4 Clinical research trials
may also be described according to the objects being studied. They may
involve testing drugs, diagnostic methods, devices or even treatment
methods and may be invasive or non-invasive.
In order fully to appreciate the context in which modern clinical trials
are run and the reasons for the development of principles and
mechanisms to protect human subjects, it is necessary to first consider
how clinical research has evolved over the centuries.
Evolution of Clinical Trials
The modern scientific tradition of medicine5 has evolved over centuries
of trial and error. Early physicians worked at the bedside and
hypothesised causes and effects of diseases and illnesses and tested out
their theories on their patients. Treatment modalities were more often
3 The use of the terminology therapeutic trial instead of non therapeutic trial has been the subject
of some debate as using the word therapeutic seems to infer that the primary aim of the trial is
treatment, which is not the case as the primary aim of any trial is the generation of generalisable
knowledge. See J. Menikoff and E. P. Richards, What the doctor didn't say: the hidden truth about
medical research, (New York ; Oxford 2006) at 22
4 The subject population may also include patients who are not suffering from the specific
condition that is being researched.
5 Hippocrates and his followers are generally recognised as having laid down the foundations for the
modern scientific tradition of medicine.
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than not based on anecdotal evidence of past successes or failures to
cure patients. In this way the breadth and depth of medical knowledge
grew slowly and fitfully. The line between medical practice and medical
research had yet to be drawn and in truth, almost all medical practice
was also clinical research. Bedside medicine6 as practised by the
Hippocratics, was founded on the idea of humoral medicine, which
emphasised the importance of diet, exercise and bathing and believed
in the body’s ability to heal itself. This form of medicine was typically
observational rather than experimental.7
Over time, medical practice moved8 from the bedside into the hospital
and the science of medicine moved from passive observation of patients
to active laboratory based medicine. The emergence of hospital
medicine transformed the practice of medicine in both terms of location
and its content. The hospital became the centre of medical teaching,
research and the arbiter of medical knowledge.9 This type of medicine
was especially associated with the city of Paris between 1794 and
1848.10
Clinical research began to take on a more systematic and scientific
approach during the ascendency of hospital medicine since it was in
the hospitals where the “three pillars of the new medicine – physical
6 Bedside medicine is said to have held sway in Western Europe from the Middle Ages to the 18th
Century. See Andrew Cunningham and Perry Williams, The Laboratory Revolution in Medicine
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). at 1
7 Few records exist of pure research activities and the most frequently cited cases involve testing the
efficacy of poisons on condemned prisoners. (See S Post (ed) Encyclopaedia of Bioethics 3rd Ed, Vol 4,
Thomson Gale, pg 2316) Some accounts of human vivisectional experiments were also recorded in this
age and in each case condemned criminals were also used as subjects. (S. F. Spicker, The Use of human
beings in research: with special reference to clinical trials, (Dordrecht ; London 1988) at 33)
8 The history of Western medicine has been described as involving five types of medicine: bedside:
medicine, library medicine, hospital medicine, community medicine and laboratory medicine. See W.
Byrnum, “Reflections on the History of Human Experimentation” in Spicker, S. F. (1988). The Use of
human beings in research: with special reference to clinical trials. Dordrecht ; London, Kluwer
Academic at 29-46
9 Cunningham and Williams, The Laboratory Revolution in Medicine. at 2
10 Ibid. at 1
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examination, autopsy and statistics could be developed.”11 Hospital
medicine also made it possible to run clinical experiments on large
numbers of people.12 This in turn provided physicians with rich data
upon which to design treatment modalities. Using hospital patients as
research subjects was considered appropriate because for most of the
eighteenth century, hospitals were administered to care for the poor
and infirm who were considered the most suitable subjects for
experiments because of their illnesses, their perceived resulting
obligation to society and the power structure within hospitals that
created a regulated research environment.13 The attitude of
practitioners toward test subjects reflected this view of the entrenched
social hierarchies of the community. Bernard de Gordon14 advised that
medicines should be tested “first on birds, next on mammals, then [on
patients] in hospitals, then on lesser brethren, and then on others in
[ascending] order, because if it should be poisonous it would kill.”15
Notwithstanding the advances in the number of subjects and statistical
analysis made possible by hospital medicine, clinical research
remained largely observational and the border between practice and
research was still indistinguishable.
This changed with the advent of laboratory medicine, that is, the use of
laboratory tests in clinical problem solving,16 which gained prominence
in the second half of the nineteenth century17 and continues to
11 Erwin Heinz Ackerknecht, Medicine at the Paris Hospital, 1794-1848 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1967). at 15
12 In the early seventeenth century, a group of French professors revolutionised medicine by using
big public hospitals for research. See Roy Porter, The Cambridge Illustrated History of Medicine
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). at 173
13 Stuart F. Spicker, The Use of Human Beings in Research : With Special Reference to Clinical
Trials, Philosophy and Medicine ; V. 28 (Dordrecht ; London: Kluwer Academic, 1988). at 36
14 Master of the Faculty of Medicine at Montpelier, who is considered to be possibly the most
noteworthy representative of the academic quality and professional standards of that age (1250-
1350), see Luke E. Demaitre and Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies., Doctor Bernard De
Gordon, Professor and Practitioner (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1980).
15 Ibid at 28
16 D Burke, "Laboratory Medicine in the 21st Century," American Journal of Clinical Pathology
114, no. 6 (2000). at 841
17 Spicker, The Use of Human Beings in Research : With Special Reference to Clinical Trials. at
39
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dominate the practice of medicine today. Claude Bernard, one of the
pioneers of laboratory medicine and among the greatest scientists of
his day, maintained that hospital medicine had two limitations. First,
it was observational and thus purely passive whereas what was
required was the active observation of the subject under controlled
conditions. Second, the sickbed involved too many factors that could
not be assessed to allow for precise understanding.18 The solution was
laboratory medicine according to his famous statement in 1865:
“…I consider hospitals only as the entrance to scientific
medicine; they are the first field of observation which a
physician enters; but the true sanctuary of medical science is a
laboratory; only there can he seek explanations of life in the
normal and pathological states by means of experimental
analysis.”19
Laboratory medicine, which was actively experimental and based on
systematic and standardised methodologies, essentially separated the
practice of medicine from medical research.20 Clinical research thus
developed into formally run scientific trials, setting out to prove or
disprove specific hypotheses, while medical practice moved into the age
of evidence-based medicine.21 In this way, the foci of clinical research
and medical practice drifted apart. While medical practice remained
concerned with treating the individual patient, clinical research fixed
its eyes upon the advancement of scientific knowledge.22 Significantly,
18 Porter, The Cambridge Illustrated History of Medicine. at 182
19 Claude Bernard, An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine (New York: Dover
Publications, 1957) at 146
20 This is not to say that the division of medical practice and research is complete; doctors faced
with new diseases or difficult cases continue to experiment with new methods of treatment and
care. Some prominent physicians continue to regard the task of separating medical practice from
medical research as a very important and exceedingly difficult task. See RJ Levine Ethics and
Regulations of Clinical Research (2nd edn Urban & Schwarzenberg, Baltimore-Munich, 1986) at 3
21 According to the Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine, this is the conscientious, explicit and
judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients.
The practice of evidence-based medicine means integrating individual clinical expertise with the
best available external clinical evidence from systematic research. See
http://www.cebm.net/index.aspx?o=1914 accessed on August 17, 2010
22 In America, World War II is generally considered as the moment when human experiments lost
their directly therapeutic character. For a greater discussion of this, see David J. Rothman,
Strangers at the Bedside : A History of How Law and Bioethics Transformed Medical Decision
Making (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1991).
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however, this never resulted in a formal and distinct separation of the
notions of clinical research and medical practice. This is particularly
true of therapeutic clinical trials where physicians enrol their patients
into research projects. Because research and practice are ultimately
seeking to achieve very different ends, the fact that there remains an
indistinct boundary between practice and research, both in terms of
institutional arrangements and mindsets of participants, places
patients/subjects at risk. This is especially manifested in the discussion
in Chapter 4 concerning the informed consent process in clinical trials.
Clinical research has continued to evolve in sophistication and in the
past 30 years, the face of clinical research has dramatically changed,
resulting in a much larger, more distant and complex enterprise.
Modern clinical research projects are to a large extent initiated and
funded by governments23 and multinational pharmaceutical
companies,24 which outsource trials to large business enterprises
known as contract research organisations/clinical research
organisations (CRO). A clinical research project might involve
physicians running trials in several different countries, enrolling
thousands of subjects and be supported by a host of other professions.
The United Kingdom Medical Research Council (MRC)25 notes that:26
‘Well run clinical trials rely on the expertise and commitment of
a range of healthcare professionals: the researchers who will
pose the research question and plan the trial; the nurses and
23 This is because states bear the primary responsibility for the health of their citizens and many
are also signatories to international commitments on health see Global Forum for Health Research,
Monitoring Financial Flows for Health Research 2006 at http://www.globalforumhealth.org
accessed August 17, 2010
24 The pharmaceutical industry is responsible for half the global total of research and development
investment in health research. See Global Forum for Health Research, Monitoring Financial Flows
for Health Research 2009, Behind the Global Numbers at
http://www.globalforumhealth.org/Media-Publications/Publications/Monitoring-Financial-Flows-
for-Health-Research-2009-Behind-the-Global-Numbers at 10 accessed August 17, 2010
25 The United Kingdom Medical Research Council is a national organisation funded by the
taxpayer. It promotes research into all areas of medical and related science with the aims of
improving the health and quality of life of the public and contributing to the wealth of the nation.
See http://www.mrc.ac.uk accessed 21 January 2006
26 Medical Research Council, Clinical Research It’s Everyone’s Business Medical Research
Council 2004 at 5 at http://www.ct-
toolkit.ac.uk/_db/_documents/MRC_clinical_research_leaflet.pdf accessed August 17, 2010
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therapists who administer the treatments being tested; and the
trial manager and administrators who are responsible for the
efficient day to day running of the trial, including data
management and recruitment of participants, and recruiting
thousands of subjects.’
The modern clinical research industry is a flourishing activity, largely
because it has been very successful in contributing to better health
care. Medical research and in particular, drug development has played
a significant role in improving health care. Increased global
immunisation coverage has resulted in a fifty percent reduction of the
infant mortality rate in developed countries over the last 25 years27
and new drug therapies such as antiviral and cardiovascular drugs
have substantially decreased mortality rates in developed countries.28
It is estimated that health-related technology improvements led by the
introduction of new drugs have reduced human mortality by more than
fifty percent between 1960 and 1990.29 As recognised by Daniel
Callahan,30 “It has been a wonderful contributor to a reduction in
mortality, to improved health, and to the relief of pain and suffering. It
has thus by most measures been a glorious enterprise. It works, and
we want more of it.”
27 International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations, The Pharmaceutical
Innovation Platform, Sustaining Better Health for Patients Worldwide (IFPMA Oct 2004) 11
quoting The World Health Organisation, World Health Report 2003. Global Health; Today’s
Challenges (WHO 2003)
28 Ibid at 14
29 Ibid at 11, quoting J Wang et al Measuring country performance on health: Selected indicators
for 115 countries.(The World Bank, Human Development Network, Washington DC, 1999)
30 D Callahan What Price Better Health? Hazards of the research imperative (University of
California Press, 2003) at 33
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We want more of it because we place a very high value on good health.
In a global survey31 commissioned for the Millennium Summit of the
United Nations, good health ranked as the most important desire of
men and women around the world.32 Health brings the capacity for
personal development and economic security in the future and is the
basis for job productivity, the capacity to learn in school, and the
capability to grow intellectually, physically, and emotionally.33
Successful medical research also carries a vast amount of economic
value. An economic analysis of the potential gains from improvement
in health care estimates that reducing deaths from heart disease by
10% would generate approximately $5.1 trillion in economic value,
while reducing cancer death rates would be worth roughly $4.4
trillion.34 It is thus not surprising that the medical research industry is
one of the most lucrative industries in the world. In 2003, a Reuters
Business Insight Healthcare Report noted that the pharmaceutical
market was growing at an annual rate of approximately 8% and
estimated that it would be worth over $400 billion by 2005.35
Consequently, spending on medical research is ever increasing.
Globally, annual spending on medical research rose by an average of
US$4.6 billion a year during the 1990s to reach US$84.9 billion in
1998. It then rose much more steeply, by an average of US$7.0 billion
per year, during the next three years, reaching a total of US$105.9
31 In 1999, Gallup International sponsored and conducted a Millennium Survey of 57,000 adults in 60
countries, the world’s largest ever public opinion survey.
32 K A Annan, Millenium Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Chapter 2,
Globalisation and Governance, at 9 in “We the peoples” The Role of the United Nations in the 21st
Century United Nations 2000 available at http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ accessed August 17,
2010
33 Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, Macroeconomics and Health: Investing
in Health for Economic Development Chaired by J D Sachs Presented to Gro Harlem Brundtland,
Director-General of the World Health Organisation on 20 December 2001 available at
http://www.emro.who.int/cbi/pdf/CMHReportHQ.pdf accessed August 17, 2010
34 Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel, Measuring the Gains from Medical Research : An Economic
Approach (Chicago, Ill. ; London: University of Chicago Press, 2003) at 42
35D Jackson “The Pharmaceutical Market Outlook to 2010. – Essential Analysis of Key Drivers and
Change” Reuters Business Insight – Healthcare, Datamonitor PLC, 2003 at 21
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billion in 2001.36 In 2005, global investments in health research
amounted to US$ 160.3 billion.37 The pharmaceutical industry is the
biggest non-public health investor in medical research worldwide.38
Total research and development expenditures by pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies in 2002 reached almost US$50 billion.39
Clinical trials – human subject protection
The evolution of clinical research from intimate interactions between
physicians and patients at bedsides, to the activities of multi-national,
billion dollar enterprises that involve interactions between thousands
of different players the world over, has as discussed above, been to a
large extent a great success story. However, at some point during this
progression, there was a transformation of the relationship between
the physician/researcher and the patient/subject. At some point, the
research enterprise, or rather the way in which clinical research was
carried out, changed the way in which the public viewed the
physician/researcher, which in turn led to a proliferation of guidelines
and restrictions and the devising of mechanisms to circumscribe the
actions of physicians/researchers. Rothman40 places this transforming
event as occurring during World War II. He ascribes the
transformation to four factors: first, the establishment of co-ordinated
and extensive government funded research programmes; second,
experiments were no longer being carried out for the benefit of
subjects, but for others – specifically the soldiers engaged in war; third,
36 Global Forum for Health Research, Monitoring Financial Flows for Health Research 2004 at
http://www.globalforumhealth.org/filesupld/monitoring_financial_flows2/MFF04chap0.pdf
accessed 20 Jan 2006
37 Global Forum for Health Research, Monitoring Financial Flows for Health Research 2009,
Behind the Global Numbers at http://www.globalforumhealth.org/Media-
Publications/Publications/Monitoring-Financial-Flows-for-Health-Research-2009-Behind-the-
Global-Numbers at 136 accessed August 17, 2010
38 Ibid at 10
39 International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations, The Pharmaceutical
Innovation Platform, Sustaining Better Health for Patients Worldwide (IFPMA Oct 2004) at 17
40 D. J. Rothman, Strangers at the bedside: a history of how law and bioethics transformed
medical decision making, Second ed., (Hawthorne, NY 2003) at 30
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researchers and subjects were more often than not, strangers to each
other; and finally, consent was often superseded by a sense of urgency.
In the clinical trial environment, two main mechanisms were put into
place to protect human subjects who participate in these trials: ethics
review of trial protocols and the informed consent process. This thesis
examines whether the first of these mechanisms, the ethics review
process, as it is carried out today in Malaysia, provides meaningful
protection to mentally incompetent adults who participate in clinical
research trials.
This examination will be carried out by looking at three aspects of
ethics review: the underlying principles that guide the decision-making
process; the administrative and legislative structures under which
ethics committees operate; and the independence of these committees.
The hypothesis of this study if that the process of ethics review falls
short of its purpose to provide meaningful protection to research
subjects and even more so in respect of mentally incapacitated
patients.
Mentally Incapacitated Patients
Vulnerable populations
Certain populations are considered to be vulnerable and are thus
afforded special protections, above and beyond those available to the
general public. Even though there is no universally accepted definition
of a vulnerable population, there is little doubt that mentally
incapacitated persons fall within this category. While a detailed
dissection of the notion of vulnerability is beyond the scope of this
thesis, it is worth taking some time to consider the idea of what a
vulnerable population is, as this provides a valuable starting point for
constructing a framework for protecting mentally incapacitated
patients.
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Vulnerability and vulnerable populations have been described in a
number of ways. Vulnerable subjects have been defined as those who
are cognitively impaired or subject to intimidation.41 In a paper
commissioned by the American National Bioethics Advisory
Commission, Kipnis sets out what he describes as a ‘useful taxonomy
for the concept of vulnerability’.42 Six discrete types of vulnerability are
identified: cognitive, juridic, deferential, medical, allocational and
infrastructural; and the types of vulnerability are distinguished by
asking six specific questions.43 More controversially, according to
Levine et al.44 the current concept of vulnerability in the research
arena is both too broad and too narrow to be of any use. Instruments
such as the Declaration of Helsinki45 and CIOMS guidelines46 describe
what it means to be vulnerable in such an all-encompassing way, that
it is hard to imagine anyone not being vulnerable at some level. At the
same time, the authors note that identifying vulnerability by focusing
solely on group characteristics such as gender or age, ‘diverts attention
from features of the research itself, the institutional environment, or
the social and economic context that can put participants in harm’s
way’,47 and also stereotypes ‘whole categories of individuals, without
distinguishing between individuals in the group who indeed might
have special characteristics that need to be taken into account and
those who do not.’48
41 P Backlar ‘Human Subjects Research, Ethics, Research on Vulnerable Populations.’ in TH
Murray and MJ Mehlman (eds) Encyclopedia of Ethical, Legal, and Policy Issues in
Biotechnology, Volume 2, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000) at 641.
42 Kenneth Kipnis, "Vulnerability in Research Subjects: A Bioethical Taxonomy," in Ethical and
Policy Issues in Research Involving Human Participants (Bethesda MD: National Bioethics
Advisory Commission, 2001). at G4
43 Ibid. at G6
44 Carol Levine et al., "The Limitations Of "Vulnerability" As a Protection for Human Research
Participants," The American Journal of Bioethics 4, no. 3 (2004).
45 World Medical Association, "Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles Of Medical Research
Involving Human Subjects," (2004). Principle 8
46 (CIOMS) Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, "International Ethical
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects," (2002). Guideline 13
47 Levine et al., "The Limitations Of "Vulnerability" As a Protection for Human Research
Participants." at 46
48 Ibid at 47
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It is worth making two observations at this point. First, it seems that
when Levine et al. contend that vulnerability is defined in too broad a
manner, they have not picked up a flaw in the way vulnerability is
understood, they have in fact, discovered a truth about human subject
research. All research subjects are in some way vulnerable. They are
vulnerable because every research trial carries a certain level of risk.
Moreover, recognising the environment in which human subject
research is carried out today, it is almost impossible for any person to
be able to meaningfully review the foreseeable risks and adequacy of
protection or accurately assess the research process itself and its social
and economic context. It is for this very reason that the mechanisms of
human subject protection have been put into place.
Second, some research participants will be in more vulnerable
positions than others because they possess certain physical,
psychological or social characteristics that render them particularly
susceptible to intimidation or exploitation. It is generally these
populations that are referred to as being vulnerable. Examples of such
vulnerable populations would include the mentally incompetent,
children, prisoners, medical students, armed forces, women and
refugees. Although Levine is right to point out that the categorisation
of people based on membership of certain groups fails to recognise
diversity and individuality within the group, it is nevertheless
important to be aware of the fact that people who fall within such a
categorisation may be subject to abuse. There is undoubtedly some
value in recognising that some group-held characteristics make it more
likely that certain people might be treated badly and to require that
special attention be paid in such situations.
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However, at the end of the day, it is submitted that vulnerability is
really about unequal relationships49 and has been described most aptly
as being about powerlessness50 and the attendant loss of control that
ensues from it, and the potential for abuse and exploitation by more
powerful groups. History has borne witness to many instances where
the devalued vulnerable have served as unwitting subjects in research
benefiting "privileged members of society”.51 Therefore, a person is
vulnerable if he is in a situation where he is potentially subject to
abuse and exploitation by more powerful individuals or groups. The
roots of his vulnerability might be found in a number of places and
might range from an identification with or membership of a particular
group to his specific individual circumstances. By looking at
vulnerability in this way, the sources of vulnerability may exist at two
levels, at a group level and on an individual basis.
Adopting this approach to understanding what it means to be
vulnerable is useful in that it provides a helpful guide to devising
appropriate safeguards. Safeguards are determined by identifying the
root/roots52 of the vulnerability, considering if the vulnerability can be
removed or ameliorated and if not, how best to protect53 the vulnerable
population, bearing in mind that what may seem appropriate
safeguards for a particular cohort of vulnerable subjects may be
completely meaningless to another.54
49 The CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research identifies vulnerability
with a limited capacity or freedom to consent or decline to participate in research. It recognises the
unequal distribution of knowledge and power in the relationship between potential subjects and
investigators. See Ruth Macklin, "Bioethics, Vulnerability, and Protection," Bioethics 17, no. 5-6
(2003). at 474
50 B. Hoffmaster, "What Does Vulnerability Mean?," Hastings Center Report 36, no. 2 (2006). at
41
51 See Chapter 3 Section 3.2.1
52 This may vary depending on the population; it may be poverty, marginalisation or mental
incapacity.
53 Unlike a typical discussion on research ethics, the overarching value to be protected may not
necessarily be autonomy as the vulnerability of a population may arise from an inability to be
autonomous such as that found in very young children and some mentally ill.
54 Different populations suffer from different types of vulnerabilities. For a discussion about some
of the distinct problems faced by different vulnerable groups see Jason P. Lott, "Module Three:
Vulnerable/Special Participant Populations," Developing World Bioethics 5, no. 1 (2005).
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Therefore, applying this two-level approach, at the first and more
general level, there needs to be an identification of the specific factors
that render certain groups of people vulnerable. At a second and more
specific level, there should be an appreciation of the special position of
each individual subject in relation to the specific clinical trial being
proposed, and at the heart of this enquiry should be concern for the
protection and empowerment of the specific individual. This two-level
approach is also valuable as it recognises the inherent tension between
an administratively efficient system, which addresses the concerns of
all members of a population, and the need for securing a just result for
individuals within the population. It acknowledges the fact that while
a certain population is made up of individuals who share certain
characteristics, they nevertheless remain individuals within the
population with individual needs and interests. It is this
understanding of vulnerability that is employed in Chapter 3 in the
discussion of what it means to respect the dignity of mentally
incompetent patients.
Mentally incapacitated patients and clinical trials
If vulnerable populations are susceptible to exploitation, it may then be
argued that the most prudent course of action would be never to
include vulnerable populations in research trials so as to avoid any sort
of abuse at all. This is not a feasible option as this may lead to further
marginalisation. Refugees for instance, very often live in camps where
clean drinking water is in very short supply. Meaningful research into
managing hydration levels may require the participation of people
living in refugee camps. Refusing to allow any sort of research in this
area cannot be in the interest of refugee populations.
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Similarly, if treatment modalities are to be developed for people
suffering from conditions that lead to mental incapacity, research must
be carried out and at some point, clinical trials must be run before
treatments are made available to the public. Until these treatments
are tested on the very populations that suffer from the disorders that
affect capacity, there will be no reliable evidence concerning the
efficacy or the safety profiles of the treatments.
Disorders that affect capacity and that may render individuals unable
to make certain decisions for themselves mostly involve psychiatric or
neurological conditions. Dementia, delirium, schizophrenia, depression
and severe mental retardation are among the conditions that are most
commonly associated with impaired decision-making.55 Notably, these
conditions affect a significant proportion of society. In 2001, the World
Health Organisation recgonised that mental and behavioural disorders
were estimated to account for 12% of the global burden of disease and
that mental disorders represented four of the 10 leading causes of
disability worldwide.56 Moreover, the economic and social impact of
mental disorders is described as being ‘wide ranging, long lasting and
huge’.57 It is evident that these disorders, which are likely to impact on
decision-making abilities, are both prevalent and impact heavily on the
lives of individuals as well as society in general. There is in short, a
need to develop effective treatments for these disorders.
55 United States. National Bioethics Advisory Commission, "Research Involving Persons with
Mental Disorders That May Affect Decisionmaking Capacity, Volume II," (Rockville, Md. (6100
Executive Blvd., Suite 5B01, Rockville 20892-7508): National Bioethics Advisory Commission,
1998) at 1-2
56 WHO, "The World Health Report 2001: Mental Health: New Understanding. New Hope,"
(World Health Organisation, 2001) at 3
57 Ibid. at 7
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Unfortunately, notwithstanding the fact that calls58 have been made
for greater support for mental health research, there is still a great
imbalance in the amount of current research into mental health
disorders. A survey evaluating the relation between the global burden
of disease and conditions studied in randomised clinical trials
published in general medical journals found that only 2.44% of clinical
trials targeted mental disorders.59 Similarly, a search of the ISI Web of
Science database from 1992 – 2001, found that only 3.57% of health-
related publications were related to mental health.60 Taking into
consideration the current burden of mental disease, much more
research is needed to attain new knowledge and discover better ways to
treat and manage mental disorders.
Therefore, mentally incapacitated patients represent an important
cohort of research subjects. First, because at some point on the
research continuum, mentally incompetent patients will inevitably
need to participate in clinical trials if treatment modalities are to be
developed for their disorders. Second, the growing burden of disorders
that affect capacity coupled with recent pharmacological advances,
have created a greater demand for research into these disorders, which
will mean an increasing number of mentally incapacitated adults will
be invited to participate in clinical trials.
Objective, scope, outline of chapter, terminology and
research methodology
Objective of the research
The objective of this research is to analyse and evaluate the adequacy
of the ethics review process in providing an adequate level of protection
58Ibid. at 112, United States. Department of Health and Human Services, "Mental Health: A
Report of the Surgeon General.," (Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Center for Mental Health
Services, National Institutes of Health, National Institutes of Mental Health, 1999). at 453
59 Paula A. Rochon et al., "Relation between Randomized Controlled Trials Published in Leading
General Medical Journals and the Global Burden of Disease," CMAJ 170, no. 11 (2004).
60 Shekhar Saxena et al., "The 10/90 Divide in Mental Health Research: Trends over a 10-Year
Period," Br J Psychiatry 188, no. 1 (2006) at 81
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to mentally incapacitated adults who participate in clinical trials in
Malaysia, and to offer a framework for ethics decision-making in the
context of clinical trials. Even though the main focus of this thesis is
the Malaysian ethics review process, many of the comments and
discussions put forward in the following chapters are also very relevant
to the ethics review processes in other jurisdictions given the
international regulatory scheme that currently governs the conduct of
clinical trials in many parts of the world.
This thesis aims to achieve the above objective by evaluating three
aspects of the ethics review process. First, there is a consideration of
the underlying principles that inform medical research on human
subjects and whether or not ethics committee members are in fact able
to provide adequate protection to mentally incapacitated subjects by
engaging in meaningful ethical discussions during the review process.
Second, the thesis looks at the current regulatory framework under
which ethics committees operate and considers the adequacy of these
guidelines in protecting human subjects. Finally, this thesis considers
the notion of conflicts of interests in the clinical trials arena and calls
into question the independence of the ethics review process and how
this impacts on the interests of human subjects in general and
mentally incapacitated adults in particular.
Scope of the study and outline of the chapters
This study assesses the adequacy of the protection afforded by ethics
review committees to mentally incapacitated adults in clinical trials
and focuses on three main aspects of ethics review: the underlying
principles that inform ethics decision-making, the guidelines under
which ethics review is carried out, and the prevalence and influence of
conflicts of interests in the ethics review process.
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While this thesis raises some crucial questions and provides a taste of
what the answers to those questions might be, it is beyond the scope of
this thesis to explore fully all these issues. For example, much more
should and hopefully will be said in the future about the notion of
respecting human dignity as raised in Chapter 3. What this thesis does
seek to achieve is to argue convincingly that current ethical
frameworks and guidelines are not providing ethics committees with
the right tools and language to engage in meaningful discourses and
that there needs to be a new way of looking at the ethical basis of
research which is sufficiently rich to encompass the needs and
interests of diversity within communities; but which also at the same
time sets objective standards that hold persons accountable when
necessary. Another example is the very important observation made in
Chapter 5 about the impossibly compromised position of the
researcher/physician in the informed consent process and the complete
lack of recognition of the need for an independent informed consent
facilitator in these situations.
It is also not within the scope of this thesis to make detailed
recommendations relating to the weaknesses and insufficiencies
uncovered by the discussions in the earlier chapters. At the end of the
day, it is hoped that this thesis represents a first step in a journey
towards reshaping the philosophy and process of human subject
protection. To this end, much more empirical evidence will need to be
collected to understand how ethics committees function and how within
the political, economic and social realities of a developing country,
improvements can be made to the way in which ethics review is carried
out.
The following chapter, Chapter 2, provides an overview of the medical
research industry in Malaysia in general and the machinery of clinical
trials specifically. There is also a discussion of the Malaysian laws and
guidelines that govern the enrolment of mentally incapacitated adults
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into clinical trials. This sets the stage for the following three chapters,
which analyse three main aspects of the ethics review process.
Chapters 3 and 4 deal with how ethics committees make decisions and
whether or not they are able to engage in meaningful ethics
discussions, which have at their heart, the interests of mentally
incompetent patients. This is dealt with at two levels: first, by looking
at the big picture, the very basic ethical principles that have been
drawn up to provide for the protection of human subjects and
considering if they are effective guides, and second, by analysing a
specific guideline that is today considered the main document that
ethics committees need to comply with. Chapter 3 begins with an
examination of the current ethical guidelines and principles that are
meant to guide decision-making in medical research involving human
participants and contends that these guidelines and principles fail to
provide a workable and coherent framework for ethics committees.
Following this, by setting this discussion in the historical narrative of
research misconduct, it is demonstrated that the notion of the
undervaluation of human life lies at the heart of research misconduct
and that this understanding is crucial to the construction of a rational
and coherent ethical basis because it invites the question of what is the
appropriate value of human life, the answer to which is presented as
being respect for human dignity.
Chapter 4 then proceeds to look specifically at the ethics review
process, putting it in its historical context. The Chapter also closely
examines the document, which for all intents and purposes guides the
way in which ethics committees are set up and under which they
operate, namely the International Conference on Harmonisation of
Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for
Human Use’s Guideline for Good Clinical Practice E6 (R1). It argues
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that this guideline falls far short of providing ethics committees with a
framework for meaningful decision-making.
Chapter 5 considers the issue of the independence of ethics review
committees. Beginning with a brief discussion of the notion of what it
means to have a conflict of interest, it demonstrates the importance of
the notion of independent ethics review by considering both the
historical context and the impossibly compromised position of
physicians/researchers in the informed consent process. Finally it
demonstrates, how at a number of levels, ethics review committees
possess or at least appear to possess conflicts of interests.
Research Methodology
This thesis relies on both desk and empirical research. Materials were
obtained from libraries and the Internet. In-depth interviews were also
conducted with 8 members of Malaysian ethics committees to
understand how committee members see their roles as well as to get a
better understanding of how they make decisions. The interviews,
which on average lasted one hour, were taped and transcribed. Given
the dearth of published information regarding clinical trials in
Malaysia, informal interviews were also conducted with a number of
psychiatrists/researchers, including the Chief Psychiatrist of Malaysia,
Dr Suaran Singh61 to obtain an insight into how clinical trials are run
on a day-to-day basis. Discussions were also held with some senior
members of the civil service involved in the regulation of clinical trials
to obtain a better picture of the regulatory mechanisms.
Insofar as materials obtained from libraries and the Internet are
concerned, this thesis relies heavily on materials from the United
Kingdom and the United States of America. This is because as noted
61 The inteview with Doctor Suaran Singh elicited mainly factual information regarding psychiatric
trials in Malaysia.
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earlier, there is little, if any, Malaysian material. Apart from a few
government publications, there is an absence of relevant textbooks or
articles on the Malaysian position. Although there has been a heavy
reliance on materials from other jurisdictions, the fact is that clinical
trials are conducted under very similar guidelines across many
jurisdictions and the primary points of references such as international
guidelines and declarations apply equally in Malaysia as they would in
the United Kingdom as well as in the United States of America.
Consequently, many of the problems or issues faced in those
jurisdictions would also apply to the Malaysian position and vice versa.
Interviews with ethics committee members were considered vital as
the interviewees would have first hand experiences of the ethics review
process and would be able to provide accurate and vivid narratives of
their personal experiences. Selection of members from different
backgrounds was important, as this would allow for a variety of
perspectives, which would make for a richer, more nuanced, multi-
dimensional view of the ethics review process.
Therefore, the basis of selection of interviewees was their experience,
knowledge and the variety of perspectives that they bring to the topic.
Interviews were thus conducted with laypersons,
clinician/investigators and scientists. Interviewees were informed that
their identities would not be revealed but as the pool of ethics
committee members and investigators is a small one, interviewees
were alerted to the fact that their identities may be quite easily
discovered. They were told that transcripts of the interviews and
sections of the research that made reference to them individually could
be sent to them for comments before submission of the thesis,
especially if they seemed reluctant to talk freely for fear of being
misquoted or misunderstood.
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There are two types of ethics committees in Malaysia, the Medical
Research Ethics Committee (MREC), which reviews all applications to
carry out research at any Ministry of Health (MOH) facility or using
MOH resources; and ethics committees of academic institutions.
Interviews were carried out with several members from both types of
ethics committees. While letters asking for permission to interview
ethics committee members were sent out to most of the ethics
committees of academic institutions, only two positive responses were
obtained: one from a relatively new medical faculty, which has yet to
conduct any clinical trials in the areas of psychiatry or neurology; and
another, from University A. University A has a well established
medical faculty, with a proven track record in carrying out clinical
research trials. In particular, the department of psychological medicine
at University A has a very active research arm with five full time
research co-ordinators and claims to have no less than five
pharmaceutical related clinical trials being conducted at any one time.
So far, they claim to have been involved in over 45 clinical trials.
Moreover, University A’s medical school is recognised as a pioneer in
developing psychiatric services within the context of a general hospital
and the model from which subsequent university hospital psychiatric
services have been developed. Therefore, interviews were conducted
with members of the ethics committee at University A, who were
contactable and who agreed to be interviewed. The members
interviewed are from a variety of disciplines: two lay members, one
clinician-investigator and one scientist.
Various attempts were made to get permission to interview members of
the MREC, but most of these attempts were met with refusals or
silence. Given the fact that the MREC is a part of the Ministry of
Health, this is perhaps unsurprising as civil servants in Malaysia are
generally uneasy about releasing any information or discussing
government policy. As a result of this, it was not possible to arrange for
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interviews via the chairperson of the MREC. However, two members of
the MREC were approached personally and agreed to be interviewed.
One of them was the immediate past Chairperson of the MREC, who is
still a member of the committee and is a clinician/investigator. The
other person, who is also the Director of the Clinical Research Centre
of Malaysia was also in the past a clinician/investigator. Another
informal discussion was held with another member of the committee
who is also a senior civil servant, as he declined a formal taped
interview.
There are many different types of qualitative interviewing patterns
ranging from open-ended unstructured interviews that provide a
general flavour of the topic; to semi-structured/focused questions,
which are either suggested by the answers to the initial question or
when the researcher is interested in one core idea or specific piece of
information. The type of interviewing pattern also depends on the
subject of the approach. Using a two dimensional approach of breadth
of focus and subject of focus, Rubin & Rubin62 construct a table of the
variety of qualitative interviews patterns.
Narrowly
Focused Scope
In-Between Broadly
Focused Scope
Focused Mainly
on Meanings
and
Frameworks
Concept
clarification
Theory
Elaboration
Ethnographic
interpretation
In-Between Exit interview Oral histories
Organisational
culture
Life history
Focused Mainly
on Event and
Processes
Investigative
interviewing
Action research
Evaluation
research
Elaborated case
studies
The current study employed a mixture of open-ended unstructured
questions and semi-focused questions. The questions asked were meant
62 Rubin, Herbert J. and Rubin, Irene, S. 2005 Qualitative Interviewing: The art of hearing data,
2nd Edition, Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications at 5
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to generally guide conversational partners in an extended discussion to
elicit depth and detail. Unlike survey research, each conversation is
unique and the questions that are asked may vary depending on the
flow of conversations. The idea of the interview was to generate depth
of understanding rather than breadth. The aim of the questions was to
obtain the interviewer’s interpretations of their experiences and
understanding of the processes and as such, the interviewer had to be
aware of personal opinions, experiences and prejudices and be careful
not to allow it to colour the conversation.
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2 Chapter 2
The Malaysian Context
This chapter provides a brief snapshot of the context in which clinical
trials are run in Malaysia. The discussion in this chapter on the
environment in which clinical trials are run is meant to serve the
following purpose; to demonstrate how over the last twenty years, the
growth of biotechnology research in general and clinical trials
specifically, have come to represent an important source of revenue for
the government and how this has created a tension between creating
an environment that is attractive to the sponsors of international
clinical trials and ensuring that the rights and interests of subjects are
protected.
Medical Research in Malaysia – A Brief History
Early days
The Institute of Medical Research (IMR),63 Kuala Lumpur, established
in 1900 by the British as a Pathological Institute to study tropical
diseases64 is the oldest medical research centre in Malaysia. The
institute was meant to serve as a research outpost for the London
School of Tropical Medicine, established a year earlier in 1899.65 Early
research was limited to tropical diseases such as malaria, beri-beri,
dysentery and cholera.66
63 For further information see http://www.imr.gov.my/about/history.htm accessed August 17, 2010
64 See http://www.who.int/tdrold/publications/tdrnews/news64/imr.htm accessed August 17, 2010
for further details.
65 K. Ramanathan, Winnie C. Cheah, and Timothy J. Dondero, 75 Years of Medical Research in
Malaysia : 1901-1976, Rev. ed. (Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Medical Research, 1976) at 5
66 Since then, the IMR has extended the ambit of its research into areas such as immunology,
cancer research, herbal medicine and environmental health. Its research priorities are not
commercially driven and remain directly related to health problems faced by the country, and it
continues to excel in the management and treatment of tropical diseases. It is a WHO collaborating
centre on taxonomy and immunology of Filariasis and clinical trials of drugs against Brugian
Filariasis; ecology, taxonomy and control of vectors of Malaria, Filariasis and Dengue; and
training for the Lymphatic Filariasis Elimination Program.
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One of the earliest records of a clinical trial carried out in Malaysia is
found in the 1907 issue of the Lancet entitled, “Rice and beri-beri:
preliminary report on an experiment conducted in the Kuala Lumpur
Insane Asylum.”67 Owing to a high incidence of beri-beri in the KL
asylum, an experiment was carried out to determine if the cured
(Siamese) rice supplied to the patients was the cause of the disease.
Half the patients were provided with uncured (Indian) rice, while the
other half remained on cured rice. The results showed that 34 out of
120 patients fed on cured rice developed beri-beri out of which 18 died,
whilst there were no deaths among the 123 patients who dieted on
uncured rice, and that the only 2 cases that were reported, had been
suffering from the condition upon admission.68 The experiment
provided valuable insights into the causes of beri-beri, of which very
little was known about at that time. Interestingly, no mention was
made of the consent, willingness or even knowledge of the patients who
were entered into the experiment; the researchers only sought the
consent of the Government before starting the trial.
Apart from the primary research carried out by the IMR, the majority
of clinical research trials carried out in Malaysia until recently have
been Phase IV69 marketing studies. These Phase IV studies tended to
be “seeding trials”, which were largely funded and managed by local or
regional marketing offices of pharmaceutical companies, looking to
promote the use of recently registered drugs among local doctors.70
Running earlier phase clinical trials in developing countries was at
67 W Fletcher, "Rice and Beri-Beri: Preliminary Report on an Experiment Conducted in the Kuala
Lumpur Insane Asylum," Lancet 1 (1907).
68 Ibid at 1776
69 Clinical trials are run in a series of steps/phases where each phase is designed to answer a
specific question. The phases run from Phase I to Phase IV. A Phase I trial is carried out on a
small test population at an early stage of drug development to determine the safety profile of the
drug. This is followed by Phase II trial that is carried out on a larger cohort of people to further
evaluate the safety profiles of the drug. In Phase III, the trial drug is given to large groups of
people to confirm its effectiveness, monitor side effects, compare it to commonly used treatments,
and collect information that will allow the drug or treatment to be used safely. Phase IV is done
after the drug has been marketed to gather further information for marketing purposes.
70 C.C. Lang, "The Current Status of Clinical Trials in Malaysia," Drug Information Journal 32,
no. Oct-Dec 1998. at 1243S
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that time viewed as pointless, because in order to register drugs in
countries such as the US, Europe and Japan, drug developers needed
to rely on decisions made by the regulatory authorities in these
developed countries, 71 which only permitted the use of data generated
by trials in those countries. Big sponsors of clinical trials were
reluctant to fund clinical trials in small developing countries such as
Malaysia as the markets in these countries were too small to be of any
significant interest to them. Also, because the regulatory authorities in
developing countries themselves were relatively unsophisticated
compared to developed countries such as the US and Japan, they
tended to rely on the decisions made by the regulatory authorities in
the developed countries, particularly the American Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). Consequently, registration of drugs in these
markets tended to rely on FDA approval. This meant that it was vital
for new drugs to be approved by the relevant authorities in the US,
Europe and Japan.
Emergence of the local clinical trial industry
The position has changed dramatically over the last fifteen years with
a marked increase in the number of clinical trials run in Malaysia. In
1996, less than 10 trials were conducted in the country; whereas in
2008, 87 clinical trials were contracted to Malaysia, recruiting in 323
investigative sites, and targeting 5409 patients for enrolment.72
Malaysia is also emerging as a preferred destination for clinical
research in South East Asia. A report by Pacific Bridge Medical,73
describes Malaysia as a country where trials can be of ‘decent quality
and normally offer significantly lower costs than places like Taiwan,
Singapore and Hong Kong.’ Notably, the report remarks that Malaysia
71 Ibid. at1244S
72 Y. M. Ong, "Role of Crc in Promoting Malaysia to Industry," in National Conference for
Clinical Research, Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: 2009).
73 Report from Pacific Bridge Medical, a leading Asian medical consulting firm, published in
Speciality Pharma website http://www.specialtypharma.org/; Gross, A., Momoko H, Conducting
Clinical Trials in Asia
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is the most popular location for trials in Southeast Asia (not including
Singapore) as it has a relatively developed hospital infrastructure and
an advanced regulatory environment for drugs. In 2008, Malaysia was
ranked 16 out of the 50 most active Asian cities based on the total
number of study sites.74
In terms of the phases75 of clinical trials run in the country, there has
been a steady increase in the number of Phase II and Phase III trials.
In the year 2008, applications for Phase III trials accounted for 63% of
the total number of applications, with Phase II trials coming in second
highest with 29% of the total. This is in marked contrast with the
situation in 1996, where there were no applications for Phase I and
Phase II trials and Phase III trials accounted for less than a third of
the total number of applications.76 Clinical trials are primarily run in
the following therapeutic areas: cardiovascular medicine,
endocrinology, oncology, hepatology, infectious diseases, psychiatry and
paediatrics.77 Significantly, psychiatry ranked as the top therapeutic
area of research.78
The rapid expansion of the local clinical trial industry can be
attributed to two developments. First, there was a growing acceptance
by the FDA that its decision making process should make use of data
from properly carried out trials in foreign countries. Allowing the use
of data from foreign trials would serve several ends: it would
dramatically improve the statistical significance of the findings, as
74 J Karlberg, "Development of Sponsored Clinical Trials in Asia," Clinical Trial Magnifier 1, no.
5 (2008) at 82
75 See Note 7 for a description of the different types of phases of clinical trials.
76 ZH Zakaria, "Regulatory Aspects of Clinical Trials in Malaysia," ed. Ministry of Health
National Pharmaceutical Control Bureau. at
http://www.research.kk.usm.my/pages/enrich/notes/Talk%2005%20-
%20Regulations_and_Issues_of_Clinical_Trials_in_Malaysia_-_Zaril%20Harza.pdf accessed
August 17, 2010
77 PRA International, "Clinical Research in Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia," PRA
International, www.prainternational.com
78 Ong, "Role of CRC in Promoting Malaysia to Industry.", National Conference for Clinical
Research, Malaysia, 9 July 2009, Kuala Lumpur
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more subjects would be recruited; it would also shorten the timeline for
clinical testing as many more trials could be run concurrently; and
finally, such trials, if carried out in developing countries, would be
much cheaper to run. Following from this, in 1990,79 the regulatory
authorities for Europe, Japan and the United States initiated a ‘joint
regulatory/industry project to improve, through harmonisation, the
efficiency of the process for developing and registering new medicinal
products in Europe, Japan and the United States’,80 in the form of The
International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements
for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH). The ICH
publishes guidelines that meet regulatory requirements for drug
registration for the three jurisdictions, thus allowing for the running of
multi-centre, international clinical trials for a single research protocol.
The guidelines serve as a sort of quality control to ensure the integrity
of data generated by any trial run in any country. The ICH guidelines
are exhaustive and range from topics such as the clinical safety of
drugs to terminology in pharmacogenomics. The guideline that is of
specific relevance to the running of clinical trials is the ICH Good
Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline (ICH-GCP Guideline),81
which describes the responsibilities and expectations of all participants
in the conduct of clinical trials, including investigators, monitors,
sponsors and Institutional Review Boards. With the emergence of the
ICH guidelines, large pharmaceutical companies who sponsor the
majority of clinical trials were now able to rely on data obtained from
clinical trials run anywhere in the world when applying to register
their drugs in developed countries, as long as the trials adhere to the
ICH standards.
79 2nd ICH Steering Committee Meeting in Tokyo, 23-24 October 1990
80 History and Future of ICH at http://www.ich.org/cache/compo/276-254-1.html accessed on
August 17, 2010.
81 E6(R1): Good Clinical Practice : Consolidated Guideline at
http://www.ich.org/cache/compo/276-254-1.html (accessed August 21, 2007)
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Second, because of the creation of the ICH process, pharmaceutical
companies, which were looking at declining profit margins, became
increasingly drawn to running trials in developing countries. Every
year, Big Pharma82 spend US$14 billion on testing drugs on human
subjects.83 Nevertheless, these companies are facing huge losses as
investors begin to lose faith in their growth prospects.84 The growth of
generic firms, ending of patents on current drugs,85 and increasing
costs86 incurred in developing new treatments have impacted heavily
on the drug industry. The big money in pharmaceuticals lies in
patented drugs. The highest selling twenty drugs in the year 2000
generated sales of about US$100 billion, which was the equivalent of
fifty percent of the total sales of the top 500 drugs.87 Companies cannot
invest heavily in research and development and at the same time
expect to generate profits unless new drugs are developed and
introduced into the market before current patents lapse. It is estimated
that in order to maintain current levels of profitability, industry
leaders will have to launch between 24 to 34 new drugs per year.88
Therefore sponsors are constantly on the lookout for more cost efficient
means of developing drugs and an increasing number of clinical trials
are now run in developing countries. A review of 300 articles reporting
the results of clinical trials in the New England Journal of Medicine,
the Lancet, and the Journal of the American Medical Association, in
82 Big Pharma is a term that is used to describe the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies. The
top ten companies account for over 50% of global industry sales. See D. Jackson, "The
Pharmaceutical Market Outlook to 2010," in Reuters Business Insight - Healthcare, ed. Reuters
(Reuters, 2003). at 8
83 D. Smith Evans, M. and Wilen, D., "Big Pharma's Shameful Secret,"
http://www.bloomberg.com/specialreport/pharma.pdf.
84 An article in the Economist, cites a report by Accenture, which calculates that US$1 trillion of
future profitability has been wiped out because of lack of confidence on the part of investors.
"Billion Dollar Pills," The Economist, Jan 25 2007.
85 See Evans, "Big Pharma's Shameful Secret." Pharmaceutical companies that make 28 top-selling
drugs will lose a total of $50 billion in revenue as their patents expire from 2003 to 2008 according
to Norwalk, Conneticut-based market research firm BCC Inc.
86 It is estimated that the average cost of bringing a new drug to market in the United States is
about $500 million. Frank Davidoff et al., "Sponsorship, Authorship, and Accountability," Ann
Intern Med 135, no. 6 (2001) at 463
87 Jackson, "The Pharmaceutical Market Outlook to 2010." at 8
88 Karine Morin et al., "Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical Trials," JAMA
287, no. 1 (2002) at 78
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1995 and 2005, found that the number of trial sites outside the United
States had more than doubled, whereas the proportion of trials
conducted in the United States and Western Europe had decreased.89
Clinical trials in Asian countries such as Malaysia, for example, are
less expensive and less time-consuming than those carried out in
developed countries. Because clinical research costs are largely driven
by human labour, much of the cost difference is attributable to the
lower salaries paid to investigators, nurses and study co-ordinators.90
Also, patient recruitment in developing countries is reported to be
generally easier and faster.91 This is significant as recruitment
sometimes accounts for about half of the time required for the clinical
trial. Another important reason why clinical trials are moving to
developing countries is the increasingly bureaucratic and expensive
regulatory environment in many developed countries; developing
countries tend to have less complicated regulatory regimes, allowing
for faster approval times and place less burdens on investigators and
sponsors.92
Government support of clinical trial industry
Developing countries in turn, have eagerly embraced this development
and vie for the opportunity to conduct multinational trials in their
countries. Malaysia for instance has put into place policies and
programmes aimed at enticing sponsors to its shores. Among other
things, it advertises the country as being an ideal place to carry out
research owing to its pro-business government, political stability, cost-
effective base for business, excellent transportation and ICT
89 Glickman et al., "Ethical and Scientific Implications of the Globalization of Clinical Research,"
N Engl J Med 360, no. 8 (2009) at 816
90 Ibid. at 816
91 Report from Pacific Bridge Medical, a leading Asian medical consulting firm, published in
Speciality Pharma see http://www.specialtypharma.org/
92 Glickman et al., "Ethical and Scientific Implications of the Globalization of Clinical Research."
at 818, Asprey, D. "UK Government Asks Academy to Review Regulation of Research." BMJ 340
(2010): c1770.
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infrastructure, cost-competitive base of knowledge workers and its rich
diversity in flora, fauna and population.93
In 2005, the National Biotechnology Policy published by the Ministry of
Science, Technology and Innovation, set out a series of financial
incentives94 such as grants and tax allowances, in the hope of
‘attracting the best biotechnology ventures along the entire research
and industry value chain.’95 The policy among other things, establishes
the Malaysian Biotech Corporation (MBC) that is entrusted with co-
ordinating biotechnology initiatives from all relevant government
ministries and is intended to be a dedicated one-stop agency with the
main objective of developing the country’s biotechnology industry.96 In
relation to health care matters, the MBC works together with the
National Institutes of Health (NIH)97, which was set up in 1996 to set
research priorities and allocate research funding.98 There are seven
institutes99 under the NIH and each institute has its own major
research thrust, with the Network for Clinical Research Centres (CRC)
as the clinical research arm of the NIH. The CRC is the main clinical
research organisation in the country, with a network of 14 centres
around the country, providing a single point of contact to access all
Ministry of Health (MOH) hospitals and clinics nationwide’100. Apart
from the Ministry of Health facilities, clinical trials are also run by the
university hospitals. Private health care facilities as a rule do not carry
out clinical trials. Recognising that at present very little basic research
93 Ministry of Science Technology and Innovation Malaysia, "Bioetechnology for Wealth Creation
and Social Well Being. The Way Forward," ed. Technology and Innovation (MOSTI) Ministry of
Science (MOSTI, 2005). at 3
94 The full list of incentives can be viewed online at www.mosti.gov.my
95 Foreword by the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Datuk Seri Ahmad Badawi, in Ministry of Science
Technology and Innovation Malaysia, "Bioetechnology for Wealth Creation and Social Well
Being. The Way Forward." at 1
96 Ibid. at 7
97 Set up under the Ministry of Health (MOH)
98 See the National Institutes of Health website, http://www.nih.gov.my accessed 9 July 2007
99 Institute for Medical Research, Institute for Public Health, Network for Clinical Research
Centres, Institute for Health Management, Institute for Health Systems Research, Institute for
Health Promotion and National Institute for Natural Products, Vaccines and Biologicals.
100 See http://www.crc.gov.my/default.asp?page=/about_us/index accessed 26 August 2007
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on drug development is carried out in the country as it lacks the
financial and technical resources,101 the main aim of the policy
regarding clinical trials is to attract foreign investment. In a recent
press interview, the Director-General of Health was quoted as saying;
"I would like to see Malaysia position herself as the region's preferred
clinical trial destination in the not-too-distant future."102
Globalisation and the impact on human subject protection
The globalisation of clinical trials has been both a boon and a bane to
developing countries such as Malaysia. Malaysia clearly benefits from
the injection of money and technology into its health care system.
However, there are two broad areas of concern that stem from the
globalisation of clinical trials. First, there is the worry that because of
the wide disparities that exist between developed and developing
countries in respect of education, economic and social standing, and
health care provision; there is a real danger that governments and
companies of wealthy nations may exploit developing countries. Much
ink has been spilled on both sides of the debate and an in depth
discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.103 However,
some of the concerns raised in this regard go straight to the heart of
human subject protection. An example of this is the issue of placebo-
controlled trials. In a placebo-controlled trial, the efficacy of a new drug
is tested against a placebo. Such a trial is generally considered
unethical if there is a known effective treatment for that same
101 It is estimated that the average sum of US$800 million is spent to develop a single drug from
laboratory to marketplace. Economic Planning Unit Prime Minster's Department Malaysia, "Ninth
Malaysia Plan 2006-2010," ed. Prime Minister's Department (Economic Planning Unit Prime
Minster's Department Malaysia, 2006) at 414
102 T. T K Letchumy, Malaysia to position itself as region's clinical trial destination, Malay Mail, (Kuala
Lumpur 2 June, 2010)
103 A good discussion on the issue of exploitation and developing countries can be found in J S
Hawkins and E. Emanuel, eds., Exploitation and Developing Countries. The Ethics of Clinical
Research (Princeton: Princeton Universtiy Press, 2008).. Also see R Macklin, Double Standards in
Medical Research in Developing Countries (Cambridge University Press, 2004), Garrafa, V, JH
Solbakk, S Vidal, and C Lorenzo. "Between the Needy and the Greedy: The Quest for a Just and
Fair Ethics of Clinical Research." Journal of Medical Ethics 36, no. 8 (2010): 500.
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condition. It is unfair to offer subjects a placebo in place of an effective
treatment. However, under current ethics guidelines, placebo-
controlled trials are permitted where no current proven intervention
exists.104 This criterion usually obtains in developing and least
developed countries because the existing intellectual property market
regime of patent protection has meant that many developing countries,
including Malaysia are often105 unable to afford these proven
interventions as standard interventions. It is thus permissible to carry
out placebo-controlled trials in these countries. Therefore, subjects in
Malaysia may be submitted to a clinical trial that would be otherwise
considered unethical in U.K. Also, given the fact that clinical trials are
only run in government facilities and academic centres, the cohort of
patients tend to be drawn from the poorer sections of society. This
situation is exacerbated in clinical trials involving mentally
incapacitated persons. The worry is whether subjects drawn from
marginalised sections of society are being exploited. The process of
ethics review, if it is to mean anything, must be able to recognise and
take into account the specific concerns that are raised by Malaysia
being a developing country.106
The second concern is that because the Malaysian government wants
to become the venue of choice for the clinical trial industry, it may end
up compromising human subject protection in its pursuit of economic
prosperity. As is discussed in the following section, the clinical trial
industry for all intents and purposes regulates itself. The only
document that is used in practice to regulate clinical trials is the ICH-
GCP. There is no local legislation that provides for local standards and
104 Principle 31 World Medical Association, "Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects," (2008).
105 In 2002, the world drug market was valued at $406 billion, of which the developing world
accounted for only twenty percent British Commission on Intellectual Property, "Integrating
Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy," in Report of the Commission of Intellectual
Property (London: 2002). at 32
106 The issue of placebo-controlled trials in clinical research trials involving mentally incompetent
patients is discussed in more depth in Chapter 4 at 145-151
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scrutiny of trials. The establishment and terms of reference of ethics
review, is similarly based on ICH-GCP principles, which as discussed
in Chapter 4, does not have human subject protection as its underlying
philosophy. It is simply not in the interest of developing countries to
have complex, time-consuming and expensive processes. Ethics
committee review is carried out because it is mandated by the ICH-
GCP; but the issue of whether or not the review process does in fact
provide adequate protection to subjects by engaging in meaningful
discussion, is rarely addressed. In fact, several studies of the existence
and resources of ethics committees in developing countries in Africa
and South America have raised troubling questions about the lack of
training provided to members and composition of committees.107 To
date, there has been no similar research carried out in Malaysia, but
preliminary evidence from interviews conducted for this thesis reveals
a similar picture.
Regulation of clinical trials in Malaysia
Legislation
There is no law in Malaysia that specifically regulates the running of
clinical trials. The only relevant legislation is the Sale of Drugs Act
1952 and its corresponding Control of Drugs and Cosmetics
Regulations 1984, which regulate the importation and licensing of
drugs for clinical trials. The act and the regulation fall under the
purview of the National Pharmaceutical Board (NPB) of the Ministry of
Health.
The body entrusted with developing government policies for the clinical
trial industry is the National Committee for Clinical Research
107 C Perrey et al., "Ethical Issues in Medical Research in the Developing World: A Report on a
Meeting Organised by Foundation Merieux," Developing World Bioethics 9, no. 2 (2009). at 92
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(NCCR).108 There appears to be some interest in the NCCR for bringing
the clinical trial industry under some sort of regulation,109 but specific
information as to how this would be accomplished could not be
obtained because of the Official Secrets Act 1972.110 It is however quite
clear that the government does not have any immediate plans to create
a comprehensive piece of legislation to regulate clinical trials because
of the many objections of interested parties; any control mechanisms
are likely to be marginal and effected by extending the powers of the
NPB under the Sale of Drugs Act 1952.111 This light touch approach is
as noted earlier a hallmark of clinical trial regulation in developing
countries. It is telling that not one of the five terms of reference of the
NCCR mentions human subject protection, but all five are geared
towards expansion of the clinical trial industry. In fact, the final term
of reference of the committee is “to take pro-active action at all times112
in enhancing clinical research in Malaysia in tandem with the
development in developed nations”.
Guidelines
Although there is no legislation currently in place, in practice, clinical
trials are run in strict compliance with the ICH-GCP Guideline. The
reason for this is that all clinical trials are carried out in public
institutions113 that fall under the purview or influence of the Ministry
of Health, and specifically the NCCR.114 Apart from developing broad
government policies, the NCCR is also responsible for developing and
publishing guidelines for clinical trials. To date, the NCCR has
108 Established in 1997, The NCCR is a policy making body under the Ministry of Heatlh. For
more information see http://www.nccr.gov.my
109 Interview with Dr Kamaruzaman Shah, Head of Clinical Research and Compliance Centre,
National Pharmaceutical Control Board, Ministry of Health and also secretary to the NCCR on 2
March 2008
110 The Official Secrets Act 1972 restricts the dissemination of information classified as an official
secret. Draft legislation is habitually classified as falling under the Official Secrets Act 1972.
111 Interview with Professor Visweswaran Navaratnam, NCCR member, 22 November 2008
112 Author’s emphasis
113 Ministry of Health hospitals and university hospitals run by public universities.
114 For more information see, http://www.nccr.gov.my
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published a Malaysian version of the ICH-GCP Guideline and
Guidelines for Applications to Conduct Drug-Related Clinical Trials in
Malaysia.115 Although the guidelines do not have the force of law, all
public institutions or institutions that receive public funding, are
bound to abide by the guidelines issued by the NCCR.
ICH-GCP Guideline
The Malaysian ICH-GCP Guideline116 is almost identical to the
original ICH-GCP Guideline with very few minor amendments, which
are mostly concerned with administrative matters such as the
inclusion of local regulatory authorities in the glossary;117 allowing
institutions without ethics committees to make requests to the ethics
committee of the Ministry of Health or any of the University
committees;118 requiring that all investigators receive approved
training in Good Clinical Practice;119 and providing for thumbprints as
evidence of consent where a subject or legal representative is unable to
read.120 The only amendment of any significance is the inclusion of
para 4.8.10 (u) that requires investigators to inform subjects that the
source of the investigational product may be culturally unacceptable.
This was presumably added primarily for the benefit of Muslim
subjects as some trial products contain porcine material.121 All centres
currently conducting clinical trials in the country are bound by these
guidelines issued by the NCCR, which for all intents and purposes will
result in close compliance to the original ICH-GCP Guideline.
115 Guidelines for Application to Conduct Drug-Related Clinical Trials in Malaysia, 12 April
2007.
116 Malaysian Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice 2004, 2nd Edition.
117 Ibid.
118Ibid. Para 3.2.7
119 Ibid. Para 4.1.1
120 Ibid. Para 4.8.9
121 As a past member of the University of Malaya Medical Centre’s Ethics Committee, I observed
that concerns were only raised when investigational products had porcine material. It should be
borne in mind that Hindu or Buddhist subjects might have objected to products of bovine origin,
but these concerns were never dealt with.
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Special emphasis is placed on adherence to the ICH-GCP Guideline
because almost all drug trials carried out in the country, including the
current drive by the government towards the expansion of the clinical
trial enterprise, revolve around trials sponsored by multinational
pharmaceutical companies. It is vital to these organisations that
regulatory authorities in America and Europe accept the data
generated by these trials. To this end, compliance with ICH-GCP
standards is essential. An interesting point to note is that while the
Malaysian ICH-GCP Guideline requires that all investigators receive
approved GCP training; the current approved GCP workshops run by
the Ministry of Health examine investigators not on the Malaysian
version of the ICH-GCP, but rather on the original ICH-GCP
Guideline.
Guidelines for Applications to Conduct Drug-Related
Clinical Trials in Malaysia
The Guidelines for Applications to Conduct Drug-Related Clinical
Trials in Malaysia122 issued by the NCCR, require that prior to the
commencement of any clinical drug trial, approvals must be obtained
from research and ethics committees and the National Pharmaceutical
Control Bureau (NPCB).123 Parallel submissions of applications are
permitted and a recent industry report124 estimates that the process
takes approximately twelve to fourteen weeks. Research committees
scrutinise the protocols for scientific merit while the principal task of
ethics committees is to ‘ensure that proposals comply with
internationally accepted guidelines in the care and treatment of human
122 Guidelines for Application to Conduct Drug-Related Clinical Trials in Malaysia.
123 The NPCB is responsible for issuing import licences and permits for drugs used in clinical trials
under the Sale of Drugs Act 1952.
124 PRA International, "Clinical Research in Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia.". However, the
Director-General of Health in a recent interview with a local daily placed the average time taken
for approval at six weeks. See Star Online, "Clinical Trials in Malaysia," The Star Online, April 22
2007.
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subjects.’125 The specific responsibilities of the ethics committees is
found in the ICH-GCP Guideline which mentions that clinical trials
should be conducted in accordance with the ethical principles that have
their origin in the Declaration of Helsinki, and that are consistent with
GCP and the applicable regulatory requirement(s).126
Incapacitated subjects and clinical trials in Malaysia
Legislation
Malaysia has no specific law that regulates the participation of
mentally incapacitated subjects in clinical research, but some guidance
may be obtained from the laws that regulate decision-making for those
who are considered unable to provide consent because of immaturity or
infirmity. In the case of children, the parents or guardians of infants127
are given powers to make health decisions for them under Section 3 of
the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961,128 which stipulates that the
guardian of an infant shall be responsible for his ‘support, health and
education’. There is no further mention of what it means to have this
responsibility but it can be assumed that this empowers the guardian
to make decisions on behalf of the child in relation to among other
things, health care matters.
Mental Disorders Ordinance 1952
The answer as to who should be allowed to make health care decisions
for mentally incapacitated adults is much less clear. A perusal of the
Mental Disorders Ordinance 1952 (the Ordinance), which provides for
125 Section A, Guideline 2.3 in Guidelines for Application to Conduct Drug-Related Clinical
Trials in Malaysia.
126 Guideline 2.1 World Medical Association, "Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles For
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects.", Guideline 2.1 Malaysian Guidelines for Good
Clinical Practice 2004, 2nd Edition.
127 Interestingly, the Act recognises that a Muslim child attains majority at the age of 18 years,
whereas a non-Muslim child attains majority at the age of 21 years. Section 2(2) Guardianship of
Infants Act 1961 (Act 351).
128 Ibid.
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the care, reception and detention of persons of unsound mind does not
provide any ready answers. The Ordinance primarily concerns itself
only with matters concerning the reception and detention of persons in
mental hospitals and is silent on matters relating to proxy decision-
making. However, it is quite interesting to note that the Ordinance
provides the courts with the power to appoint a committee or
committees of the person and estate of a person129 following a
determination that such a person is mentally disordered.130 There is
unfortunately, no further mention of who should be appointed to this
committee or what the powers or duties of the committee might be. It
does however, seem to be the only provision in the Ordinance that
comes close to giving another person/group of persons some decision-
making power on behalf of the mentally disordered individual, and
therefore merits closer scrutiny.
The notion of appointing a committee of a person is derived from
archaic English mental health policy.131 This power was defined in the
early fourteenth century and originated from the prerogative
jurisdiction of the Crown, which was delegated to the Lord
Chancellor.132 An inquiry was held where upon a determination of an
appropriate degree of insanity, the care of the patient’s person would
be entrusted to a committee of the person. Unsworth133 describes this
sort of order as being a ‘pre-carceral134 mode of furnishing legal
provision for the insane’, which was property-driven rather than
person-oriented, and in practice was usually reserved for cases where
129 Section 10(1)Mental Disorders Ordinance 1952, Federation of Malaya.
130 A mentally disordered person is defined as any person ‘found by due course of law to be of
unsound mind and incapable of managing himself or his affairs’ Section 2 Ibid. The Court makes
this determination following a formal inquiry Section 8 Mental Disorders Ordinance 1952,
Federation of Malaya.
131 The Ordinance suffers from several weaknesses, one of which is the fact that it is painfully out
of date.
132 See Clive Unsworth, "Law and Lunacy in Psychiatry's 'Golden Age'," Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 13, no. 4 (1993) for a more detailed discussion.
133 Ibid. at 490
134 It provided a means for caring for mentally incapacitated patients in a time before the en masse
institutional detention. The power of psychiatry was at this time founded on the asylum.
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control over family wealth was at issue. With the arrival of the carceral
era, this jurisdiction was progressively marginalised and eventually
disappeared. Clearly, the order in its inception was never intended to
bestow proxy health care decision-making powers on the committee.
This would also suggest that as far as the Malaysian Ordinance is
concerned, the committee of the person should not be assumed to
possess proxy health care decision-making powers. Even if it were
possible to infer proxy decision-making powers into the appointment,
there are three further problems with the way in which these powers
would operate under the Ordinance. First, much like the early English
law,135 there is almost no control exercisable over committees and
while in England there was progressive law reform, which provided for
oversight of the committees, no similar regulatory structures exist in
Malaysia. A committee of the person appointed under the Ordinance
would thus have an unfettered discretion to make decisions for the
incapacitated individual.
Second, the Ordinance deals with the issue of incapacity as being
either universally present or absent. When the court judges an
individual to be mentally disordered, he is presumed to be universally
unable to manage himself or his affairs and the committee of the
person is entrusted with the management of all his personal affairs,136
which would presumably include health care decisions. This view of
incapacity is not in keeping with the current understanding of
incapacity, which is based on a functional approach,137 and would
result in giving the committee a very wide power over the
incapacitated individual.
135 Unsworth, "Law and Lunacy in Psychiatry's 'Golden Age'." at 490
136 The committee of the person is entrusted with the general care of the person and may among
other things, commit him to an asylum; fix his residence and select his physician. See G. Pitt-
Lewis, John Anthony Hawke, and Robert Percy M. D. Smith, The Insane and the Law (London: J.
& A. Churchill: London, 1895) at 91
137 The functional approach to capacity recognises that a person’s ability to make a decision is
determined in the context of a particular function or decision-making task.
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Third, and most importantly, this power only comes into play in limited
situations where the person is found to be not only mentally disordered
but is also considered a danger to himself or to others.138 Thus, it is
only of restricted application and cannot be used as a general tool for
proxy health care decision-making, much less deciding whether or not
to enrol someone in a clinical research trial.
Parens Patriae Jurisdiction
As discussed earlier, the Mental Disorders Ordinance 1952 is not able
to provide a satisfactory legal basis for adult proxy health care
decision-making. In the absence of any specific legislative provision,
the question arises as to whether the court’s inherent parens patriae
jurisdiction would extend to the care of mentally incompetent adults.
There is no local case law on this matter and therefore guidance may
be obtained from English common law. The English common law
relating to proxy decision making for incompetent adults, is found in
the case of Re F (Mental patient: sterilisation)139 where the court
declared that its ancient parens patriae jurisdiction originally vested in
the Lord Chancellor only survived in relation to children and no longer
existed in relation to adult persons of unsound minds with the coming
into force of Section 1 of the Mental Health Act 1959.
It is unclear whether or not this jurisdiction still exists as far as the
Malaysian courts are concerned. Section 3(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956
states that
138 Section 10(2) Mental Disorders Ordinance 1952, Federation of Malaya.”If the Court finds that
the person who is alleged to be mentally disordered is incapable of managing his affairs, but is not
dangerous to himself or to others, the Court may appoint a committee of his estate, without
appointing a committee of the person.”
139 [1990] 2 AC 1
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‘Save so far as other provision has been made or may hereafter
be made by any written law in force in Malaysia, the Court shall
-
(a) in West Malaysia or any part thereof, apply the common law
of England and the rules of equity as administered in
England on the 7th day of April 1956’
Assuming that the appointment of the committee of the person under
the Ordinance does not include proxy health care decision-making
power based on the reasons discussed earlier, then this would appear
to suggest that the appropriate position of the common law in Malaysia
is pre section 1 of the UK Mental Health Act 1959, which means that
the ancient prerogative jurisdiction remains. However, it is submitted
that this should not be the case. The reason why the Mental Health Act
1959 was considered by the court in Re F140 to be the point at which the
prerogative ceased to exist, was presumably because it was at that
point that decisions relating to the detention and treatment of
mentally ill persons were taken away from the judiciary and handed
over to an administrative process.141 Applying the same line of
reasoning to the situation in Malaysia, the enactment of the Mental
Disorders Ordinance 1952, which provided an administrative process
for the detention and treatment of mentally incapacitated adults,
should logically be the point at which the parens patriae jurisdiction of
the Malaysian courts in relation to incapacitated adults ceased to exist.
Common Law Doctrine
This then leaves the option of the position at common law as stated in
Re F, where the basis for making health care decisions for incompetent
adults lies under the common law doctrine of necessity and that the
doctor should act in the best interests of the patient. The application of
140 Ibid
141 For a brief account of the history of mental health, see
http://www.mind.org.uk/help/research_and_policy/the_history_of_mental_health_and_community
_care-key_dates accessed August 17, 2010
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this common law doctrine in cases of enrolling mentally incompetent
adults in clinical research trials is not without its problems. It is
difficult to see how one might argue that necessity demands that it is
in a patient’s best interests to be entered into a clinical trial. Much has
been written regarding what is called the ‘therapeutic misconception’
and the importance of not confusing research with treatment; and in
fact some argue that even the distinction between therapeutic and non-
therapeutic trials should be abandoned.142 Accordingly, the Belmont
Report has made clear that research and practice are mutually
exclusive and
‘that “practice” refers to interventions that are designed solely to
enhance the well-being of the individual patient or client and
that have a reasonable expectation of success. … By contrast,
the term “research” designates an activity designed to test a
hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn and thereby to
develop or contribute to generalisable knowledge.’143
No research trial, therapeutic or otherwise is ever designed solely to
enhance the well-being of a subject and it is never concerned with the
best interests of the individual patient. It is therefore impossible to
claim that based on necessity, is in the best interests of the mentally
incapacitated adult to enrol in a clinical trial.
The situation thus appears to be that there is no legally sanctioned
basis for enrolling mentally incapacitated adults into clinical trials.
Mental Health Act 2001
The state of the law will change once the Mental Health Act 2001(the
Act) comes into force. The Mental Health Act 2001 replaces the
142 See Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody, "A Critique of Clinical Equipoise: Therapeutic
Misconception in the Ethics of Clinical Trials," The Hastings Center Report 33, no. 3 (2003). for
an excellent analysis of the therapeutic misconception
143 National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, "The Belmont Report, Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human
Subjects Research," (Washington: Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1979) at 2-3
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existing Mental Disorders Ordinance 1952 and will be implemented
once regulations have been agreed upon. The long title of the Act notes
that it is an Act to consolidate the laws relating to mental disorder and
to provide for the admission, detention, lodging, care, treatment,
rehabilitation, control and protection of persons who are mentally
disordered144 and for related matters. The Act as a whole has not been
particularly well drafted and many of the provisions leave much to be
desired. Curiously enough, it retains the power of appointment of the
committee of the person,145 while at the same time, makes specific
provision for proxy health care decision making for mentally
incompetent patients. Which then begs the question, what are the
responsibilities of a committee of the person?
Significantly, section 77 provides for proxy consent to participation in
clinical trials. Section 77 (1) of the Act provides as follows:
Where a mentally disordered person is required to undergo
surgery, electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) or clinical trials,
consent for any of them may be given-
(a) by the patient himself if he is capable of giving consent
as assessed by a psychiatrist;
(b) by his guardian in the case of a minor or a relative in
the case of an adult, if the patient is incapable of
giving consent;
(c) by two psychiatrists, one of whom shall be the
attending psychiatrist, if there is no guardian or
relative of the patient available or traceable and the
patient himself is incapable of giving consent.
The determination of whether a person is capable of providing consent,
is provided for in section 77(5) as follows:
In determining whether or not a mentally disordered person is
capable of giving consent under paragraph (1)(a), the examining
144 Mental disorder here is defined as any mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of the
mind, psychiatric disorder or any other disorder or disability of the mind however acquired.
Section 2 Mental Health Act 2001 (Act 615), Malaysia. Unlike the earlier Ordinance where the
issue of a person being mentally disordered was a question of law and it necessarily followed that
such an individual was also incompetent, being mentally disordered in this Act does not inevitably
lead to a conclusion that a person is incompetent.
145 Ibid. at section 58
53
psychiatrist shall consider whether or not the person examined
understands –
(a) the condition for which the treatment is proposed;
(b) the nature and purpose of the treatment;
(c) the risks involved in not undergoing the treatment;
and
(d) whether or not his ability to consent is affected by his
condition.
Unfortunately, section 77 fails to provide any meaningful protection for
mentally incompetent adults enrolling in clinical trials for four main
reasons. First, the failure to recognise the difference between
treatment and research leaves mentally disordered persons in a very
unsafe position. There is a fundamental difference between medical
treatment and medical research. The main aim of treatment lies
always in the welfare of the individual patient whereas the ultimate
goal of research is to gain further knowledge about a particular disease
or condition. The decision to send a patient into surgery or for a course
of ECT is likely to be made because it is considered to the best option
based on the patient’s need for that specific intervention. Decisions to
enrol patients in clinical trials are based on exclusion and inclusion
criteria found in the trial protocols. The trial is not offered because it is
the best option for the individual patient, it is offered because, all
things being equal, it is as good an option as the standard available
therapy, with the added bonus of providing valuable data to the
investigators and sponsors. In addition, there is the added possibility
that third parties may have competing interests in the participation of
incompetent patients in clinical trials. Clinical trials should not be
equated with medical treatment; additional safeguards need to be put
in place. The section as it stands does not go far enough to protect
these persons.
Second, paras (1)(a) and (b) of Section 77 provide proxy decision-
makers with what appear to be unfettered decision-making powers.
There is no mention of the best interests of the mentally disordered
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person. In fact, there is no mention of his or her interests at all. There
is nothing in the Act that requires either the relatives or physicians of
persons declared incompetent to make any sort of enquiry regarding
the interests of that person. The only protection afforded to the
mentally disordered person is found in section 86, which renders it an
offence to ill-treat or wilfully neglect a patient. It is possible to make a
decision against the interests of a person, to fail to respect his human
dignity without ill-treating or wilfully neglecting him.
The third point to note is that giving ‘a relative’ such broad powers as
in para (1) (b) may not necessarily result in the best decision for the
mentally disordered person. ‘Relative’ is defined in the Act as applying
to any of the following persons of or above eighteen years of age: (a)
husband or wife; (b) son or daughter; (c) father or mother; (d) brother
or sister; (e) grandparent; (f) grandchild; (g) maternal or paternal uncle
or aunt; (h) nephew or niece.146 Relatives do not automatically know us
better than anyone else. The intimacy of a relationship is not
determined by kinship but rather by familiarity, friendship and
companionship. The more progressive view is that whenever possible,
to allow for the prior appointment of a health proxy decision-maker in
the event that an individual loses his or her capacity. Carers are also
increasingly being recognised as people whose interests are closely
connected to their wards and who should be consulted in any decision-
making process.
Finally, para (1) (c) appears to be flawed. It states that in the absence
of any relative, two psychiatrists, one of whom shall be the attending
psychiatrist, should give consent. Having regard to the fact that mental
disorder is defined in the Act as ‘any mental illness, arrested or
incomplete development of the mind, psychiatric disorder or any other
146 Ibid. Section 2
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disorder or disability of the mind however acquired’,147 not all mentally
disordered adults will be suffering from psychiatric illnesses. A patient
suffering from Alzheimer’s disease is unlikely to even have an
attending psychiatrist. If the basis for allowing doctors to make
decisions in such cases is that they are best placed to do so, having
regard to their medical knowledge, a psychiatrist cannot surely be in a
better position than the patient’s attending physician.
Guidelines
As discussed above, the law as it stands, provides little or no protection
to mentally incompetent adult patients enrolling in clinical trials. Even
when the Mental Health Act 2001 comes into force, the situation is
unlikely to improve. As mentioned earlier, in practice, clinical trials
are carried out in close compliance with the ICH-GCP Guideline; and
therefore the protections afforded in it are at present the only real
effective safeguards for trial subjects.
Research ethics approval148 and the requirement for informed
consent149 are the main routes for protecting human subjects under the
ICH-GCP Guideline. The guideline also stipulates that if a subject is
unable to provide informed consent, the consent of a legally acceptable
representative should be obtained.150 Legally acceptable representative
is defined as ‘an individual or juridical or other body authorised under
applicable law to consent, on behalf of a prospective subject to the
147 Ibid. Section 2
148 Section A, Guideline 1.2 Guidelines for Application to Conduct Drug-Related Clinical Trials in
Malaysia. , Guideline 3.1.1 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements
for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated
Guideline E6 (R1)," in ICH Harmonised Tripartite Guideline (1996) , principle 13, World
Medical Association, "Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles For Medical Research Involving
Human Subjects."
149 Guideline 2.9 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline
E6 (R1)." , Guidelines for Application to Conduct Drug-Related Clinical Trials in Malaysia.
150 Guideline 4.8.5 Malaysian Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice 2004, 2nd Edition.
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subject’s participation in the clinical trial.’151 In practice, investigators
enrolling mentally incompetent patients always obtain consent from
who they believe to be the ‘legally acceptable representative’. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that investigators commonly identify the next of kin
as being the appropriate legally acceptable representative. The earlier
review of the law152 would suggest that this is not so and that there is
in fact, no legally acceptable representative in the Malaysian
context.153
Ethics committee review
Ethics committee review as noted earlier, is a means of protecting
human subjects who take part in clinical trials. In order to appreciate
the way in which ethics review is carried out in Malaysia, it is
necessary to understand the historical context of the ethics review
process. A detailed account of the American experience is also provided
for two reasons. First, there are many invaluable lessons to be learnt
from the American experience. The American review system is
commonly regarded as one of the oldest formalised independent review
systems of research in the world and has been the subject of a great
deal of rigorous scrutiny, debate and reform for well over three
decades. This is particularly significant in the Malaysian context, as
the Malaysian government is moving towards developing its research
systems in the image of the American National Institutes of Health
(NIH).154 At the launch of the Malaysian NIH, the Minister of Health
pointed out that the Malaysian NIH was modelled on the US NIH and
that there would be close collaboration between the two agencies. In
151 Ibid. Guideline 1.42
152 See section 2.3.1.4 of this chapter on section 77 of the Mental Health Act 2001.
153 For a discussion of the impact this has had on how clinical trials are conducted see Chapter 5,
Section 5.4.3.2.1
154 The NIH, a part of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHSS), is the primary
Federal agency for conducting and supporting medical research in America
57
fact, he went so far as to say “I have instructed NIH Malaysia to
benchmark themselves against the NIH USA.”155
What is more, the influence of the American ethics review system goes
beyond that of merely providing good lessons to countries that might be
grappling with the limitations of their own systems. In matters
relating to clinical trials for the purposes of drug development and
registration, the American system stretches far beyond its shores. The
long arm of the American Federal Drug Authority (FDA) extends into
foreign jurisdictions, as it requires that contribution of non-US data to
the FDA must be conducted under FDA regulations.156 The impact of
this is highly significant on developing countries such as Malaysia
where a very sizeable proportion of clinical drug trials are
international multi-site trials that are sponsored by pharmaceutical
companies. These companies will undoubtedly be looking to submit
their data to the FDA for registration and marketing purposes, which
effectively means that most of the trials conducted in Malaysia will be
subject to US regulation and FDA inspections. These reasons warrant
a close consideration of the development of the US ethics review
system within the context of its legislative framework.
History of ethics review
The first formal expression of the principle that proposals for research
involving humans should be subject to prior independent peer review
can be traced back to the first revision of the Helsinki Declaration,
which was adopted by the World Medical Association (WMA) at its 29th
general assembly in Tokyo in 1975 (the Declaration). Principle 2 of the
1975 Declaration, stated that:
155 Speech by YB Dato’ Chua Jui Meng, Malaysian Minister of Health in conjunction with the
launch of the “National Institutes of Health (NIH)” at Institute of Health Management, Jalan
Bangsar, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 11 August 2003, 9:30 a.m.
156 21 CFR 312 Subpart B for foreign studies under an Investigational New Drug Application
(IND) or 21 CFR 312.120 for foreign studies not conducted under an IND
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The design and performance of each experimental procedure
involving human subjects should be transmitted to a specially
appointed independent committee for consideration, comment
and guidance.
In 2000, the fifth revision of the Declaration at the 52nd WMA general
assembly in Edinburgh, extended the role played by independent ethics
review. Independent review is now found in principle 13, which states
... This protocol should be submitted for consideration, comment,
guidance, and where appropriate, approval to a specially
appointed ethical review committee, which must be independent
of the investigator, the sponsor or any other kind of undue
influence. This independent committee should be in conformity
with the laws and regulations of the country in which the
research experiment is performed. The committee has the right
to monitor ongoing trials. The researcher has the obligation to
provide monitoring information to the committee, especially any
serious adverse events. The researcher should also submit to the
committee, for review, information regarding funding, sponsors,
institutional affiliations, other potential conflicts of interest and
incentives for subjects.
U.S. Experience
At about the same time that the WMA was asserting its view that
independent peer review was a necessary part of medical research on
humans, developments in the United States were also moving policy
makers in the same direction. In what is described by Levine157 as a
“highly emotionally charged atmosphere fuelled by public concern”,158
the American Congress in 1974,159 established the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and
Behavioral Research. After intense study and detailed review of
existing regulations, the commission published a set of reports and
recommendations. These reports formed the basis for the creation of a
157 Robert J. Levine and Louis Lasagna, "Demystifying Central Review Boards: Current Options
and Future Directions: A Summary Report of Outcomes From "Central Irb Review of Multi-Site
Trials," 27-28 October 1998," IRB: Ethics and Human Research 22, no. 6 (2000). at 5
158 This concern was based on the many troubling reports about the abuse of research subjects and
notably the article written by Henry Beecher in 1966. H. K. Beecher, "Ethics and Clinical
Research," New England Journal of Medicine 274, no. 24 (1966).
159 Pub. Law 93-348, The National Research Act (1974)
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series of federal regulations under the aegis of the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS)160 and Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)161 that today govern the operation of the
thousands of university and hospital institutional review boards that
must review and approve research.162
The most significant of these regulations is the Federal Policy for the
Protection of Human Subjects (the Policy) promulgated in 1974 by the
DHSS at Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), part 46.
Under this Title 45, the DHSS set out regulations aimed at protecting
the rights of people enrolled in research. In 1991 this sphere of federal
protection was extended to apply to a much broader range of research
activities as the Policy was adopted by 16 federal agencies,163 and has
since become generally known as the “Common Rule”.
The approach taken by the US government in its development of the
Common Rule was to create a highly regulated environment within
which, the primary mechanism for delivering protection of human
subjects was by way of independent review of research. Independent
review was set up to address what was then recognised as the inherent
conflict between the subject’s interest and the researcher’s quest for
new information,164 as “investigators should not have sole
responsibility for determining whether research involving human
subjects fulfils ethical standards. Others who are independent of the
research must share this responsibility because investigators are
160 Department of Health and Human Services Rules and Regulations 45 CFR 46
161 Food and Drug Administration Rules and Regulations 21 CFR 50, 56
162 Levine and Lasagna, "Demystifying Central Review Boards: Current Options and Future
Directions: A Summary Report of Outcomes From "Central Irb Review of Multi-Site Trials," 27-
28 October 1998." at pg 5
163 United States Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, Department of Commerce, Consumer Product Safety Commission,
International Drug Development Cooperation Agency, Agency for International Development,
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Justice, Department of Defense,
Department of Education, Department of Veteran Affairs, Environmental Protection Agency,
National Science Foundation, Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of
Transportation.
164 John A. Robertson, "The Law of Institutional Review Boards," UCLA L. Rev 26 (1978-1979).
at 487
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always in positions of potential conflict by virtue of their concern with
the pursuit of knowledge as well as the welfare of the human subjects
of their research.”165
The Common Rule provides for independent ethics review of research
by way of the Institutional Review Board (IRB). IRBs are charged with
reviewing all research protocols that are covered by the Common
Rule,166 before the research begins, as well as conducting continuous
review of ongoing research at intervals appropriate to the degree of
risk, but not less than once a year.167 IRB membership is regulated168
to the extent that there must be at least five members with varying
backgrounds; at least one scientific and one non-scientific member; at
least one member who is not affiliated with the institution; and a
membership diverse in race, gender and cultural backgrounds who are
sensitive to issues such as community attitudes.
When reviewing research, an IRB is required by the Common Rule169
to ensure that the following requirements are satisfied: that the
research design is sound; the risk-benefit ratio is reasonable; subjects
are selected in an equitable manner; informed consent is obtained and
appropriately documented and that additional safeguards have been
included in studies involving vulnerable populations.
Vulnerable populations are described in the Common Rule as including
children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled persons or
economically or educationally disadvantaged persons.170 An IRB
reviewing research that may involve vulnerable populations is
165 National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, "Institutional Review Boards: Reports and Recommendations," ed. DHEW (Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978).
166 The Common Rule applies to “all research conducted, supported or otherwise subject to
regulation by any federal department or agency, which takes appropriate administrative action to
make the policy applicable to such research.” 45 CFR 46.101(a)
167 45 CFR 46.109(e)
168 45 CFR 46.107
169 45 CFR 46.111(a)
170 45 CFR 46.113(3)
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generally required to ensure that additional safeguards have been
included in the study to protect the rights and welfare of these
subjects.171 In particular, an IRB is required to pay special attention to
ensure that the selection of subjects is equitable by taking into account
the purposes of the research and the setting in which the research will
be conducted.172 Moreover, an IRB that regularly reviews research
involving vulnerable populations is obligated to consider including on
its committee, one or more individuals who are knowledgeable about
and experienced in working with these subjects.173
In addition to these general rules relating to vulnerable populations,
there are specific regulations governing research on pregnant women,
prisoners and children.174 Surprisingly, there are no such specific
regulations relating to research involving mentally incompetent
persons. Concern for this cohort led to the 1998 publication of a
National Bioethics Commission Advisory report, “Research involving
persons with mental disorders that may affect decisionmaking
capacity,”175 which included twenty-one recommendations regarding
additional protections for this group of subjects. It is noteworthy that
none of the recommendations in this excellent report have ever been
incorporated into the Common Rule as notwithstanding the general
support of researchers, they feared that the protective spirit of the
recommendations would result in stringent regulations that would
slow down or even curtail potentially important research.
Ultimately, the responsibility for ensuring compliance with these
regulations falls on the shoulders of an institution carrying out
171 45 CFR 46.111(b)
172 45 CFR 46.113(3)
173 45 CFR 46.107(a)
174 Subparts B, C and D of 45 CFR 46
175 United States. National Bioethics Advisory Commission., "Research Involving Persons with
Mental Disorders That May Affect Decisionmaking Capacity, Volume I," (Rockville, Md. (6100
Executive Blvd., Suite 5B01, Rockville 20892-7508): National Bioethics Advisory Commission,
1998).
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research and not on individual investigators. The Common Rule
achieves this by requiring all institutions engaged in research covered
by it to provide written assurances to the Office for Human Research
Protections (OHRP) that they will comply with its requirements176 as
well as the Terms of the Assurance.177 The only type of assurance
currently accepted and approved by the OHRP is the Federalwide
Assurance (FWA), which as the name suggests may also be relied on by
other federal agencies and departments that have adopted the
Common Rule. As part of the assurance, institutions are required to
provide178 (i) a statement of principles governing the institution in the
discharge of its responsibilities for protecting the rights and welfare of
human subjects; (ii) the designation of one or more IRBs179 that will
review the research covered by the FWA (If an institution does not
have an IRB, it has the option to negotiate an agreement with an
external IRB; establish an IRB; or negotiate an agreement with a
commercial or independent IRB.); (iii) a list of IRB members identified
by name; earned degrees; representative capacity; indications of
experience; and any employment or other relationship between each
member and the institution; (iv) written procedures which the IRB will
follow; and (v) written procedures for ensuring prompt reporting to the
IRB. An FWA is only effective for a period of three years and must be
renewed at the end of that period of time to remain effective. Although
institutions are only mandated to provide assurances for research
supported by federal funds, they are permitted to voluntarily extend
the assurance to cover all human subject research regardless of the
source of support and most institutions have done so.180
176 45 CFR 46.103
177 The Terms of Assurance can be found on the United States Department of Health and Human
Services website at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/assurance/filasurt.htm (accessed
March 15, 2008)
178 45 CFR 46.103
179 Each IRB must be registered with the OHRP before the FWA can be approved. See
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/IRBfaq.html (accessed March 15, 2008).
180 Levine and Lasagna, "Demystifying Central Review Boards: Current Options and Future
Directions: A Summary Report of Outcomes From "Central Irb Review of Multi-Site Trials," 27-
28 October 1998." at 6
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In addition to the Common Rule, clinical drug trials, which are
regulated by the FDA,181 must also comply with FDA regulations.182
Part 312.66 issued by the FDA, requires investigators to assure that a
properly constituted IRB183 is responsible for initial and continuing
review and approval of a clinical trial. This means that where clinical
drug trials are concerned, the duty to ensure IRB review falls not only
on the institution carrying out research184 as required under the
Common Rule, but also on the individual investigators as provided by
the FDA regulations.
Ethics Review in Malaysia
It was apparent since the early 1990s that if the Malaysian health care
research institutions were to benefit from the development of
harmonised standards that allowed for the outsourcing of clinical
trials, they would need to have, among other things, ethics review
systems in place. Thus, the Malaysian system of ethics committee
review was conceived and continues to develop in accordance with the
ICH-GCP Guideline,185 which requires independent ethics review of
protocols by Independent Ethics Committees or Institutional Review
Boards.186 As an expression of the commitment of the government to
the ICH-GCP process, in 1999, the Ministry of Health (MOH)
published the Malaysian version of the ICH-GCP Guideline. The
sections187 describing the responsibilities; composition, functions and
operations; procedures and records of Institutional Review Boards in
181 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ss 505(i) & 520(g)
182 Title 21 CFR
183 As provided for in 21 CFR 56
184 By way of providing an FWA.
185 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1)."
186 While these terms are defined separately in the glossary: Guideline 1.27 describes an
Independent Ethics Committee, and 1.31 describes the Institutional Review Board, they are used
interchangeably in the rest of the document and are subject to the same responsibilities, functions
and procedures.
187 Malaysian Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice 2004, 2nd Edition. Guidelines 3.1-3.4
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the Malaysian guidelines mirror those found in the original ICH-GCP
Guideline.188
In the same year, the Ministry released the Guidelines for Applications
to Conduct Drug-Related Trials in Malaysia,189 aimed at providing
useful practical information to the pharmaceutical industry, sponsors
and investigators. The guidelines describe the processes that need to be
adhered to before a clinical drug trial may commence, including the
requirement of ethics committee approval. Information is provided
about the different ethics committees: contact details, workflow charts
and average time taken for approval of protocols. The document reads
more like an information leaflet as opposed to a set of norm prescribing
guidelines as it is neither a standards framework nor does it set out
any principles of good research. What it does do is spell out for the first
time in an official publication, the existing structure of the ethics
committee review system in the country.
Clinical trials in the country are run in two types of settings: Ministry
of Health facilities; and universities or the private sector. As such,
there are two corresponding types of ethics committees. The first, the
Medical Research Ethics Committee (MREC), has the authority to
review all health research conducted by MOH researchers and non-
MOH researchers utilising facilities and resources of the MOH.190 An
application to conduct a multi-site trial in MOH facilities only requires
the submission of a single application to the MREC, provided that all
the investigators involved and all relevant directors of the institutions
sign the application. However, an MREC approval for a multi-site trial
188 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1)."
Guidelines 3.1-3.4
189 Guidelines for Application to Conduct Drug-Related Clinical Trials in Malaysia.
190 The remit of the MREC was reiterated in the NIH Guidelines for Conducting Research in the
Ministry of Health (Moh) Institutions and Facilities 2007, 3 February 2008.in policy no 2, which
also requires that all submissions to the MREC for ethics review be conducted online at
www.nmmr.gov.my
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will not extend to any research conducted in universities or the private
sector unless the said institution does not have an ethics committee.
The second type of ethics committee is the university/private
institution ethics committee. Currently, all the ethics committees191 in
this category are affiliated with universities with the exception of the
National Heart Institute.192 There are no ethics committees operating
in private healthcare facilities. These committees can be likened to the
American IRBs in that their remit is limited to their institutional
affiliation although they are permitted to review protocols from centres
that have no ethics committee. Such instances are rare as ethics
committees of universities and private institutions are very reluctant
to take on the heavy burden of reviewing and monitoring clinical trials
conducted in other centres and these sorts of applications, if any, are
usually made to the MREC.
Notwithstanding the absence of legislation, there is close compliance
with the standards set up in the ICH-GCPs. There are two main
reasons for this. First, the guidelines contained in both the Malaysian
ICH-GCP Guideline and the Guidelines for Applications to Conduct
Drug-Related Trials in Malaysia are binding on all MOH institutions
and institutions that receive funding or fall under the influence of the
MOH, which include the universities. At the present time, all clinical
trials running in the country are run in these institutions that are
obliged to comply with the guidelines. Second and perhaps more
importantly, as this would apply universally to all research centres
throughout the country, the pharmaceutical industry, which is
presently the biggest sponsor of clinical trials, has a vital interest in
191 University of Malaya, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia,
International Islamic University Malaysia, National Heart Institute, and Universiti Malaysia
Sarawak.
192 The National Heart Institute was initially part of the Ministry of Health, but was corporatised
by the state in 1992 when the Ministry of Finance bought it. It is now run as a semi-private
institution.
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ensuring that ICH-GCP standards are met. Sponsors run international
multi-site clinical trials with the main aim of generating statistically
significant data to support their applications to regulatory authorities
for research or marketing permits193 for their products. The largest
drug regulatory authority in the world, the FDA clearly states194 that it
“may decide not to consider in support of an application for a research
or marketing permit any data or information that has been derived
from a clinical investigation that has not been approved by, and that
was not subject to initial and continuing review, by an IRB…” No
sponsor would even consider running a trial without prior ethics
committee review in spite of the absence of any legal compulsion.
Ethics committee review is thus firmly established in the Malaysian
context. However, if ethics review is to fulfil its purpose as a
mechanism for human subject protection, the enquiry that needs to be
made is not whether the process has been put into place or
institutionalised, but whether or not the deliberations and decisions
made during the course of ethics review, as well as the way in which
the committees are constituted, do in fact provide meaningful
protection to mentally incapacitated adults. The rest of the thesis will
take up this enquiry. The next chapter concerns itself with the big
picture by reflecting on the fundamental ethical principles that are
meant to guide decision-making in medical research.
193 For purposes of this thesis the definition of an application for research or marketing permit is
as provided by 21 CFR 50.3(b)(6)-(10), which includes new drug applications; investigational new
drug applications; requests relating to bioavailability and bioequivalence data; and data submitted
as part of drug classification.
194 21 CFR 56.103 (b)
67
3 Chapter 3
Ethics committee review and the ethics of clinical research
Whether or not ethics committees are effective protectors of the rights
of human subjects will depend largely on the quality of their
discussions. To engage in meaningful deliberations, they must
understand the task set before them as well as posses the tools to carry
out their mandate. To begin with, ethics committees need to be
equipped with knowledge of, and the ability to engage in, rigorous
ethical discourse. Ethics guidelines are meant to serve this purpose.
There is some evidence that ethics committee members who are key
players in the protection of human subjects in the clinical trial process
do not or are not able to use ethics guidelines effectively in their
decision making.195 Apart from the chairperson of the MREC and the
director of the CRC, none of the persons interviewed had heard of or
read the Nuremberg Code, the Belmont Report, the ICH-GCP
Guideline or any other guideline apart from the Helsinki Declaration.
Even though the majority of ethics committee members interviewed
were able to cite the Helsinki Declaration as being the basis of ethical
guidelines in medical research, none of them were able to articulate
any of the principles contained within nor had any of them received
any formal training in understanding or applying the principles
contained in the declaration. One of the lay members described how
she came upon the Helsinki declaration.
Because before I first went to the meeting, I said, ethics,
something has got to be there, so I just got on the internet, put
on medical ethics and then found that Helsinki appears… later
on I knew I was on the right track because the [chairperson]
mentioned it.196
195 As noted earlier, the two main mechanisms that exist to protect human subjects are ethics
committee review and the informed consent process.
196 Interview with Ethics Committee Member A, Institution A, 30 June 2008
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The other lay member recalled reading the declaration but had no
recollection of it and added thoughtfully, “yah, probably I should have
looked into that more carefully.”197 One ethics committee member who
is also a physician/researcher when asked about the principles found in
the Helsinki Declaration said,
I think once it is embraced as part of your professional
guidelines it’s got no impact because you’re living within those
rules and guidelines and I really haven’t thought much about
it.198
In fact, these ethics committee members do not even appear to have a
meaningful understanding of the length and breadth of their roles as
protectors of the rights and interests of human subjects. Even as they
recognised that their roles were to protect the interests of human
subjects, their understanding of what this meant in practice seemed
rather limited. The responses ranged from ones based on well-
intentioned unawareness to hardened cynicism, neither of which bode
well for the ethics review process. One of the lay members said that
when looking at protocols, she was generally concerned with the
patient’s discomfort and whether or not taking part in the trial would
incur additional costs to the patient; on a more troubling note, the
same person was of the opinion that the main responsibility of the
ethics committee was to ensure that the research carried out was
scientifically valid.199 Another lay member recognised that her role was
to look out for the interests of the patients but saw that mainly as
making sure that
Patients are not getting any less than what they should be
getting normally… if there is anything more they should not pay
for it. Even if it benefits them, they should not pay for it.200
The response from a senior member of the Ministry of Health, who sits
on the MREC, was a cynical,
197 Interview with Ethics Committee Member B, Institution A, 21 December 2007
198 Interview with Ethics Committee Member C, Institution A, 28 June 2008
199 Interview with Ethics Committee Member A, Institution A, 30 June 2008
200 Interview with Ethics Committee Member B, Institution A, 21 December 2007
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It is all there in the GCP … you know the party line again is
protection of human research subjects. … I am telling you the
party line if that is what I do or how I actually behave in ethics
committee, I don’t know (laughs).
It was unclear whether he was being light hearted or genuinely
cynical.
A considerable part of the problem is the lack of training provided to
ethics committee members, a point that was raised by every person
interviewed. Unlike investigators, who must be GCP certified before
they can run clinical trials, ethics committee members are not required
to undergo any formal training.201 People are expected to learn on the
job and according to a senior member of the MREC,
People who are freshly appointed … will be guided by senior
members of the committee. That is how most ethics committees
learn, at least in this country, where it is still fairly informal.
Only one person interviewed recalled being given any specific training
after joining the committee and could only recall being taught the
different phases of a drug trial and “some guidelines, I can’t remember
exactly”.202 Ethics committee members are thus unlikely to be engaging
in meaningful review because they are not adequately trained and they
do not have the tools they need to construct a meaningful discourse. As
is argued below, the tools that are currently on offer are inadequate;
they are confusing, unclear and contradictory. A new paradigm is
needed.
The next section makes the argument that the current ethical
frameworks that exist in the research arena today fail to provide
coherent and workable frameworks for decision-makers. Beginning
with a consideration of the history of research misconduct and the
201 Interestingly, even in the UK where is an expectation that ethics committee members attend a
certain amount of training, there is no centralised training or national or uniformed curriculum. It
is up to the NHS authority to arrange for training. Telephone interview with David Neal, Deputy
Director and Head of Policy, National Research Ethics Service. 19 March 2008, 4pm.
202 Interview with Ethics Committee Member B, Insitution A, 28 May 2008
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subsequent articulations of three of the most influential guidelines and
the problems with these guidelines, the proposition is made that the
main failure of these guidelines is that they fail individually and as a
whole to recognise that the underlying problem is that of undervaluing
human life. Following from this, there is a short discussion of how and
what it means to undervalue life and finally, offers a solution as being
the idea of respecting human dignity.
History of clinical research misconduct
It is difficult to arrange and structure the history of clinical research
misconduct as a consistent and coherent analytical narrative as the
case studies recorded in the literature are not easily reconciled.
Historians have approached this task in a number of ways such as
framing the narrative as a reflection of the secularisation of society;
placing it in the context of the history of informed consent; and telling
the story in relation to the involvement of the State.203 Each one trying
to make sense of why certain groups of people treated other people,
who were often in no position to protect themselves, very badly; and by
providing these insights, hopefully ensuring such misconduct would
never recur. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to delve into the
murky depths of the history of research misconduct, it is possible to
identify a select number of high profile exposés that ultimately led to
the development of three very influential ethical guidelines that are
discussed in the following section.
World War II Human Experiments and the Nuremberg Code
Nazi Experiments
The atrocities carried out by German physicians and administrators
during World War II shocked the world. On December 9, 1946, twenty-
three German physicians and administrators were indicted for war
203 See J. Goodman, A. McElligott and L. Marks, Useful Bodies: Humans in the Service of
Medical Science in the Twentieth Century, (Baltimore 2003), Chapter One
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crimes and crimes against humanity before an American Military
Tribunal in Nuremberg, commonly referred to as the Nuremberg
Medical Trial.204 They were accused of murders, tortures, and other
atrocities committed in the name of medical science. The experiments
included but were not limited to high-altitude experiments; freezing
experiments; malaria experiments; lost (mustard) gas experiments;
sulphanilamide experiments; bone, muscle, and nerve regeneration and
bone transplantation experiments; sea-water experiments; epidemic
jaundice experiments; sterilization experiments; spotted fever
(fleckfieber) experiments; experiments with poison and incendiary
bomb experiments.205
The victims of these crimes were numbered in the hundreds of
thousands. In the opening statement of the prosecution, Brigadier
General Telford Taylor noted, 206
“… most of these miserable victims were slaughtered outright or
died in the course of the tortures to which they were subjected.
For the most part they are nameless dead. To their murderers,
these wretched people were not individuals at all. They came in
wholesale lots and were treated worse than animals. They were
200 Jews in good physical condition, 50 gypsies, 500 tubercular
Poles, or 1,000 Russians. The victims of these crimes are
numbered among the anonymous millions who met death at the
hands of the Nazis and whose fate is a hideous blot on the page
of modern history.”
The defendants tried to convince the judges that their experiments had
not violated conventional standards for medical experimentation on
human subjects, and that the extraordinarily cruel treatment of the
subjects was not as much a sign of individual human failure as it was a
testimony to the brutalising effect of the war. It was also argued,
204 See The Nuremberg Medical Trial, The Holocaust and the Origin of the Nuremberg Medical
Code, Horst H. Freyhofer, Peter Lang Publishing, New York, 2004.
205 Ibid. The most famous examples of these experiments are the twin studies conducted by Dr Josef
Mengele, one of the most notorious Nazi physicians. See Matalon Lagnado, Lucette, and Sheila Cohn
Dekel. Children of the Flames: Dr. Josef Mengele and the Untold Story of the Twins of Auschwitz.
London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1991.
206 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law
No. 10. Nuremberg, October 1946 - April 1949. Washington D.C.: U.S. G.P.O, 1949-1953
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among other things that it was necessary to sacrifice the well being of a
few in the interests of the many. Significantly, however, it was clearly
always the intention of the Germans that the ‘few’ should only
comprise of members of certain groups such as Jews, gypsies, Poles and
other such ‘persons of lesser worth’. It would have been very unlikely
that any Aryan Germans would have been included as subjects of these
trials. To the judges, those arguments were unacceptable and
demonstrated an urgent need for clear and binding standards capable
of protecting human subjects from further abuse and an institutional
framework capable of safeguarding these standards. The Nuremberg
Medical Trial had made it obvious to many observers that the largely
self-regulatory nature of the medical profession had failed miserably to
prevent the atrocities committed in Germany. Consequently in their
verdict, the judges introduced a set of medical principles. This set of
principles is today known as the Nuremberg Code.
Japanese Experiments
Curiously, in contrast to the German experiments, which were
revealed in all their gruesomeness to a shocked world, very little was
known about the Japanese experiments that were also carried out
during World War II. It has been claimed207 that the experiments
carried out by the Japanese rivalled and at times exceeded those of the
most inhumane Nazi doctors. Much like the Nazis, the Japanese
believed that their race was superior to any other race or group and the
military administrators and doctors did not regard other Asians and
Westerners as truly human or worthy of the respect accorded to
humans.208 It was not until the 1980s and 1990s that these events were
brought to the attention of the world and even then, received very little
public attention. The perpetrators of these crimes were never charged
207 Sheldon H Harris, Chapter 16 - Japanese Biomedical Experimentation During the World War II
Era, Military Medical Ethics, Volume 2, page 466 Available at
http://www.bordeninstitute.army.mil/ethicsbook_files/Ethics2/Ethics-ch-16.pdf Accessed 10
October 2005
208 Ibid at 471
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or convicted and many of them went on to enjoy successful careers in
medicine and science.209 It was not that the allied forces were unaware
of the atrocities committed by the Japanese; it was that the Americans
had an interest in the Japanese research results, specifically the
human biological warfare data. Sheldon Harris describes210 how the
advent of the Cold War coupled with the availability of scientifically
sound data resulted in the Americans coming to an agreement with the
Japanese experts. The Japanese agreed to hand over their data in
return for promises of immunity. There was never a ‘Tokyo Trial’ or a
‘Tokyo Code’.
Both the Japanese and German researchers sought to justify their
actions on the ground of sacrificing the few for the benefit of the many.
But as pointed out earlier, it is vital to recognise that the selection of
the sacrificial few was based on the notion that the lives of certain
groups of people were worth less than the lives of the Japanese or
Aryan Germans, and as a result, the sacrifice was negligible compared
to the benefits that would be enjoyed by the ‘superior’ group. The fact
that both countries were engaged in a protracted and horrific war led
these researchers further to believe that they were entitled on
utilitarian grounds forcibly to subject these sacrificial few to appalling
medical experiments. Both these ideas - first, that some human lives
are worth more than others; and second, that it is justifiable to
sacrifice a few for the good of the many were inextricably linked and
lay at the heart of the research misconduct during World War II.211
209 For a further discussion see Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological
Warfare, 1932-45, and the American Cover-Up, London: Routledge 1995
210 Sheldon H Harris, Chapter 16 - Japanese Biomedical Experimentation During the World War II
Era, Military Medical Ethics, Volume 2, page 492 Available at
http://www.bordeninstitute.army.mil/published_volumes/ethicsvol2/ethics-ch-16.pdf Accessed
August 17, 2010
211These ideas can also be seen as examples of ways in which human life can be undervalued. This
argument that the greatest and most significant threat to human subjects who participate in clinical
research is the undervaluation of human life is taken up again in Section 3.2
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Nuremberg Code
This does not however; appear to be the way in which the judges at the
Nuremberg Medical Trial approached the problem when they
formulated the Nuremberg Code. It is worth examining the ideas that
seem to have informed the development of the Nuremberg Code as it is
generally viewed as being the first important declaration of ethical
guidelines for medical research on human subjects and as such
represents the “beginning of the story” of clinical research ethics. But
more than this, as recognised by Capron, the principles212 prescribed
by the Code continue to “guide the development of subsequent
declarations, guidelines and regulations.” 213 The foremost principle is
that which is set out as the very first, the requirement for free and
informed consent:214
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of
choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit,
duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion;
and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the
elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an
understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires
that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the
experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature,
duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by
which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonable
to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may
212 Need for free and informed consent from subjects, and that risk should be minimal and
proportionate to scientific ends that are themselves reasonably attainable. A. Capron,
"Experimentation with Human Beings: Light or Only Shadows" (2006) 6 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. &
Ethics 431 at 436
213 A. Capron, "Experimentation with Human Beings: Light or Only Shadows" (2006) 6 Yale J.
Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 431 at 436
214 Principle 1, Nuremberg Code at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html Accessed August
17, 2010
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possibly come from his participation in the experiment. The duty and
responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon
each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It
is a personal duty and responsibility, which may not be delegated to
another with impunity.
In presenting the principle of informed consent as the primary vehicle
by which human subject protection might be achieved, the judges only
addressed one of the underlying causes of the abuse - the utilitarian
notion that the well being of an individual may be sacrificed for the
good of society. Informed consent addresses this problem by
recognising that every individual must be given the right to determine
for himself whether or not to choose to participate in research and that
this right cannot be taken away from him on the grounds that it would
serve the interests of the many. However, by focusing on informed
consent, the judges at Nuremberg failed to give recognition to what
was perhaps the greater driving force behind the atrocious
experiments, namely the undervaluation of certain groups of
vulnerable people who were regarded as being of less value than the
German Aryans. There was never any interest in obtaining any form of
consent from these prisoners and because these prisoners were viewed
as ‘inferior’ beings not worthy of full moral respect even if informed
consent had been laid down in a code of practice or law in Germany or
Japan before the outbreak of World War II, it would not have
prevented the commission of the subsequent atrocities. The abuses
occurred and were sanctioned by the state largely in part because the
subjects were not recognised as possessing worthwhile lives.
What the Nuremberg Code should also have made perfectly clear is
that all human beings regardless of race, religion or social standing
must be accorded the same level of respect. It should have made it
clear that in no situation should a human being belonging to one
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section of society ever be used as a means to an end for any human
being belonging to another section of society. It should have mandated
that individuals or persons in power (state) be responsible to protect
the interests of minorities and vulnerable populations. In failing
specifically to address these issues, the Code failed to recognise that
the undervaluation of human life215 lay at the heart of the experiments.
Also, the Code at the time of its articulation did not have a great
impact on the way in which clinical research was being carried out in
other countries216 as it was seen as only being of direct application to
the physicians that were on trial, who were viewed as either products
of something “inherently flawed in the German character or as the
playthings of an evil race and totalitarian regime that had collectively
abandoned its “civilized” qualities”.217 This was evident from the fact
that even after the revelations that were made at Nuremberg, there
continued to be many instances of unethical trials being conducted on
unsuspecting subjects in other countries, which led to the formulation
of a number of international and national level ethical guidelines
which are discussed in the next section.
Before proceeding to consider some of the events that led to the
development of the abovementioned documents, there is one more
noteworthy observation that can be made of the events that followed
the German and Japanese World War II experiments –as to why there
was never a Japanese equivalent of the Nuremberg Code. The main
difference between the Japanese and German researchers was, as the
215 A discussion of the idea of the undervaluation of human life is found in section 3.2
216 The Nuremberg Medical Trial, The Holocaust and the Origin of the Nuremberg Medical Code,
Horst H. Freyhofer, Peter Lang Publishing, New York, 2004 at 10
217 J. Goodman, A. McElligott and L. Marks, Useful Bodies: Humans in the Service of Medical
Science in the Twentieth Century, (Baltimore 2003) at 7
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literature218 suggests, that the Japanese had something of value to the
Americans who were in power at that point of time. There can be no
question that both the Germans and the Japanese had been unethical
but only the Germans were called to answer for their crimes. It is
ironic that the most famous medical research trial in history which
resulted in one of the most important research ethics declarations was
conducted by a government that was at the same time acting
unethically by wilfully turning its back to a set of even more diabolical
research trials. At the heart of this contradiction appears to be the fact
that the then American government was acting on interests other than
the interests of justice. It was acting on what it perceived to be
American national security interests and it was the Americans who
had the power to act on their interests and in doing so failed to act in
the interest of justice. While this observation in no way undermines
the validity of the principles laid down in the Code, it does serve as an
illustration of the problems created by conflicting interests, an issue
that is taken up in greater depth in Chapter 5
Henry Beecher’s Article and the Declaration of Helsinki
Henry Beecher’s Article
As noted earlier, few physicians at that time outside or inside Germany
felt that the Nuremberg Code had any direct bearing on their work.
The code was seen as only being of direct application to the physicians
that were on trial.219 In fact, in the period shortly after the end of
World War II, physicians/researchers in America enjoyed high levels of
autonomy in conducting human experiments that were “limited only by
their individual consciences...”220 It was not until the publication of an
218 Sheldon H Harris, Chapter 16 - Japanese Biomedical Experimentation During the World War II
Era, Military Medical Ethics, Volume 2, Available at
http://www.bordeninstitute.army.mil/published_volumes/ethicsvol2/ethics-ch-16.pdf Accessed
August 17, 2010
219 The Nuremberg Medical Trial, The Holocaust and the Origin of the Nuremberg Medical Code,
Horst H. Freyhofer, Peter Lang Publishing, New York, 2004 at 10
220 D. J. Rothman, Strangers at the bedside: a history of how law and bioethics transformed
medical decision making, Second ed., (Hawthorne, NY 2003) at 69
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article by Henry Beecher221 in 1966 that steps were taken to fetter the
discretion of these physicians/researchers. In his article, Henry
Beecher documented 22 problematic studies and referred to a personal
communication from M.H. Pappworth222 who had himself collected 500
examples of what he took to be unethical trials. Human subjects in
these trials were placed in positions where their health and sometimes
lives were placed at risk, and in almost all cases, without their
knowledge or acquiescence. Notably, these trials were conducted by
respected researchers in mainstream institutions, and were funded by
well-respected sponsors such as the United States military, the
National Institutes of Health and established pharmaceutical
companies.
Among the more notorious experiments that caught the attention of
the public were case studies 16 and 17, more commonly known now as
the Willowbrook Hepatitis Study223 and the Jewish Chronic Disease
Hospital Trial. In the Willowbrook study, mentally defective children
who were residents at the Willowbrook State School for the Retarded
were fed live hepatitis viruses in order that researchers might better
understand the basic nature of the disease. The manner in which the
study was conducted raised concerns about the use of children as
subjects in clinical research and in particular, the use of what was
essentially a captive and vulnerable population: institutionalised
mentally retarded children. Moreover, there were problems with the
way in which parental consent was obtained as there was evidence that
221 Beecher H, Ethics and Clinical Research, N Engl J Med 1966: 274: 1354-60. For an excellent
account of the events leading up to the publication of the article and the subsequent responses of
various parties, see D. J. Rothman, Strangers at the bedside: a history of how law and bioethics
transformed medical decision making, Second ed., (Hawthorne, NY 2003). Chapter 4
222 Pappworth had earlier in 1962 reviewed a number of published studies that revealed similar
abuses. See M. H. Pappworth, "Human Guinea Pigs: A Warning" (1962) Autumn Twentieth
Century 66-75. Also see M. H. Pappworth, Human Guinea Pigs: Experimentation on Man,
(Harmondsworth 1969).
223 For a detailed account of the experiment and an analysis of the arguments that were forwarded
by the researchers in defence of the study, see J. Goodman, A. McElligott and L. Marks, Useful
Bodies: Humans in the Service of Medical Science in the Twentieth Century, (Baltimore 2003).
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parents had been coerced into providing consent.224 At the other end of
the age spectrum, the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital Trial recruited
chronically ill and debilitated elderly patients who were residents at
the Brooklyn Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital. The study, which was
funded by the American National Institutes of Health saw
investigators inject live cancer cells into 22 human subjects as part of a
study of immunity to cancer. Although the investigators claimed to
have obtained informed consent, it was revealed that many of the
patients were incapacitated or did not speak English; and those that
were able to provide consent were not told of the true nature of the
cells or that the injections were unrelated to their normal therapy
programme.225 Beecher notes in his article that, “... the subjects
(hospitalized patients) were “merely told they would be receiving ‘some
cells’ – ... the word cancer was entirely omitted.”226
The publication of Beecher’s article following close on the heels of the
revelations made at Nuremberg prompted the medical profession to
act. Under the aegis of the World Medical Association, the profession
set out what was to become arguably the most important set of
guidelines relating to the conduct of human research, the Declaration
of Helsinki.227
224 The wards of this facility were closed to new admissions due to overcrowding and parents on
the waiting list were told that their children would be admitted if they were placed in the research
ward and would later be transferred into the facility. See E. J. C. Emanuel, Robert A. Arras, John
D. Moreno, Jonathan D. Grady C. (ed.), Ethical and regulatory aspects of clinical research :
readings and commentary, (Baltimore 2003), at 3-4
225 United States. National Bioethics Advisory Commission., Ethical and policy issues in research
involving human participants, vol. 1, (Bethesda, Md. (6705 Rockledge Drive, Suite 700, Bethesda,
20892-7979) 2001). Appendix C, page 152 Also see J. Katz, A. M. Capron and E. S. Glass, "The
Jewish chronic disease hospital case" (1972) Experimentation with human beings. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation 36-65.
226H. K. Beecher, "Ethics and Clinical Research" (1966) 274 New England Journal of Medicine
367 – 372 at 371
227 At http://wma.net Accessed 21 October 2005
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The Declaration of Helsinki
The Declaration of Helsinki was adopted by the World Medical
Association (WMA) in 1964228 at its 18th Assembly in Helsinki and
since then has been modified on several occasions.229 More recently,
amendments have been made that reflect the changing nature of the
research enterprise such as concerns about the growing
internationalisation of research especially in relation to research in
developing countries,230 and the problem of conflicts of interests. It is
recognised by the Council for International Organisations of Medical
Sciences231 as,
‘… the fundamental international document in the field of ethics
in biomedical research and has influenced the formulation of
international, regional and national legislation and codes of
conduct.’
The declaration was primarily developed to provide guidance to
physicians232 involved in research on human subjects.233 Because of
this, the declaration takes a more flexible approach to clinical trials,234
unlike the stern and uncompromising tenor of the Nuremberg Code.235
For example, the Nuremberg Code is rigid in that it only permits
research on subjects who are able to provide informed consent and
never in a therapeutic setting; whereas the Helsinki declaration while
228 For a discussion of the historical development of the Declaration of Helsinki see Brody B.A. ‘A
historical introduction to the requirement of obtaining informed consent from research participants.’ in
L Doyal and JS Tobias (eds) Informed Consent in Medical Research (BMJ Books 2001) 7 - 14
229 The declaration, which was originally tabled in 1961, was revised several times before its final
adoption in 1964. It was substantially revised in 1975; reviewed and minor revisions made in 1983;
amended in 1989, 1996 and 2000; and 2 notes of clarification made in 2002 and 2004. In 2008, the
Assembly passed a revised version, which included 3 new paragraphs.
230 In particular Principles 29 and 30 of the Declaration of Helsinki and notes of clarification on both
these paragraphs
231 Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in collaboration with the
World Health Organisation (WHO), International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research
Involving Human Subjects CIOMS, Geneva 2002, 15
232 The Nuremberg Code by comparison, is of wider application to the scientific community in
general.
233 Declaration of Helsinki Principle 1
234 J F Childress, Nuremberg’s Legacy – Some ethical reflections, Perspectives in Biology and
Medicine, 43,4, (Spring 2000), 347 at 356 describes Nuremberg as being ‘protectionist’ and
Helsinki as ‘inclusionist’
235 Which was unsurprising, given the fact that it was set out by judges in response to scientists
who were on trial for committing horrific acts of abuse.
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recognising the primacy of informed consent, also allows for the idea of
proxy consent for incompetent patients.236 In addition it allows for the
combination of medical research with medical care.237 Significantly, it
introduced for the first time a requirement for independent ethics
review238 of trials; and the idea of balancing risks and benefits of the
research. With this, the Helsinki declaration brings together in one
document for the first time, the two main safeguards for human subject
protection: informed consent and independent ethics review.
The fact that the Helsinki declaration represents a significant
milestone in the development of human subject protection is not in
dispute. Nonetheless it is unsatisfactory as it suffers from two main
weaknesses: first, like the Nuremberg Code, it diminishes the wrongs
visited on human subjects by failing to recognise the underlying basis
of unethical trials;239 and on a more practical front, it saddles
investigators and ethics committee members with an unworkable
framework for making ethical decisions. Decision-makers relying on
the declaration will be hard pressed to derive from its text any
coherent or consistent basic ethical principle or set of principles; this in
turn is exacerbated by the open textured language of its text, leaving
the guideline open to a very wide range of interpretations.
Take for example the fact that on the one hand, there is a clear
rejection of the type of utilitarian arguments forwarded by the German
scientists in Principle 5, which states, ‘In medical research on human
subjects, considerations related to the well-being of the human subject
should take precedence over the interests of science and society.’ On
the other hand, utilitarianism appears to inform principle 18 where it
states, ‘Medical research involving human subjects should only be
236 Principle 24 Declaration of Helsinki
237 Part C, Additional Principles for Medical Research Combined with Medical Care, Principles 28
– 32 Declaration of Helsinki
238 Principle 13 Declaration of Helsinki
239 A further discussion of this is found in section 3.2
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conducted if the importance of the objective outweighs the inherent
risks and burdens to the subjects…’ These principles are at odds with
each other. If the interests of the human subject always take
precedence over the interests of science and society, any calculation as
to the importance of the objective (which presumably means the
advancement of science or benefit to society) should never outweigh the
inherent risks and burdens to the subjects.
Another case in point is the principle allowing for proxy consent. One of
the developments of Helsinki as noted earlier, was to adopt an
inclusionist approach by allowing proxy consent for incompetent
subjects. However, the qualification of allowing for proxy consent is
that ‘these groups should not be included in research unless the
research is necessary to promote the health of the population
represented and this research cannot instead be performed on legally
competent patients.’240 This means that incompetent people can only
participate in research relating to the particular diseases or disorders
that have rendered them incompetent.241 Therefore, a person suffering
from severe mental retardation who subsequently contracts a terminal
form of cancer will not even be considered for enrolment into a trial
that might offer access to new therapies for his cancer. The inclusionist
principle that brings in the idea of allowing incompetent patients
access to the research arena is offset by this exclusionist qualification,
which denies them access to potentially beneficial treatments.
An instance of the vague and imprecise language of the text is evident
in principle 8, which introduces the idea of vulnerable populations in a
manner that is less than helpful. It provides too broad a description of
vulnerability that ultimately leaves it with very little meaning. It
describes vulnerable populations as: the economically and medically
240 Principle 24 Declaration of Helsinki
241 This is the only way to achieve advances in the treatment and management of some of these diseases
and disorders.
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disadvantaged, those who cannot give or refuse to give consent, those
who may be subject to giving consent under duress, those who will not
benefit personally from the research and for those for whom the
research is combined with care. Ultimately, all participants save the
wealthy, healthy, strong-willed and self-interested fall under the term
vulnerable populations. The physician is then enjoined to give special
protection and special attention to these populations. There is no
further elaboration of what special protection or special attention
might include. Such vague and imprecise terms render the principle
unworkable at best and subject to manipulation at worst.
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study and the Belmont Report
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study242
Even as Henry Beecher was writing his exposé on research misconduct,
one of the most infamous human experiments in the history of the
United States was well on its way. Curiously, neither the public outcry
that followed the publication of Beecher’s article, nor the articulation of
the Declaration of Helsinki seemed to have had any discernible effect
on the conduct of the trial where for forty years from 1932 until 1972,
the United States Public Health Service conducted a study on the
effects of untreated syphilis on poor and illiterate black men living in
the county of Tuskegee. The only goal of the study was to compile data
on the effects of the evolution of the untreated disease. It had nothing
to do with treatment and the men did not even know that they had
syphilis and one subject recalled that he was only told that he had ‘bad
blood’.243 Not only were these men denied treatment, they were tricked
into believing that they were receiving a “blood tonic” that would help
them and were even threatened with being dropped from the study if
242 For a detailed case study of the experiment, see James H. Jones, Bad Blood : The Tuskegee
Syphilis Experiment, New and expanded ed. ed. (New York: Free Press ; Toronto : Maxwell
Macmillan Canada ; New York : Maxwell McMillan International, 1993).
243 Ibid. at 5
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they took any other treatment for their ‘bad blood’.244 Although
apologists for the study pointed out that there were no effective
treatments for syphilis in the 1930s, the study became indefensible
when after 1945, penicillin was discovered to be an effective treatment
for the disease and investigators withheld this treatment from the men
in the study. When the story broke on July 25, 1972, the press reported
that as of 1969 at least 28 and perhaps as many as 100 men had died
as a direct result of complications caused by syphilis. These disturbing
disclosures triggered a national debate on research ethics, which led to
the establishment of the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 245, which, in
1979, published the Belmont Report.246
The Belmont Report
The Belmont Report is a significant document for two reasons. First,
unlike the Declaration of Helsinki, which merely lists twenty-four basic
principles that are meant to promote ethical behaviour, it sets out a
different approach to determining ethical research conduct. It is the
first guideline to adopt247 a ‘principled’ approach to ethical decision-
making in human subject research. Three basic ethical principles are
identified which are then meant to inform the application of the
specific principles expressed within the rest of the report. The three
basic ethical principles are: respect for persons, beneficence and justice.248
244 Ibid. at 6
245 TheNational Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research was created by the National Research Act (Pub. L. 93-348).
246 National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, "The Belmont Report, Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human
Subjects Research."
247 This approach has been since taken up by other guidelines such as the International Ethical
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, by the The Council for
International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), an international, non-governmental,
non-profit organization established jointly by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and
UNESCO in 1949. See Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, International
Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects at
http://www.cioms.ch/publications/guidelines/frame_guidelines.htm accessed August 17, 2010
248 Beneficence establishes a duty to help others by doing what is best for them and justice requires
that benefits and burdens should be distributed equitably
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These principles form the bedrock of what is then flagged as the three
requirements for ethical research on human subjects: informed consent,
assessment of risks and benefits and subject selection. The other
important attribute of the Belmont Report is that unlike the earlier
ethical guidelines, it articulates specific considerations and protections
for vulnerable populations.249 It does this by way of the idea of respect
for persons. Respect for persons is recognised as incorporating two ideas:
that individuals should be treated as autonomous agents and that people
with diminished autonomy are entitled to protection.250
By setting out three basic principles that are meant to guide decision
making, the Belmont Report provides a more workable framework as
compared to the Helsinki declaration. Researchers and ethics committee
members need not plough through a list of twenty-four principles and try
to make sense of what often appear to be competing and unclear
provisions. However, it is submitted that the framework adopted by the
report is nevertheless still far from satisfactory. Two main criticisms can
be levelled at its approach. First, the lack of guidance as to how these
principles should be applied leaves the guidelines open to a wide variety of
interpretations, which leaves them uncertain and possibly ineffective.
Second, the principles of beneficence and justice are of themselves open to
different interpretations and their insertion essentially weakens the first
principle of respect for persons.
The first criticism flows from the fact that the principles are not ranked in
any hierarchical order and that there is no guidance as to how much
weight each principle might carry and when any particular principle
249 The needs of vulnerable populations is found in Part C of the report see National Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, "The Belmont
Report, Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects Research."
250 See Part B of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.htm
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should take precedence over another. The application of the three basic
principles is described as follows,251
In varying circumstances they may be expressed differently and
given different moral weight, and their application may lead to
different decisions or courses of action. The present guidelines are
directed at the application of these principles to research involving
human subjects.
It may be true that varying circumstances may require different
considerations. For instance, recruiting subjects into a clinical trial on
HIV drugs might raise concerns about the release of personal information
of subjects, which may be potentially harmful or prejudicial to subjects. In
such a situation, the principles of respect for persons and beneficence may
be the primary principles in guiding the decision making process. On the
other hand, when a trial using a placebo as a comparator rather than an
established effective intervention proposes to recruit subjects in a poor
country, concerns about the applications of the principles of justice and
beneficence are likely to dominate ethical discussions. Nevertheless, it is
submitted that it does not help to provide decision makers with
alternative and possibly competing principles without any guidance as to
how they should be applied. Taking the latter example of placebo trials: on
the one hand, it is possible to present a persuasive argument that as a
rule, when there is an established therapy for a particular condition,
placebo trials are unethical because they violate the principle of
beneficence, as subjects are harmed by not being offered an effective
treatment. Moreover, these trials remain unethical when run in
developing countries where subjects may not generally have access to
established therapies. This is because they violate the principle of respect
for the persons, as they are essentially a form of exploitation of the poor.
On the other hand an equally compelling argument can be presented as to
why trials should be allowed because they will at least offer some subjects
some benefit, and that no is harmed because the established therapy is
251 Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in collaboration with the
World Health Organisation (WHO), International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research
Involving Human Subjects CIOMS, Geneva 2002, 17
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not available as standard therapy - and so this serves the principle of
beneficence.
The second criticism or problem is that the principles of beneficence and
justice, being open to different interpretations, may weaken the idea of
respect for persons. The principle of beneficence is defined as “the ethical
obligation to maximise benefit and to minimise harm … Beneficence
further proscribes the deliberate infliction of harm on persons; this aspect
of beneficence is sometimes expressed as a separate principle,
nonmaleficence252.” The problem with this principle is that the notion of
harm and benefit may vary tremendously depending on an individual’s
personal value system.
For instance, some people consider active euthanasia as a form of harm in
that it is harmful to shorten a person’s life, whereas others view it as a
benefit in that it is a good thing to help someone who is suffering to end
his life. A doctor who holds the former view might rely on the principle of
beneficence to claim that to end a life is an infliction of harm, whereas
another physician who holds the latter view may perceive ending the
patient’s life as a beneficial action. Both these physicians will have arrived
at opposite decisions relying on their personal moral compasses without
any regard to the feelings of the patient involved. The question of whether
the ending of the patient’s life is beneficial or harmful to him may never
be asked. If researchers are left to choose and pick between the three
principles without the benefit of some hierarchical ordering or overarching
guideline, the choices they make may not result in the best possible
outcomes.
In the sixty-three years following the pronouncement of the Nuremberg
Code, many international and national guidelines and declarations
concerning ethical conduct in human subject research have been
252 Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in collaboration with the
World Health Organisation (WHO), International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research
Involving Human Subjects CIOMS, Geneva 2002, 17
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published. Most if not all of them have drawn on the structures and
principles enunciated in the three guidelines discussed above, and
because of this, most of them have missed the main point. The main
point is that the basis of research misconduct is the undervaluation of
human life. This idea is explored in the next section. Before taking up
this discussion, mention must be made of what is now undoubtedly the
most significant set of guidelines that guide clinical research trials
worldwide; the guidelines issued by the International Conference on
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, and specifically its Good Clinical
Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1)253 (ICH-GCP Guideline),
which has been referred to briefly in the previous chapter. A critical
analysis of the ICH-GCP is found in Chapter Four, but suffice to say at
this point that unlike the other guidelines, its genesis did not lie in the
quest for human subject protection, but rather the drive for economic
efficiency. As such, it is largely concerned with procedural and
administrative matters and does not offer any useful contribution to
the present discussion.
Basis of research misconduct - Undervaluation of Human
Life
As submitted earlier, the main reason why existing codes and
guidelines fail to provide a workable ethical basis for human subject
research is that they failed to appreciate the underlying cause of the
unethical treatment of human subjects and that this cause is the
undervaluation of human subjects. This undervaluation can take two
forms. First, it may be class based in the sense that a particular group
or class of persons are considered to be less worthwhile owing to the
fact that they may possess or fail to possess certain characteristics.
Second, it may be based on an undervaluation of individuals’ lives; this
253 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1)."
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can occur in one of two ways: the establishment of a moral duty to
participate in research or paternalistic decision-making practices.
Group based undervaluation of human life
People may be undervalued because they are members of what might
be regarded as inferior races or religions, if they are poor or old, or if
they are mentally immature or incompetent. This undervaluation is
often driven by discrimination and contempt for people who are viewed
as being inferior. The inferiority may be based on extrinsic or intrinsic
grounds.254 Extrinsic racism and discrimination lie in the belief that
certain groups of people differ in respects that warrant differential
treatment. Certain qualities are considered morally relevant and the
presence or absence of these qualities justifies treating groups of people
differently. For instance, people who are mentally retarded might be
viewed as lacking sufficient intelligence. Following from this, if
intelligence is viewed as being morally relevant, this group of people
are considered less valuable to society and can be treated differently.
Intrinsic racism differentiates between members of different races,
believing that every race possesses a different moral status quite
independent of morally relevant qualities. Some races are simply
regarded as superior to other races. Such racist and discriminatory
attitudes result in the dehumanisation of its victims as recognised by
Chief Justice Dickson of the Canadian Supreme Court when he
commented that "[t]he message of [racial vilification] is that members
of identifiable groups are not to be given equal standing in society, and
are not human beings equally deserving of concern, respect and
consideration."255
World War II Nazi Experiments
254 Based on the idea that there are two types of racism, extrinsic racism and intrinsic racism from
David Theo Goldberg, Anatomy of Racism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990). at
5
255 R v Keegestra [1991] 2 WWR 1 at 50. This was a case on anti-Semitic speech
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A striking example of this sort of undervaluation is the type of racist
and eugenic policy pursued by the Nazi regime. They were apparently
heavily influenced by social Darwinism256 which among other things
considers that humans are nothing more than highly evolved animals;
that natural selection should only allow for the survival of the fittest
and that policies which bring about the death of those not fit for
survival are justified. Hitler and others believed that there were
gradations of human fitness; that race and physical and mental
abilities were determinants of the fitness of humans; and that at the
lower end of the spectrum, some lives were so worthless as not to be
worth living. Unwilling to submit to the unhurried pace of natural
selection, the Nazi regime chose to exterminate those they considered
unfit or sacrifice their lives to serve the ends of the superior race by
using them as subjects in their medical experiments.
Tuskegee Syphilis Study
The Tuskegee Syphilis Study was driven by similar ideas.257 Black men
were considered far behind white men in terms of evolution and
according to their physicians, their ‘lust and immorality, unstable
families, and reversion to barbaric tendencies made blacks especially
prone to venereal diseases.’258 The doctors who formulated and ran the
study accepted this view of blacks and justified not treating their
condition on the premise that blacks, being promiscuous and lustful,
would not seek or continue treatment.259
The group-based undervaluation of human life can take many forms. In
the above-mentioned examples, it was grounded on mainly racial
256 D P O’Mathuna ‘Human dignity in the Nazi era: Implications for contemporary bioethics’ BMC
Medical Ethics 2006, 7:2 at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/7/2 accessed April 5, 2006
257 For a brief description of the study, see section 3.1.3.1. Also, an excellent article which places
the study in a historical context is AM Brandt ‘Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study’ Hastings Center Report, December 1978, 21-29
258 AM Brandt ‘Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study’ Hastings Center
Report, December 1978, 22
259 Ibid at 23
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arguments. It may also be gender-based, age-based260 or disability-
based.261 Some forms of undervaluation may be particularly insidious
as they are masked by good intentions. The past practice of sterilising
mentally retarded women serves as an example of this. Between 1907
and 1963 there were eugenical sterilisation programmes in 30
American states. It is estimated that more than 60,000 persons were
sterilised pursuant to state laws. Both men and women were sterilised
but beginning around 1930, there was a dramatic increase in the
number of sterilised women.262 It was thought that sterilising mentally
retarded women was not only in their best interests but also in the
interests of the unborn children and society as a whole, as it was then
believed that mental retardation was passed on from one generation to
another. Carrie Buck, an American woman was sterilised in 1927
because she had been committed to the State Colony for Epileptics and
the Feeble Minded. The judge in her case,263 Justice Holmes
commented that, “ It is better for all the world if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.”264
Undervaluation of the individual person
Imposition of a moral duty to participate in clinical research
trials
260 For example, the Brooklyn Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital trials where in July 1963 a
researcher at the hospital injected live cancer cells into debilitated elderly patients without their
fully informed consent. See Ezekiel J. Crouch Emanuel, Robert A. Arras, John D. Moreno,
Jonathan D. Grady C., ed., Ethical and Regulatory Aspects of Clinical Research : Readings and
Commentary (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). at 3
261 One of the more infamous cases is the Willowbrook study; in which researchers deliberately
exposed children and adolescents with disabilities to hepatitis at a New York state facility. See
Ibid.
262 P. R. Reilly, "Involuntary Sterilization in the United-States - a Surgical Solution," Quarterly
Review of Biology 62, no. 2 (1987). at 161
263 Buck v Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 47 S.Ct. 584, 71 L.Ed. 1000 (1927)
264 Interestingly, in 1980, Carrie Buck was discovered living in the Appalachian Hills and was
found to be mentally competent and disappointed that she was never able to bear a child. See B
Furrow, T Greaney, S Johnson, T Jost and R Schwartz Bioethics: Health Care Law and Ethics
Third Edition (West Publishing Co, 1997) 77
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As society tastes the fruits of successful research, it grows eager to
savour new cures and treatments. One of the consequences of this is
that there is a growing demand for new treatment possibilities and
diagnostic tools, which place an enormous pressure on researchers to
deliver new solutions. A leading American bioethics scholar, Callahan
uses the metaphor of war265 to describe the zeal with which medical
research is at present pursued. Researchers are seen as engaged in a
battle against death and disease, and the attainment of victory may
require some sacrifices. This in turn has led some besieged researchers
to view human participation in research as an obligation to society.266
Some have gone so far as to propose that certain patients should only
be offered treatment if they agree to participate in research.267
This obligation is commonly rooted in an account of morality known as
utilitarianism, which states that the rightness of any particular
enterprise is calculated based on the total benefit gained by all
individuals in a society. The argument for establishing a moral duty to
participate in research would be that it is in the interest of society as a
whole that new drugs and methods of treating illness and diseases are
discovered and that the risks undertaken and the possible harms that
might befall subjects are outweighed by the gains obtained by society
as a whole. One of the grounds on which the Nazi scientists sought to
defend their experiments was based on utility where they argued that
there was a greater good to be achieved in bringing World War II to an
end by assisting the military triumph of the German army and that it
was morally acceptable and in fact necessary to sacrifice the rights of a
few individuals to achieve that greater good.
265 Daniel Callahan, What Price Better Health? Hazards of the research imperative, University of
California Press, 2003 at 59. For examples of statements made by politicians and researchers
regarding the need to pursue research, at 57
266 This was recognised by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission in their report entitled
United States. "Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders That May Affect
Decisionmaking Capacity, Volume I." Rockville, Md. National Bioethics Advisory Commission,
1998.
267 D Orentlicher ‘Making research a requirement of treatment – why we should sometimes let
doctors pressure patients to participate’ Hastings Center Report 35, no 5 (2005): 20-28
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John Harris268 has put a more contemporary but nevertheless similar
argument forward. He attempts to establish a duty to participate in
clinical research trials based on the twin principles of doing no harm
and fairness. In the first instance, he argues that when the actions of
an individual may serve to prevent serious harm occurring to others,
he is under a moral obligation to perform those actions. Since medical
research contributes to a reduction in human suffering, there is among
other things, an obligation to participate in medical research. Second,
he relies on the principle of fairness to say that because individuals
have accepted the benefits of past medical research, they have an
“obligation in justice to contribute to the social practice that produces
them.”269 It is interesting to note that Harris utilises two of the more
commonly270 recognised ethical principles of bioethics, which are
generally associated with protecting the rights of individuals. The edict
to do no harm is rooted in the belief that Mr A should not be harmed by
the action of Mr B and that what amounts to harm should be
determined by reference to the interests of Mr A and not Mr B. The
application of the principle of justice in bioethics would require fairness
in the distribution of limited resources, that every person should be
treated equally. However, Harris has employed these principles to
construct what is essentially an argument that is utilitarian in nature.
268 J Harris ‘Scientific research is a moral duty’ J Med Ethics 2005: 31; 242-248. Also see
Shapshay, S, and KD Pimple. "Participation in Biomedical Research Is an Imperfect Moral Duty:
A Response to John Harris." British Medical Journal 33, no. 7 (2007): 414 for a good critique of
Harris’ article where the authors argue that the only thing Harris has succeeded in showing is that
participating in research is a moral good among many other moral goods and not that there is a
moral duty to participate in research.
269Ibid at 243
270 Bioethics has over the past 20 years developed a set of ethical principles that serve as a sort of
checklist when considering biomedical issues. This checklist includes at least the principles of
autonomy, doing no harm, beneficence, confidentiality and justice
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When Harris puts forward the principle of doing no harm271 to others
as being the foundation of a moral obligation to participate in research,
he presents a typical consequentialist argument of attaching negative
responsibility. Consequentialism attaches significance to states of
affairs and therefore, a person is just as responsible for things that he
fails to prevent as for things that he himself does.272 The rightness of
an action is ascertained by reference not to the action itself but rather
to the consequences of the action. When he relies on the notion that the
obligation to participate in clinical research arises from the enjoyment
of benefits obtained from previous human research participation in
clinical trials, he is proposing that the risks undertaken and benefits
enjoyed by people in a society can be off set against each other. Duties
are imposed on people today based on the consequences of the actions
of individuals who have gone before them, for the benefit of members of
society in the future. We enjoy the beneficial consequences of past
research projects and therefore we should be responsible for ensuring
that future generations continue to enjoy the same advantageous
consequences.
The utilitarian position is not an unattractive one. The utilitarian does
not look exclusively to his own comfort or benefit, but rather considers
the interests of all other members of society. Every person counts as
one and there is no place for discrimination or favouritism. However,
the contention that the maximisation of utility is an appropriate basis
for establishing a moral obligation to participate in research cannot be
accepted because it is among other things, predicated on the
undervaluation of the individual human life.
271 This is a distortion of the ordinary use of the principle of doing no harm in the field of
bioethics, which is limited to actions performed by healthcare providers engaged in providing
health care services to specific individuals. It is a duty owed by one individual to another
individual and not by one individual to society. It is based on the notion of respecting the
individual’s right to not be harmed by another individual.
272 See Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against (Cambridge University Press 1990) at
95-96
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In a utilitarian world, the primary concern of an instrument regulating
research practice such as the Helsinki Declaration would be that a
determination be made to assess the good and bad consequences of a
research project. This determination would include amongst other
things, considerations of the scientific validity of the research; the
potential value of any result obtained; the number of people currently
suffering from the condition; the level of suffering caused by the
condition; the number of people likely to benefit from the research; the
number of subjects that might be put at risk and the level of risk that
subjects might be exposed to. If at the end of the calculation, the
potential benefits of proceeding with the research are greater than the
possible harms, there should no question that the research should
continue and that individuals should be duty bound to participate in
the project. Informed consent would no longer be needed, as the
individual no longer determines whether he is willing to accept the
risks of research participation. No consideration of the rights and
interests of individual subjects is required as their interests will
already have been included as part of the initial calculation of utility.
When this is done, people are no longer treated as valuable individuals
with rights and interests; instead they are treated as tokens.
People are treated as objects or tokens that are traded against each
other when a greater value is placed on consequences rather than the
interests of individual lives. Jonas eloquently describes the problem
with treating people in this way:
“What is wrong with making a person an experimental subject is
not so much that we make him thereby a means (which happens
in social contexts of all kinds) but that we make him a thing - a
passive thing merely to be acted on, and passive not even for real
action, but for token action whose token object he is.”273
273 Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, DAEDALUS
98, (Spring, 1969), 219-247 at 221
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People are neither tokens nor things that can be subjected to
experiments for the benefit of others. Every individual is committed to
projects and actions that make his life worthwhile and to devalue a
person’s commitments is to attack his integrity. 274 To demand that a
person gives up his projects is to “alienate him in real sense from his
actions and the source of his action in his own conviction.”275
Utilitarian principles undervalue the commitment of individuals to
projects that make their lives worthwhile and in short, they
undervalue the individual human life. An example might be given of a
person Ms F, who suffers from severe arthritis and who is invited to
enrol in a randomised, double blind study of a new painkiller. There is
some evidence that the new painkiller, X may be more effective than
the standard treatment, Y. Ms F is an extremely fearful person and
cannot abide uncertainty. The thought of being enrolled in a trial
where neither she nor her doctor will know the medication she is
taking is deeply distressing to her. To force her into this trial because it
is in the best interests of society is to violate her sense of integrity by
undervaluing her preferences.
Moreover, we should not mistake what is morally praise-worthy for
what should be morally obligatory. When we declare that a particular
action is obligatory, we take away the element of individual choice; we
do not distinguish between the courageous and the timid but compel all
to take such action. Harris’ assertion that fairness requires that we
should participate in medical research trials because we have benefited
from the advances in health care provided by past medical research
projects places an unduly heavy burden on individuals. Consider the
case of a middle-aged woman, Eve, who when she was a child, was
saved from a burning building by her elderly neighbour. While on her
way to work one day, she notices that another neighbour’s house is on
274 See Bernard Williams attack on utilitarianism in Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism For and
Against (Cambridge University Press 1990) particularly 116-117
275 Ibid at 116
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fire and that a young boy is trapped in the building. Does she have a
moral duty to risk her life to save the young boy? If she attempts to
save him, we would praise her for her bravery but it would seem
unreasonable to suggest that her failure to do so was morally
blameworthy. It is unlikely that her elderly neighbour thought he was
creating a debt when he saved Eve and in fact it diminishes his heroic
act by suggesting this.
Harris’ appeal to fairness is in fact mistaken in that he assumes that a
duty to reciprocate is an obligatory response to a gift, which is freely
given.276 At most, the obligation is that the beneficiaries should be
grateful for the gift.277 Moreover, if reciprocity were to apply, it is hard
to see how the duty could be owed to anyone other than those who
participated in past research projects. In the example above, if Eve
owes anyone a duty for her rescue, she owes that duty only to her
elderly neighbour.
Certain levels of illness, disease, disability and death have been a part
of society since the beginning of time. No amount of research will
eradicate these phenomena and society will not be destroyed by their
existence.278 It would certainly be a laudable aim to embark on
research to reduce the suffering and sickness in this world but it
cannot be a moral obligation on individuals in a society.
Paternalistic decision-making
The second way in which the individual life may be undervalued is
when decisions are made for people based on what other people
perceive to be in their best interests. This may lead to situations where
276 See A L Caplan, "Is There an Obligation to Participate in Biomedical Research," in The Use of
Human Beings in Research with Special Reference to Clinical Trials, ed. Stuart F. Spicker,
Philosophy and Medicine. Vol 28 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1988). at 235
277 Caplan goes on to point out that it is naïve to think that all who participated were acting
altruistically as many compensated, others tricked or coerced into participating in trials, and it is
certainly difficult to derive an obligation from trickery or coercion. Ibid. at 235
278 This is based on normal expected mortality and morbidity rates in a society
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investigators make decisions based on beliefs and suppositions close to
the hearts of the investigators, but that may be alien to the research
subjects.
These sorts of decisions undervalue the individual by rejecting his or
her personal beliefs as being inferior or unacceptable. This sort of
undervaluation is often found in situations where health care givers
have to deal with patients from migrant communities that have very
different cultural ideas. The case of Miss Tai,279 a 42-year-old
Vietnamese immigrant, suffering from metastatic cancer illustrates
how conflicting notions of respect for autonomy can occur. In
interviews, Ms Tai suggested that her brother was her primary
decision- maker concerning her health care. The physician viewed Ms
Tai’s traditional views on decision making as being inferior to his idea
of respect for individual autonomy and in fact described the family as
being abnormal. Ms Tai’s brother was against her being told about her
cancer because he did not think that she would be able to cope with the
knowledge. Her physician opposed this view and against her brother’s
wishes, informed her of her diagnosis and expressed frustration that
she did not seem to want to make decisions on her own. The physician
undervalued Ms Tai in this case when he chose to disregard her wishes
to leave the decisions to her brother.
Ethical Basis for Clinical Research Involving Human
Subjects
When medical research is pursued relentlessly or in an unethical
manner it may bring about a great deal of harm, and as shown above,
the root of that harm is the undervaluation of human life. This then
begs the question, how do we ensure that human life is not
undervalued? What is the appropriate value that should be placed on
279 See P Marshall, B A Koenig, P Grifhorst and M V Ewijk ‘Ethical Issues in Immigrant Health
Care and Clinical Research’ Handbook of Immigrant Health ed Loue (Plenium Press 1998 New
York) 208-209
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human life? This thesis proposes that the answer is that the value of
human life should be based on the single principle of respect for human
dignity. The following discussion will demonstrate how by grounding
the moral basis of human research in the idea of respecting human
dignity, it is possible to tease out the idea of human dignity to provide
a framework for ethical decision-making that is not only coherent but
also and perhaps more importantly, that provides a discourse that is
accessible to the parties who are required to make decisions in the
interest of human subjects.
How to value human life?
Addressing the issue of how persons should be treated so as to not
undervalue their lives involves asking questions that range from what
is human life – when does life begin, to when does life matter morally
and what that entails in relation to different groups of people? As this
thesis is primarily concerned with the way in which mentally
incapacitated adults are treated, there is little to be gained280 by
delving into the fundamental questions at the edges of human life -
when does human life begin and end? Accepting the fact that human
life exists, the next step of the enquiry is to consider questions
revolving around how human life is valued: is all human life morally
significant, and whether there are different degrees of morally valuable
human lives? If, as many bio-ethicists would suggest, that not all
human life is equally morally valuable; and that moral significance is
dependent on the existence of certain criteria and indicators, the
question then must be asked as to what these criteria or indicators
are?
Valuing life based on capacities – personhood
280 This is in no way suggesting that the issue is of no importance, but simply that given the
limitations of this current research paper, it is not feasible to engage in this deliberation
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The notion of a morally valuable life has often been connected to the
notion of personhood, where theories of personhood distinguish what it
means to be ‘human’ from what it means to be a ‘person’.281 The criteria
range from very the stringent criteria such as requiring the possession
of concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences282 to the very
low requirement of simply being conceived by human parents283 (at
which point the argument collapses into all human life is morally
valuable). The problem with relying on the idea of respecting personhood
emerges at the higher end of the spectrum where what it means to be
human is distinguished from what it means to be a person.
Persons are individuals who possess certain properties. There are
nonhuman persons such as angels, devils, fictional cartoon characters
such as Donald Duck; and there are human non-persons such as
anencephalic infants and individuals in persistent vegetative states.284
Personhood is dependent on the possession of a range of capacities285 and
only persons are considered to possess morally valuable lives.286 Harris
puts forward the view that the connection between personhood and moral
value arises in two ways, possession of the capacity for self consciousness
coupled with minimum intelligence; and the capacity of an individual for
valuing his own life and taking an interest in his own future. He observes
that evidence of the latter presumes the existence of the former and thus
281 For an excellent overview of the concept of personhood in bioethics, see Ruth Macklin,
"Personhood in the Bioethics Literature," The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and
Society 61, no. 1 (1983). Ideally, the present discussion would encompass the entire spectrum of
human life from the infant to the aged individual, but the present enquiry is limited to the adult
human. While the matter of how we should value the lives of infants and children is without doubt
of great importance and should be given close consideration, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to
delve into these matters at present.
282 Michael Tooley’s criteria, see Ibid. at 44
283 John Noonan, see Ibid. at 41
284 J Harris ‘The concept of person and the value of life’ Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9.4
(1999) 293-308 at 293
285 These are by and large cognitive abilities such as self-consciousness, capacity of act on reason,
rationality and capacity to communicate.
286 Beauchamp distinguishes between metaphysical personhood, which is determined by
possession of psychological properties and moral personhood, which is determined by possession
of properties or capacities for moral agency and moral motivation. However, this distinction does
not help in the discussion, as he does not show why this distinction is important as he concludes
that moral standing does not depend on moral personhood. See T L Beauchamp ‘The Failure of
Theories of Personhood’ Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9.4 (1999) 309-324
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the capacity of an individual for valuing his own life and taking an
interest in his own future is the criterion for recognising morally valuable
lives.
Connecting the value of an individual’s life to his own capacity to value it
would allow for the killing of any individual who is assumed to have lost
this capacity. An individual suffering from a severe form of cerebral palsy
would not count as a person and according to Harris’ account would not
have any moral value. Harris would agree that as long as he was killed in
a humane manner, he could be put to death without harming him. The
only prohibition would be not to harm him by causing gratuitous
suffering.
Harris’ theory is wanting in that it alienates us from our sense of what
it means to be human. It reduces the value of human life to an
instrumental value in that it is only valuable because the person living
that life values it. It opens the door to the first type of undervaluation
of human life mentioned in the earlier section. It prejudges certain
classes of individuals as being less valuable and unworthy of moral
protection because they fail to posses certain capacities. It leaves them
vulnerable. The history of research misconduct as set out earlier is
very much a history of undervaluing people with impaired cognitive
abilities.
Valuing life based on human dignity
An alternative to basing the value of human life on notions of
personhood as possessing certain capacities is the idea of respecting
human dignity. The concept of human dignity is not a new one and has
been extensively used in various discourses. Schulman287 highlights
four key sources of the idea of human dignity that have come to shape
287 Adam Schulman, "Bioethics and the Question of Human Dignity," in Human Dignity and
Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics, ed. President's
Commission on Bioethics (US Independent Agencies and Commissions, 2008) at 6. Also see
Schüklenk, U., and A. Pacholczyk. "Dignity's Wooly Uplift." Bioethics 24, no. 2 (2010)
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the way in which the term is understood. First, dignity as used in
classical antiquity to mean something rare and exceptional; second, the
use of the term in the context of religious discourse which is generally
associated with the Catholic tradition;288 third, as used in Kantian
moral philosophy where the notion of dignity is grounded in human
rational thinking; and lastly, in the use of the term in the 20th century
where since the end of World War II, dignity has been used as a
foundational concept in human rights instruments289 and state
constitutions. Schulman argues that because of the disparate nature of
these sources, the application of the term human dignity in the
bioethics discourse has been rather uncertain and wonders if “it is a
useful concept that sheds important light on a whole range of
bioethical issues … or is it a useless concept at best... or at worst a
mere slogan that camouflages unconvincing arguments and
unarticulated biasness?”290 Schulman is right when he points out that
the term human dignity is useful when used to shed light on issues,
and dangerous when employed to substantiate biasness; but much the
same can be said about the term personhood. What matters is not the
term that is used but the way in which that term is understood.
Beyleveld and Brownsword291 on the other hand, suggest that there are
two conceptions of the notions of human dignity: human dignity as
empowerment and human dignity as constraint. Human dignity is
used as a tool for empowerment in human rights instruments292 where
it provides the justification for the recognition of human rights; and is
288 In fact, the Catechism of the Catholic Church devotes no less than 23 pages to explaining the
concept and its implications. R J Neuhaus, "Human Dignity and Public Discourse," in Human
Dignity and Bioethics. Essays Commisioned by the President's Council on Bioethics, ed.
President's Council on Bioethics (Government Printing Office, 2008). at 227
289 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, International Covenant on Economic, Social &
Cultural Rights 1966 and International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights 1966. In each case,
human dignity is specifically mentioned as one of the foundational ideas.
290 Schulman, "Bioethics and the Question of Human Dignity."at 3
291 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001).
292 The term is described as the “rock on which the superstructures of human rights is built.”Ibid.
at 12
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used as constraint primarily in the bioethics context where it restricts
individual choice by representing a collective good that society deems
worth pursuing at the expense of the individual. Beyleveld and
Brownsword provide what appears to be a very narrow understanding
of how human dignity is understood in the bioethics arena and focus a
great deal of their arguments on two particular instruments: the
Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and
the preamble to UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human
Genome and Human Rights. But there is much more to how human
dignity has been employed in the bioethics literature. For example,
human dignity is commonly employed as a principle that should guide
ethical action in caring for the elderly. Calls are made in the name of
human dignity to defer to choices made by elderly patients even if such
decisions may hasten death.293 The Social Care Institute for
Excellence294 in the United Kingdom sets out eight dignity factors,
which are considered vital in the care of the elderly. These factors are
choice and control, communication, personal hygiene, practical
assistance, privacy and social inclusion. Dignity in this sense is far
more about empowerment rather than constraint. Therefore, while
Beyleveld and Brownsword are not wrong to say that dignity may be
used as constraint and empowerment, it is untrue that it is used
primarily as constraint in bioethics and recognising that it may exist as
constraint or empowerment does not help in clarifying the way in
which the term should be used.
Richard Ashcroft provides what appears to be the most useful if not
practical description of how the term human dignity is used in
bioethics.295 He identifies four distinct ways in which current bioethics
scholars regard the term ‘dignity’. First, as incoherent and unhelpful;
293 Schulman, "Bioethics and the Question of Human Dignity." at 5
294 This is an independent charity funded by the Department of Health and the devolved
administrations in Wales and Northern Ireland. SCIE identifies and disseminates the knowledge
base for good practice in all aspects of social care throughout the United Kingdom.
295 R E Ashcroft ‘Making sense of dignity’ J Med Ethics 2005 31:679-682 at 679
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second, as ‘illuminating but reducible to autonomy as extended to cover
some marginal cases’; third, as ‘concepts about capabilities,
functionings, and social interactions and fourth, as “a metaphysical
property possessed by all and only human beings, and which serves as
a moral foundation for moral philosophy and human rights.” The
following discussion will demonstrate that the concept of dignity
should be accepted in the fourth and last sense of being a characteristic
accorded to all humans and which serves as the moral foundation for
moral philosophy and human rights.
The following section proposes a framework for understanding human
dignity that serves two main functions. First and most importantly, it
provides a rich account of the notion of human dignity that is not only
inclusive in that it embraces all human life, but that also recognises
that not all humans are able, or choose to value their lives in the same
way and that what it means to treat different individuals with dignity
may mean different things to different people. Second, by anchoring
the ethical treatment of research subjects onto the single principle of
respecting human dignity, it provides decision makers such as ethics
committee members with not only a coherent framework for their
deliberations but it provides this framework in a simple language that
is accessible to both lay and professional members of ethics
committees.
It is proposed that human dignity should be understood as applying to
all humans by recognising both the subjective and intrinsic value of
human life.
Human Dignity as accorded to all humans
If human dignity is understood as essentially being about autonomy, or
capabilities and social functionings, then there is very little to separate
dignity from the account of personhood described above. This account
as noted earlier fails to adequately provide for persons with impaired
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capabilities and social functionings. If human dignity is to address the
problem of the undervaluation of human life, it must be not only an
inclusive concept that embraces all human life, but also a rich concept
that recognises the complex nature of human life. It should allow us to
not only recognise the value of individuals who possess rationality but
also to accept our moral duties to those who do not possess this
capacity based on the idea of the intrinsic value of human life. The idea
of personhood forwarded by Harris only permits of a simplistic and
one-dimensional explanation of the value of human life as it is based
solely on the ability to value one’s life. Human life is valuable not just
because some humans value life. To this end, Dworkin296 offers a richer
and more accurate understanding of the values attached to human life.
Human dignity reflects the subjective and intrinsic value of
human life
Dworkin argues that human life possesses value in three ways:
instrumental value, which is based on how a person being alive serves
the interests of others; subjective value, which is based on how much a
person values his own life; and intrinsic value, which is a value that is
independent of what people happen to enjoy or want or need or that is
good for them.297 It is proposed that when speaking of the idea of
respecting human dignity, it is most appropriate to look to the second
and third components of the value of human life.
Subjective value of human life
The subjective value of an individual’s life is derived from the capacity
it protects, which is the capacity to express one’s own values,
commitments and convictions. In recognising the subjective value of
human life as being a reason for according it respect, we recognise the
importance of the integrity of the person and from this derive the
296 R Dworkin Life’s Dominion Harper Collins Publishers 1993
297 Ibid at 72
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principle of respect for autonomy of the person. Therefore, when
speaking of respecting the human dignity of an individual, this is often
connected to the idea of respecting his autonomy, allowing him to make
choices even though society may think that he has made the wrong
choices. In recognising that each person has a right to choose against
the wishes of others, the individual life is not undervalued.
The subjective value of an individual’s life is shaped by many factors,
for instance: a person’s genetic makeup, his personal experiences,
cultural influences and religious beliefs. In seeking to respect human
dignity, there must be a certain level of deference to how an individual
chooses to shape his or her own subjective value. For example, in some
African and Asian298 countries, one’s tribe, village or social group
defines an individual’s identity. It may be necessary to obtain consent
from a tribal village head, head of a family or religious authority before
obtaining individual consent to participate in a clinical research trial.
An individual living in that community may see the subjective value of
his life as being primarily attached to the interests of the tribe. While
this notion may be alien to a decision maker whose subjective value is
strongly tied to the notion of individual autonomy, respecting the
human dignity of the African individual would require the decision
maker to honour his choice to defer to the interests of the tribe.
In the research arena, the recognition of the subjective value of human
life of competent subjects is most often reflected in the principle of
autonomy and actualised by requiring that subjects provide informed
consent before they enter into any trial. Therefore, in most cases, ethics
committee members focus their discussions on the adequacy of
informed consent forms and patient information sheets. So long as
298 Differences may even exist within a country; Mala Ramanathan notes that a research project
carried out in India which involved both urban and rural subjects required that consent be obtained
from local leaders in rural areas before obtaining informed consent, whereas in urban areas,
consent was obtained solely from the subjects. Mala Ramanathan, Cultural Absolutism vs. Cultural
Relativism: Ethical Issues in International Health Research, Program on Ethical Issues in
International Health Research, Harvard School of Public Health, June 14-18, 2004
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patients are provided with sufficient information that maximises their
decision-making abilities by allowing them to make free and informed
choices, the subjective values of their lives are respected.299 However, it
is erroneous to presume that persons who lack the capacity to provide
informed consent have no subjective interests at all.
Capacity and subjective value
A person is typically determined as lacking capacity to provide
informed consent when he is unable to do any of the following:
understand the relevant information, weigh the information as part of
the decision-making process, or communicate his decision. This does
not mean that the incapacitated person has no interests at all as to
how his life is lived. Take for example, Mr Y, who is extremely musical
and loves to play the piano. He is also suffering from severe dementia,
which has profoundly affected his decision-making abilities. His doctor
wants to enrol him in a clinical trial for a new treatment for dementia.
There is a risk that the new drug will affect his co-ordination, and
while it does not present a risk to his health, it may affect Mr Y’s
ability to play the piano. If it is evident that playing the piano gives Mr
Y pleasure, (even if he cannot articulate this fact himself) it must
reflect a subjective value in Mr Y’s life, and as such, should be taken
into account in determining whether he should be enrolled in the trial.
Therefore, when decisions to enrol mentally incapacitate persons into
clinical trials are taken, they should inasmuch as is possible, require
inquiry into the interests and commitments of the persons and
incorporate these values into the decisions. More so if a person once
was competent, regard should be given to the person he once was.
299 Although it is debatable as to whether or not it is actually ever possible to obtain truly informed
consent.
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Intrinsic value of human life
But if this is all that is meant by dignity, then Macklin300 is correct
when she claims that dignity is a useless concept because it means
little more than respect for persons or their autonomy and at the end of
the day, this means nothing more then respecting personhood. It is
suggested that Macklin is wrong because she has failed to appreciate
that dignity means more than just respecting the subjective value of
life.
Consider the case of an elderly man X, suffering from late stage
Alzheimer’s Disease living in a nursing home. He generally appears to
be unaware and unresponsive to his surroundings. He is led to the
living area on a daily basis, where he sits for a few hours, not talking to
anyone or responding to any external stimuli. One day, he soils himself
in the living area. Supposing that there are two carers working at the
home with two very different philosophical outlooks and each of them
is asked how they would manage him. Carer A says that he would lead
X to the bathroom, disrobe him, clean him up, put on a new set of
clothes and lead him back to the living area. Carer B however, says
that he would take off X’s clothes in the living room, lead him out into
the garden, hose him down, lead him back into his room and dress him
in a new set of clothes. We instinctively feel that B’s manner of tending
to the needs of X is wrong and would say that he has treated him in an
undignified manner. However, assuming that X does not resist the
ministrations of either A or B and if we accept that dignity is limited to
respecting autonomy; it cannot be said that X has been treated without
dignity by B. But this account of dignity does not recognise central
features of our convictions about dignity, that it embraces both the
subjective and intrinsic value of human life. When an individual has
lost his capacity to value his own life and no longer has a coherent
300 R Macklin ‘Dignity is a useless concept’ BMJ 2003; 3227; 1419-1429
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sense of self, his life may not have any subjective value, but it retains
an intrinsic value.
Human life has an intrinsic value in that it is valuable ‘for its own
sake’ or ‘in its own right’. Even if that human life does not enjoy
instrumental or subjective value, it is a unique creation. It possesses a
sacred301 and inviolable value and as Dworkin proposes, it is sacred
because it exists and it is inviolable because of what it embodies.302 The
typical human life embodies the idea that it is not just important that
human life exists but that it flourishes, that there more to being
human than being alive. However, even when this life is ‘flawed’ and
unable to flourish in the ordinary sense, it remains a representation of
what it is to be human and as such should be afforded a measure of
respect. We respect the sacredness of life by not destroying it and we
respect the inviolable value of life by acknowledging that life has moral
value beyond mere existence, that it is objectively important how that
life goes and we insist that “nothing be done to or for him, that in our
community’s vocabulary of respect, denies him dignity.”303 In the case
of X, we respect his dignity by treating him as carer A would.
Human dignity means much more than merely possessing the capacity
for autonomous choice. Even when a person is unable to appreciate the
value of his or her own life, the notion of dignity requires that this
person be treated with a measure of respect. The more difficult
questions to answer are: what factors should be taken into account in
deciding what the intrinsic value of life should mean, and how might
ethics committees use this notion of intrinsic value in their
deliberations? As noted above, the intrinsic value of human life exists
independently of any instrumental or subjective value that life might
hold for the individual himself, therefore, what counts as the intrinsic
301 The word sacred is not used in the religious sense but is used to show that human life should be
regarded with a sense of reverence or respect.
302 R Dworkin Life’s Dominion Harper Collins Publishers 1993 at 74
303 Ibid at 237
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value of human life should be independent of the personal
characteristics or capacities of a person, his culture, community or
religion.
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider fully the factors
that are relevant to an enquiry into intrinsic value, the following four
factors are presented as being relevant criteria that should be taken
into account particularly in cases involving medical research enrolling
mentally incapacitated adults.
1. No person should be killed or caused to suffer undue pain or
distress or be put in risky situations. It is impossible to eliminate
all risks in a clinical trial but incompetent patients should only be
exposed to the lowest possible levels of risk and each patient should
be assessed to determine whether or not any of the procedures
involved would cause him any distress.
2. No person should be treated in a discriminatory fashion. There
should be no distinction based on factors such as intellectual ability,
cognitive powers, race, gender, national origin, and religious beliefs.
3. No person should ever be treated solely as a means to an end. No
one should be used to serve the ends of another individual or a
group of people.. There is a greater risk of this happening when
deciding for incompetent patients because the people who care for
them and who are involved in trials have interests of their own and
that there must be a determination that these interests do not
override the interests of the incompetent patient thus making him a
means to an end.
4. Identity goes to the heart of what it means to be a human being and
this identity is rooted in the cultural, societal and religious norms of
a community. It is thus important to look to a community’s
vocabulary of respect when considering the intrinsic value of an
incapacitated patient’s life. For example, a patient living in a
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conservative Muslim community should not be enrolled into trials,
which would involve him ingesting capsules made of porcine
material.
Human dignity and vulnerability - mentally incapacitated
adults
In certain circumstances a population might be deemed vulnerable.
This should put ethics committees on alert and they should pay
particular attention to ensuring that the dignity of this population is
respected. While much ink has been spilled on unpacking the notion of
vulnerability,304 there is little doubt that mentally incapacitated
persons are considered vulnerable and history has borne witness to the
fact that many unethical trials have been carried out on persons who
have lacked capacity.305 How then should the principle of respecting
human dignity be applied in cases involving vulnerable populations?
How should ethical decision-making proceed in such cases?
When considering situations involving vulnerable groups, the first step
should be to locate the sources that contribute to the vulnerability. In
the case of mentally incapacitated adults, there are internal and
external sources that feed into their vulnerability. Mentally
incapacitated adults inevitably suffer from cognitive defects or
deficiencies that render them unable to make autonomous decisions or
to communicate such decisions; and as such, these internal pathologies
are sources of their vulnerability. However, it is not internal pathology
alone that makes this group vulnerable, although it is certainly a
necessary prerequisite. The vulnerability and sense of powerlessness of
the decisionally impaired is also driven by external factors: the manner
304 See discussion in Chapter One, Section 1.2.1
305 See discussion in Section 3.1
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in which capacity judgments are made, and the mechanisms by which
decisions are made for mentally incompetent patients.306
How capacity is determined
Once a person is judged as not having capacity to decide whether or not
to enrol in a clinical trial, he loses the right to make a choice based on
what he believes is the subjective value of his life and at best, others
will decide whether he should take part in the research based on what
they can ascertain of his subjective interests and their understanding
of the factors that make up the intrinsic value of life. A finding of
incapacity deprives a person of a vital element of the subjective value
of human life – the right to autonomy - to make choices free from
external interference.
A person who faces a determination of incapacity is more or less
powerless. He has no power to decide what sort of information will be
provided to him; no choice as to which capacity test will be
administered; no say in the determination of capacity, which will lie in
the hands of the physician; and any protestations on his part, are likely
to be viewed as further evidence of his incapacity. Szasz suitably
demonstrates the vulnerability of an individual who is subject to a
determination of incapacity when he compares the difference between
the situations where a person is accused of a crime with that of a
person facing a determination of incapacity.307
‘The defendant has a right to deny his crime and disagree with
his accusers. His insistence on his innocence is not interpreted
306 There is no doubt that persons who are denied decision-making powers regarding their own
lives are vulnerable. They are subject to the decisions of others and particularly susceptible to
having decisions made for them contrary to their wishes or being exploited. Proxies do not always
make decisions that tally with what patients might really want. A systematic review of 16 studies
involving 151 hypothetical scenarios and 2595 surrogate-patient pairs, which collectively analyzed
19,526 patient-surrogate paired responses found that surrogates wrongly predicted the end-of –life
preferences of patients in one third of the cases. D. I. Shalowitz, E. Garrett-Mayer, and D.
Wendler, "The Accuracy of Surrogate Decision Makers - a Systematic Review," Archives of
Internal Medicine 166, no. 5 (2006).
307 T. Szasz, ""Idiots, Infants, and the Insane": Mental Illness and Legal Incompetence," J Med
Ethics 31, no. 2 (2005).at 80
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as evidence of his guilt. The person diagnosed as mentally ill
loses this right. His disagreement with the psychiatrist is
interpreted as “lack of insight into his illness” or “denial of his
illness”. His insistence on his sanity is interpreted as evidence of
insanity.’
Given the consequences of a determination of incapacity and the fact
that the person on whom this determination is being made is more or
less powerless to contest it; unless the judgment is beyond question, a
person whose capacity is called into doubt is placed in an extremely
vulnerable position. It is therefore troubling to note that problems have
been raised concerning the tests of capacity. To begin with, there
appears to be a lack of consistency across instruments in what is being
measured. A study308 that conducted searches on PubMed (MEDLINE),
PsycINFO, ArticleFirst, LexisNexis and Westlaw for English-language
articles from January 1980 through to December 2004 describing or
using structured instruments designed to assess adults’ capacity to
consent to clinical treatment or research found that “definitions of
“reasoning” vary from the ability to provide “rational reasons” for one’s
choices to making the “reasonable” choice in a given situation to the
underlying cognitive processes used in reaching a decision.”309
Moreover, definitions and measurements of appreciation were also
found to be variable with the focus ranging from appreciation of the
consequences of a choice to acknowledgment of the presence of a
disorder and its treatment potential to the absence of “patently false
beliefs” driving one’s appreciation.310
Second, there is a large subjective element present in the assessment of
capacity. The lack of standardized means of measuring dependent
variables noted above has resulted in investigators frequently
“devising their own measures of understanding, appreciation, and
308 L. B. Dunn et al., "Assessing Decisional Capacity for Clinical Research or Treatment: A
Review of Instruments," American Journal of Psychiatry 163, no. 8 (2006).
309 Ibid. at 1331
310 Ibid. at 1331
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rational manipulation, with varying psychometric properties.”311
Significantly, observers312 have pointed out that that patients are
rarely found to be incompetent when they agree with the choices of
their physicians.
Linked to the first and second points is the argument that assessment
of patient capacity is to a certain extent a matter of social construction
and therefore subject to the injection of bias. Capacity is a continuum
concept that ranges from full capacity through to complete incapacity
and as there are no discernable breaks in the continuum, cut-offs
stationed on it are based largely on practical and policy reasons313 and
these reasons are partially based on the dominant moral and socio-
political values of a society.314 A person who does not conform to
socially accepted norms of behaviour runs the risk of being found to
lack capacity.
Third, sometimes the poor performance of patients may not be solely
dependent on their cognitive disabilities as sometimes this may be due
to the way in which information is provided to them. Patients have no
control over the manner in which information is provided to them.
Schizophrenic patients who performed poorly on initial capacity tests
and who were subsequently given added learning opportunities, were
found to be able to bring their scores into a range of comparative group
311 Paul S. Appelbaum and Thomas Grisso, "The Macarthur Treatment Competence Study. I," Law
and Human Behavior 19, no. 2 (1995). at 111. Jos Welie and Sander Welie, "Patient Decision
Making Competence: Outlines of a Conceptual Analysis," Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
4, no. 2 (2001). at 131 notes that in the absence of a generally agreed-upon theory of health care
benefits, the views of individual clinicians inevitably will affect their assessment of patient’s
decision-making competence.
312 James F. Drane, "The Many Faces of Competency," The Hastings Center Report 15, no. 2
(1985). at 17, Welie and Welie, "Patient Decision Making Competence: Outlines of a Conceptual
Analysis." at 131.
313 Ruth R. Faden, Tom L. Beauchamp, and Nancy M. P. King, A History and Theory of Informed
Consent (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). at 289
314 Barbara Secker, "Labeling Patient (in)Competence: A Feminist Analysis of Medico-Legal
Discourse," Journal of Social Philosophy 30 (1999). at 297
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of people who did not suffer from the condition.315 A study examining
154 consent forms approved by the Internal Review Boards (IRBs) of
the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health found a discrepancy
between the readability of consent forms and the reading ability of
potential study participants.316 Furthermore, consent forms became
more difficult to read as risk levels of the studies increased. There is a
danger that determinations of incapacity may be made too summarily
based on consent forms that are too complicated for certain individuals.
Having ascertained that a source of vulnerability is the manner in
which capacity is determined, and recognising that the danger is that
persons who are subject to this process may loose their right to make
choices based on the subjective values of their lives; ethics committees
that are presented with research protocols that include the
participation of mentally incapacitated adults adhere to the principle of
respecting human dignity by engaging in rigorous examinations of the
way capacity determinations are made.
Respecting human dignity – interplay between subjective
and intrinsic values
How an ethics committee might decide how the pertinent factors that
make up subjective and intrinsic values bear on a particular case and
whether subjective or intrinsic values are more important when they
point in different directions will depend on the protocol that is set
before the committee. These decisions are not always easy to make.
Subjective values may sometimes clash with intrinsic values. There
may be instances where the treatment of a person violates the intrinsic
315 W. T. Carpenter et al., "Decisional Capacity for Informed Consent in Schizophrenia Research,"
Archives of General Psychiatry 57, no. 6 (2000). 537
316 Even by the most conservative estimate, approximately 35% were found to lack the educational
level required to read the average informed consent form. P. P. Christopher et al., "Consent Form
Readability and Educational Levels of Potential Participants in Mental Health Research,"
Psychiatric Services 58, no. 2 (2007) at 230
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value of that person notwithstanding the fact that the individual
chooses that treatment based on cultural and religious influences.
For example, it is one thing to respect the tradition of consulting a
village elder before proceeding to ask individuals in a community for
their consent to conduct a clinical trial in a community; and another
thing altogether to acquiesce to the demand from a village elder that
consent for giving women a trial drug should only be obtained from
their husbands and that researchers should make no attempt to engage
the women in any conversations. Even if the wives appear to accept
that they have no choice in the matter and do not resist the treatment
once their husbands instruct them, it is still a violation of the intrinsic
value of life. Culturally defined notions of identity and subjective value
should not to be confused with culturally based discrimination and
bias. However, these judgments are not easily made and Macklin317
provides an illuminating approach to distinguishing between the two.
She suggests that there are different levels of ethical significance and
that within and across cultures some values have greater importance
than others. Some deal with “basic ways humans treat each other and
others shade into what is more like etiquette.”318
There is no easy prescription for locating what it means to respect
human dignity in any particular case and ethics committees must
make that journey every time they are presented with a research
protocol. But at the same time, what amounts to respecting human
dignity cannot be a matter of ineffable intuition provoked mysteriously
by some factor and not another. By unwrapping the notion of human
dignity into the factors as described above, ethics committee members
have at their disposal a set of building blocks that they can use to
317 Macklin, Ruth. Against Relativism: Cultural Diversity and the Search for Ethical Universals in
Medicine. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Also see Gupta, V.B., and D
Mukherjee. "Conflicting Beliefs." Hastings Cent Rep 40, no. 4 (2010): 14-15 of a case study of an
incapacitated Hindu man.
318 Ibid at 11
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construct their own understandings of what respecting human dignity
requires in each case. While there is still much work to be done in fully
unwrapping this notion of respecting human dignity and what it means
to other potentially vulnerable cohorts such as children and refugees, it
is submitted that this approach presents ethics committees with a
coherent and workable framework for meaningful ethics discourse in a
language that is accessible to all parties.
It is evident from the discussion at the beginning of this chapter that
Malaysian ethics committee members do not or are not able to engage
in meaningful ethics review. Much of this is attributed to the lack of
training provided to committee members. However, as is argued above,
the tools that are presently on offer are flawed. Therefore, offering
ethics committee members these tools will not necessarily remedy the
situation. Guidelines such as the Helsinki Declaration are too complex
and difficult to apply. This is evidenced by the fact that eventhough
some ethics committee members did receive some training on the
Helsinki Declaration, none of them was able to articulate any of the
principles contained within. The reality is that ethics committee
members need new tools. Because ethics committee members come
from a variety of backgrounds,319 they need to be provided with an
ethics framework that is coherent and in a language that is accessible
to every member, but which at the same time is rich enough to reflect
the complex issues raised by medical research. The framework offered
above is the first step in that direction.
319 Scientists, clinicians, researchers, lawyers and lay persons.
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4 Chapter 4
Ethics Committee Review and the ICH-GCP Guideline
Chapter 3 considered whether Malaysian ethics committees were
providing adequate protection to research subjects by examining the
quality of their review process by looking at the principles that they
were using in their discussions. What was apparent from the
interviews that were conducted was that ethics committee members
were generally not relying on established research ethics guidelines
because they were either unaware of the guidelines or unable to
remember the principles contained within. One of the reasons
forwarded for this is that the current guidelines and principles that are
meant to guide ethics committee decision-making are as a whole,
incoherent and difficult to apply. To this end the principle of respecting
human dignity was proposed as being a sounder basis for meaningful
ethics review. Another reason why ethics committee members are
largely ignorant about research ethics is that for all intents and
purposes, the clinical trial industry in Malaysia is regulated by a the
ICH process320 and ethics committees are run in strict compliance with
the ICH-GCP guideline.321
This chapter sets out to describe and analyse the roles and
responsibilities of ethics review as set out by the ICH-GCP, and
demonstrates that taken as a whole, this framework reveals two major
concerns. First, ethics committees (IRBs)322 are not provided with
sufficiently clear and coherent guidance in carrying out their mandate
to protect human subjects. Second, the guideline places a
disproportionate emphasis on duties that are administrative in nature,
320 For a brief account of the development of the ICH process and the implications for developing
countries such as Malaysia, see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3
321 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1)."
322 The term IRB is used in this chapter when referring to ethics committee because this is the
language used by the ICH-GCP. There is no difference between an ethics committee and an IRB.
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which does not necessarily ensure effective protection of human
subjects. Subsequently, even where the guideline does set out valuable
rules, for example the rules relating to disclosure of information,
because of the amount and nature of the information disclosed, it lands
up placing an unduly heavy burden on ethics committees. By then
focusing on the issue of how clinical trials are designed, it further
becomes clear that if ethics review is to achieve its goal of protecting
human subjects, ethics committee members need to be able to identify
and focus their attention on information that is relevant to the issue of
subject protection and to do this they need to be able to understand the
impact certain aspects of trial design have on human subjects in
general and the local population in particular.
While these arguments clearly have a direct impact in the Malaysian
context, it is worthwhile to note the growing influence of the ICH-GCP
process in other jurisdictions such as the UK as well as with the
American FDA. Research Ethics Committees (RECs) reviewing clinical
drug trials in the UK operate under very similar standards as the
Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004323
incorporate the principles of “the GCP Directive”,324 which correspond
in broad terms to the ICH-GCP principles. In America, the FDA
currently recognises the ICH-GCP guideline as a guidance document325
and more significantly, it is also proposing to revise its regulations of
foreign clinical studies under 21 CFR 312.120. Under this revision, the
requirement to conduct studies in accordance with principles stated in
the Declaration of Helsinki will be replaced by a requirement that the
323 The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 (as Amended by S.I
2006/1928 & 2984).
324 The directive mentioned therein is the Commission Directive 2005/28/EC, which according to
the title is “laying down principles and detailed guidelines for good clinical practice as regards
investigational medicinal products for human use, as well as the requirements for authorisation of
the manufacturing or importation of such products.”
325 A guidance document represents the Agency’s current thinking on a particular subject. For
more information, see
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/GuidancesInformation
SheetsandNotices/default.htm (accessed August 17, 2010).
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studies be conducted in accordance with GCP, including review and
approval by an independent ethics committee.326 Given the increasing
influence of GCP principles in the context of clinical trials, it is
surprising to note that there is no literature on how this might impact
on the ethics review process and the protection of human subjects.
Thus it becomes imperative to analyse whether the ICH-GCP
principles adequately protect subjects in clinical trials and if not, what
the alternatives might be.
Ethics committees’ roles and responsibilities and ICH-GCP
Safeguarding rights safety and well-being of all trial
subjects – substantive duties
The first and overarching responsibility of an IRBw as recognised by
the guideline is to safeguard the rights, safety, and well-being of all
trial subjects while paying special attention to trials that may include
vulnerable subjects.327 The IRB responsibility as contained in the
guideline is twofold. First, to safeguard the rights, safety and well-
being of all subjects; and second, to pay special attention to vulnerable
subjects. Both these aspects involve what can be described as
substantive duties as opposed to administrative duties. The ICH-GCP
in general, imposes two types of duties on IRBs, which can be described
as being administrative and substantive. Administrative duties are
those that relate to tasks that are more or less clerical in nature and do
not require any exercise of discretion or judgment. For example, where
the committee is charged with obtaining certain documents and
providing review within a stipulated time.328 Substantive duties on the
other hand, require that the IRB perform certain tasks or secure
326 Food and Drug Administration, DHSS, Docket No 2004N-0018, Federal Register Vol 69, No
112, June 10 2004.
327 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1).",
Guideline 3.1.1
328 Ibid. Guideline 3.1.2
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certain outcomes, which will require some exercise of discretion or
judgment. In this case, the IRB is assigned the responsibility to ensure
an outcome: that is safeguarding the rights, safety and well-being of
subjects, and is further tasked to pay special attention to vulnerable
subjects with presumably the same outcome in mind.
Lack of clear guidance in relation to substantive duties
It is undoubtedly true that the raison d’etre of ethics review of clinical
research is to safeguard the interests of human subjects, but, if the
guideline is to act as an effective framework for ethics review, it must
also provide IRBs with the tools to enable them to achieve this
outcome. This then raises two questions: first, what sort of guidance
should be provided to IRBs and second, is this guidance provided in the
ICH-GCP document? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary
to return to the concept of a substantive duty. A substantive duty, by
definition, is made up of two aspects: first, what can be termed an
“outcome” aspect, in that it requires that a certain outcome be
achieved, in this case, the safeguarding of certain rights and interests
of human subjects; and second, what can be called a “process” aspect,
which refers to the process by which the outcome is achieved. A
consideration of process aspects would involve asking questions about
the types of properties or features of a system that need to be put into
place in order to achieve the desired outcome. Therefore, for an IRB to
successfully fulfil its responsibility as set out by the ICH-GCP, it must
be given sufficient guidance regarding both the outcome and process
aspects of its responsibility.
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Outcome aspect
As mentioned earlier,329 the desired outcome or outcome aspect of
ethics review is that the rights, safety and well-being of subjects are
protected. If an IRB is to achieve this outcome, it surely must have a
clear conception of what it means to safeguard the rights, safety and
well-being of subjects. It will be difficult if not impossible for an IRB to
arrive at this desired outcome of protecting these elements if it is not
provided at the outset with a comprehensible notion of the content of
each element. If an IRB is to safeguard the stated interests of a
subject, it needs to know what rights a subject has and whether they
are absolute or relative, what levels of safety a subject should be
provided with and what is meant by the well-being of a subject. There
is no specific detailed explanation of any of these matters in the
guideline.
Moreover, in cases involving vulnerable subjects, IRBs are tasked with
paying special attention. Vulnerable subjects330 under this guideline
include individuals who may be unduly influenced by benefits or fear of
reprisals from senior members of a hierarchy; as well as “patients with
incurable diseases, persons in nursing homes, unemployed or
impoverished persons, patients in emergency situations, ethnic
minority groups, homeless persons, nomads, refugees, minors and
those incapable of giving consent.”331 There is no further mention of
vulnerable subjects in the document apart from its definition and the
fact that trials involving these populations should be given special
attention. Having set out this requirement, the guideline stops short of
providing an IRB with any assistance about what “paying special
attention” should mean. The very fact that the guideline charges an
329 See Chapter One, section 1.1.2
330 For a discussion of the concept of vulnerability see Chapter 1, section 1.2.1
331 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1)."
Guideline 1.61
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IRB to pay special attention in such cases must mean that there are
different or extra considerations that need to be taken into account in
determining the scope of the rights, safety and welfare of incompetent
subjects. The guideline simply fails to provide IRBs with a clear idea of
what they need to achieve in order to protect human subjects in
general and vulnerable subjects in particular.
In contrast to this, the American Common Rule sets out much clearer
guidance regarding what an IRB needs to achieve. Under the CFR
46.111, an IRB must make a determination that it is satisfied that all
the requirements provided for in the section have been met before it
approves any research.332 These include providing: for the
minimisation of risks to subjects by ensuring that procedures are
consistent with sound research design, that risks to subjects are
reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, the equitable selection of
subjects, appropriately documented and obtained informed consent,
and the protection of subjects’ confidentiality. In addition to this, the
Common Rule spells out in detail what extra criteria IRBs are required
to take into account when reviewing research trials involving certain
vulnerable populations such as pregnant women, human foetuses and
neonates, children, and prisoners.333
Process-oriented aspects
In seeking to achieve the outcome of human subject protection, an IRB
engages in a process of reviewing research protocols to decide whether
or not certain trials should be allowed to carry on. What this might or
should entail is still very much open to debate. To date, very little
research has been carried out into this aspect of ethics review and most
of the literature has focused on administrative matters: such as how
332 46 CFR 46.111
333 46 CFR Subparts B, C and D
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long it takes committees to make decisions,334 and the amount of time
and money wasted on bureaucracy.335
It is submitted that there are two features, which are integral to the
process of meaningful ethics review. First, conditions must exist that
allow for meaningful discussions, which are accessible to all members
of an IRB; and second, there must be a framework for rational decision-
making. These features are closely interrelated: when IRB members
engage in meaningful discussions, they will in all probability identify
and consider the relevant principles and facts that will in turn,
promote rational decision-making. Similarly, if IRB members are
provided with an appropriate framework that sets out the relevant
principles they should take into account when making their decisions,
this will in turn, result in a more focused and meaningful discussion.
Both these features will require as a starting point, some sort of
framework that sets out the principles and considerations that
underlie the review process. The guideline does provide some guidance
in this respect under Guideline 2 where there is a list of general
principles that apply across the board to the conduct of clinical trials.
336 The principles listed under this section deal with both issues of
human subject protection as well as scientific merit. Significantly,
eight337 out of the thirteen principles go to the issue of scientific merit
and only four338 principles are directly concerned with human subject
334 Joanna Tully et al., "The New System of Review by Multicentre Research Ethics Committees:
Prospective Study," BMJ 320, no. 7243 (2000).
335 Alysun M. Jones and Bryony Bamford, "The Other Face of Research Governance," BMJ 329,
no. 7460 (2004)., Paul Glasziou and Iain Chalmers, "Ethics Review Roulette: What Can We
Learn?," BMJ 328, no. 7432 (2004)., David Hunter, "Efficiency and the Proposed Reforms to the
Nhs Research Ethics System," J Med Ethics 33, no. 11 (2007)., Hilary Hearnshaw, "Comparison of
Requirements of Research Ethics Committees in 11 European Countries for a Non-Invasive
Interventional Study," BMJ 328, no. 7432 (2004)., David S. Wald, "Bureaucracy of Ethics
Applications," BMJ 329, no. 7460 (2004).
336 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1)."
Guideline 2
337 Ibid. Guidelines 2.4, 2.5, 2.7, 2.8, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12 and 2.13
338 Ibid. Guideline 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.9
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protection. The principles provided in the guideline were most likely
never intended to serve as a framework for IRB decision making as the
title of the section itself suggests that these are simply principles of
ICH GCP. The best option for basing a framework for IRB decision
making is guideline 2.1, which states that clinical trials should be
conducted in accordance with the ethical principles that have their
origin in the Declaration of Helsinki and that are consistent with GCP
and applicable regulatory requirements.339 This however, is not
without it problems. As discussed in chapter 3, the Declaration of
Helsinki is plagued with conflicting principles and the open-texture of
the language used exposes it to many different and possibly
contradictory interpretations.
In addition to having a coherent and meaningful set of principles to
guide the ethics review process, two other elements are vital to ensure
that an IRB engages in rational decision-making. First, an IRB must
be properly constituted and second, the committee must be provided
with sufficient, relevant information. The issues of the composition of
an IRB and the documents that must be submitted for review are
covered in great detail in the guideline and discussed in greater depth
in later parts of this chapter as well as in Chapter 5
As such, as in the case of the “outcome” aspect discussed above, the
Guideline fails also in formulating a process that satisfactorily aids an
IRB in achieving the outcome of subject protection in clinical trials.
Administrative duties
The guideline stipulates the composition, function and operation of
ethics committees; the procedures it should follow; and matters
relating to record keeping. The content of these sections is to all intents
339 Ibid. Guideline 2.1
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and purposes, administrative in nature and is aimed at ensuring that
the operations of a committee are well documented. It is worth
pointing out that three340 out of the four sub-topics under the heading
of Institutional Review Board/Independent Ethics Committee cover
matters that relate to the administrative duties of an IRB. Moreover,
even guideline 3.1 that deals with the responsibilities of the IRB has as
many subsections prescribing administrative duties341 as it has
prescribing substantive duties.
This really goes to the heart of what the ICH process is all about. It is
concerned with two things: first, ensuring that regardless of where
drug development and manufacturing takes place, drugs are developed,
tested, registered and monitored in a manner that ensures their
quality and safety; and second, making the process of developing new
drugs more efficient and less expensive. It does these things by
prescribing harmonized standards for what are mostly scientific and
quantitative processes, which mainly involve close observation and
documentation. Apart from the ICH-GCP, all the other ICH guidelines
prescribe standards for scientific and quantitative processes and it is
therefore not surprising that the ICH-GCP is to a large extent made up
of administrative duties.
Admittedly, these administrative processes lend themselves well in the
scientific arena as a manner of demonstrating compliance to standards.
Take for example the ICH Guideline on Structure and Content of
Study Reports that sets out the standards for adverse event
reporting.342 Close monitoring of adverse events is a crucial part of
ensuring the safety profile of drugs in clinical trials. Adverse events
340 Ibid. Guidelines 3.2-3.4
341 See Ibid. Guidelines 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.1.4, 3.1.9
342International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use. "Structure and Content of Clinical Study Reports E3." In ICH
Harmonised Tripartite Guideline, 1995. at para 12.2, Study reports must document all adverse
events in a brief narrative supported by more detailed tabulations and analyses.
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during the course of a trial may indicate that a certain drug is
generally unsafe or unsafe when used in certain populations. To ensure
that a drug is safe for use, information needs to be compiled regarding
how many people have had bad reactions during the trial; the type of
reactions; the severity of the events; the possible causal links between
the reactions and the drugs; and so on. The accurate and careful
compilation of relevant data is essential to any meaningful analysis.
Moreover, when a trial is run across several countries in hundreds of
institutions involving thousands of subjects, this can only be
successfully achieved if there is detailed and accurate documentation of
identical data. For this reason, standardization of documentation is key
to ensuring the quality of the analysis and this is what the ICH process
sets out to ensure.
The question is whether or not this same approach is appropriate in
situations that involve non-science based activities such as the activity
of ethics review? Ethics review is concerned with human subject
protection, and as noted earlier imposes substantive duties on an IRB.
The endpoint of a successful ethics review should be determined by
whether or not the safety and well being of subjects have in fact been
adequately protected. The fact that a committee is required to
scrutinise an exhaustive series of documents is certainly important as
it serves as evidence that its attention has been drawn to pieces of
relevant information, but it surely cannot on its own, be evidence of the
quality of the decision made based on the documents provided to it.
Similarly, evaluating whether or not an ethics committee has
performed its functions according to written standard operating
procedures, and whether it has maintained written records of its
activities and minutes of its meetings is valuable but only to the extent
that it speaks to its good organisation rather than its success in
protecting human subjects. While there is a undoubtedly a great deal of
value in these procedural requirements, they cannot and should not be
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the last word on setting the standards of ethics review. The fact that
the largest portion of the guideline concerns itself with administrative
duties rather than giving flesh to the bare bones of the few substantive
duties set out, renders it much less valuable as a tool for protecting
human subjects.
This then raises the question as to what is needed to give flesh to the
bare bones of the substantive duties set out in the guideline?
Undeniably, ethics review in the “real” sense does not lend itself easily
to accurate measurement. There are a series of questions that might be
considered. How does one measure whether or not human subjects are
protected? Should we ask subjects or physicians? How do we know that
ethics committees have taken the right principles into account? Are
there any right principles to begin with, or should these committees be
free to come up with their own principles, or choose from a list of pre-
approved declarations and guidelines? How do we ensure that these
committees are free from the types of conflicts of interest that bedevil
investigators, institutions and the pharmaceutical industry? This
would involve asking questions such as what principles should guide
decision-making, particularly in cases involving vulnerable populations
such as mentally incompetent patients and whether or not ethics
committees are taking such principles into account and if they are not,
why?
In answering these questions, and in seeking to enable IRBs to perform
their substantive duties satisfactorily, it is necessary to return to the
origins of ethics review and the concerns that needed to be met at that
time; and place them against the current setting of clinical trials. In so
doing, three broad themes emerge. First, the importance of the notion
of independence. Second, the essential need for a coherent and
inclusive set of general principles that underlie the decision-making
framework and third, the need for institutional structures that allow
129
for high-quality review. These themes go far beyond the guidelines
found in the ICH-GCP and bring to sharp focus the shortcomings of a
system that has chosen to rely on this document to shape the manner
in which ethics review of clinical trials is conducted.
Having said this, it is important to recognise that some aspects of the
ICH-GCP have the potential to play a very important part in ensuring
effective ethics review. This is particularly true in relation to the rules
relating to documents that must be provided to ethics committees.
Rules relating to Disclosure of information
There is no doubt that the ethics review process as required by the
ICH-GCP guideline provides an extra level of detailed scrutiny of
research trials. Investigators are require to submit a number of
documents343 relating to the clinical trial for ethics review including:
the trial protocol, written informed consent forms, subject recruitment
procedures, written information to be provided to subjects,
Investigator’s Brochure,344 available safety information, information
about payments and compensation available to subjects and the
investigator’s current curriculum vitae.
A typical research application submitted to an ethics committee easily
runs into several hundred pages, as very detailed disclosure is required
by the guideline. For instance, the trial protocol alone should include at
the minimum, the following topics345: general information regarding
the title of the trial, names and addresses of the sponsors, medical
experts, investigators, clinical laboratories and institutions involved in
the trial; background information of the investigational product,
343 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use. "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1)."
Guideline 3.1.2
344 The Investigator’s Brochure is a compilation of the clinical and non-clinical data on the
investigational product which is relevant to the study of the product in human subjects, Ibid.
Guideline 1.36
345 Ibid. Guideline 6
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including summaries of findings from relevant non clinical studies and
known potential risks and benefits; reference to relevant literature and
data; a detailed description of the objectives and purposes of the trial;
the trial design in detail, which would include specific statements of
endpoints, whether it is randomised, placebo-controlled, double-
blinded, the dosage regiment, duration of the trial, stopping procedures
and accountability procedures; the selection and withdrawal criteria of
subjects; the treatment provided to subjects; assessments of efficacy
and safety of the trial; statistical methods to be employed; IRB access
to source data and documents; quality control and assurance; ethics
considerations; data handling and record keeping; financing and
insurance and publication policy.
The fact that investigators are required to submit for ethics review
such an exhaustive amount of data for every trial that they hope to run
has both positive and negative aspects. On the positive side, sponsors
and investigators are compelled to articulate in detail almost every
aspect of the research trial. This is in stark contrast to the practice in
the immediate post-World War II period where investigators were, for
all intents and purposes, left to decide whether or not to submit their
research trials to any sort of peer review and if so, how much
information they chose to divulge. The autonomy they enjoyed was only
limited by their individual consciences and the manner in which this
discretion was frequently abused eventually became the focus of
several exposes,346 demonstrating the dangers of leaving investigators
to their own devices. The ICH-GCP guideline in requiring not just
cursory but comprehensive disclosures of the different aspects of a
clinical trial makes it very difficult for an investigator to hold back any
information, which in turn, allows for a more effective ethics review
process.
346 Beecher, "Ethics and Clinical Research.", M H Pappworth, Human Guinea Pigs:
Experimentation on Man (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1969).
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In addition to this, the very fact that investigators and sponsors have
to spell out each aspect of the trial so specifically, lends to a much more
thoughtful and careful planning and development process. Clinical
trial design and development has evolved into a complex activity.
Teams of people are often involved in writing protocols with input from
many different parties. The development process involves collaboration
among study statisticians, scientists, clinical investigators, editors,
protocol co-ordinators and managers.347 When protocol development
teams sit down to design a trial and write a protocol, they do so with a
clear picture of the issues they will need to address and clearly
describe. In addition to detailing the scientific aspects of the trial, they
will also have to draw up patient information sheets, describing the
nature of the trial in lay terms, together with descriptions of the
potential risks and benefits of the trial. This would mean that by the
time the research protocol is presented for ethics review, a great deal of
work will have already been put in to ensure that the trial will pass
ethics review.
There are two potentially negative aspects of requiring such detailed
disclosure. First, ethics committee members are required to look
through a voluminous amount of material as a single application for
ethics review usually runs into hundreds of pages. A typical ethics
committee meets once a month and at each meeting peruses
approximately between eighteen to twenty research protocols. As a
conservative estimate, if each protocol runs into 150 pages and there
are eighteen protocols submitted each month, ethics committee
members will need to read through on average, 2,700 pages every
347 An example of this is the American Clinical Trials Co-operative Group Program, which is
sponsored by the National Cancer Institute. It works with the Insitute to identify important
questions in cancer research and to design clinical trials. This programme involves more than
1,700 institutions and thousands of investigators. For more information see
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/NCI/clinical-trials-cooperative-group (date accessed
22 May 2008)
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month. Most committee members are employed on a full time basis and
serve on ethics committees as volunteers, and as such will be hard
pressed to find the time and energy to carefully scrutinise thousands of
pages of information.
In addition to this, because the guideline requires not just detailed
disclosure of information, but detailed disclosure of information across
a wide range of topics; ethics committee members land up struggling
with not only just reading through thousands of pages, but also with
trying to understand the different types of information provided in the
protocols. For example, a standard protocol would include among other
things: scientific information relating to the characteristics of the
product being studied; the treatment regime involved, which would
include the route of administration, dosage and treatment period;
details of the statistical analysis employed; information about data
collection, handling and record keeping; details of the trial design; an
informed consent sheet; information to be provided to patients about
the trial procedure, risks and benefits; and pharmacovigilance348
measures. The language used in most of these topics will be highly
technical and often, inaccessible to the lay reader. A clinician might
find it easy to understand and assess the treatment regime proposed
and the type of disorder being studied, he might not however, find it so
easy to understand the details of the characteristics of a new product
that is being proposed for study. A pharmacologist on the other hand,
may find that he has the opposite problem, and both of them might
have trouble understanding the type of statistical analysis that is being
proposed.
So, ethics committees are likely to struggle with both the volume and
content of the material submitted for review. The logical solution to the
348 This is a branch of pharmacological science relating to the detection, assessment,
understanding and prevention of adverse effects of medicines.
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latter problem is to have a committee that is made up of a sufficiently
broad range of experts who will be able to assess effectively the
different types of information provided in a trial protocol. This is
provided for in the guideline, which states, “The IRB/IEC should
consist of a reasonable number of members, who collectively have the
qualifications and experience to review and evaluate the science,
medical aspects and ethics of the proposed trial.”349 The guideline does
not specify what sorts of qualifications ethics committee members
should have apart from requiring that at least one member’s primary
interest must lie in a non-scientific area,350 and that one other member
must be independent of the institution or trial site.351 In practice, both
academic ethics committees as well as the MREC are made up of
clinicians, scientists and lay representatives. Members of the ethics
committee at University A, and the MREC are primarily appointed by
virtue of the positions they hold in their respective institutions. At
University A, the ethics committee is comprised of:
 Chairman – The Dean of the Faculty of Medicine or named
representative, in this case, a senior Professor of the Faculty of
Medicine,
 Hospital Director or representative,
 Head of the Department of Medicine or named representative,
Faculty of Medicine,
 Head, Department of Psychological Medicine or named
representative, Faculty of Medicine,
 Head, Department of Surgery or named representative, Faculty
of Medicine,
 Dean, Faculty of Law, or named representative
349 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1)."
Guideline 3.2.1
350 Ibid. Guideline 3.2.1 (b)
351 Ibid. Guideline 3.2.1 (c)
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 Head, Department of Pharmacy/Pharmacology, Faculty of
Medicine, or named representative, on rotation through a two-
yearly term
 Head, Pharmacy Unit, or named representative and
 2 public representatives
The composition of the MREC is as follows:
 Deputy Director-General of Health (Research & Technical
Support) – permanent chairman
 Director of the Institute for Medical Research
 Director of the Institute of Public Health
 Director of the Network of Clinical Research Centres
 Two Public Health Medical Specialists
 Two Clinical Medicine Specialists
 Three Medical Research Specialists
 Three Senior Research Officers
 One Senior Pharmacist
 One Nurse
 One Medical Laboratory Technologist
 One Lay Person
 One Representative from the Academy of Medicine
Theoretically these committees, which are made up of clinical
physicians, scientists, lay representatives, and legally trained
representatives are well placed to evaluate the different aspects of trial
protocols. In fact, this would also appear to solve the problem of the
high volume of material that is submitted for review. If physicians are
confident that their scientist counterparts are carefully reviewing the
scientific aspects of protocols and vice versa; and if lay members are
confident that the scientists and physicians are reading through the
medical and scientific descriptions carefully, they might be satisfied
with merely looking through the informed consent sheets and patient
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information sheets. The latter certainly appears to be the case as one
lay member commented that
‘We basically focus on the objective and then the procedure and
the patient consent form. So we think the rest of it is okay.’352
Another member from the MREC353 said that
‘Some of them who are not well versed in the clinical part of it
will look at the informed consent part for instance, and try to see
from a layman’s point of view or from a non doctor’s point of
view, whether what information which is given, whether it was
enough or appropriate. Those who are doctors tend to ask a bit
more questions about the clinical part of the trial.’
It is submitted that if this is true, then ethics committee members are
not paying enough attention to aspects that they think are beyond
their expertise or understanding but that are integral to meaningful
ethics review, and by conducting separate, disjointed reviews of
different aspects of the protocols and by seemingly relying on each
other to function in a uncoordinated manner, they are placing all
human subjects at risk and especially incompetent adult patients.
The following section will demonstrate how this can occur in relation to
the issue of how trials are designed. It might be maintained that an
evaluation of the way a trial is designed, is more a matter of scientific
review rather than ethics review. It will be argued that this is not
necessarily the case and where trials are sponsored by the industry,
the issue of trial design becomes very much a concern for ethics
committees, and that what at first appears to simply be a question of
science, turns into an ethical dilemma with rather surprising
paradoxical consequences. The fact is that the problem of having to
review large amounts of information, most of which is highly technical,
cannot be solved by apportioning review of different aspects of trial
protocols to committee members who have special qualifications.
Because the ICH-GCP guideline throws such a voluminous amount of
352 Interview with Committee Member B, Institution A, 21 December 2007.
353 Interview with Ethics Committee Member A, MREC, 25 November 2008
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information in the way of ethics committees it is not easy for committee
members to know which aspects of a protocol require their combined
attention and review and the solution must go further than the
appointment of a variety of experts. Among other thing, ethics
committees need to be provided with sufficient and appropriate
training that will allow them to engage in meaningful ethics review.
Industry-sponsored trials and trial design
The majority of trials run in Malaysia are industry-sponsored trials.
These trials are usually carried out to prove that the experimental
therapy, which is usually a drug or compound manufactured by the
sponsor, is superior to existing treatment modalities. Numerous
studies have indicated that industry-sponsored trials are far more
likely to report in favour of experimental therapy compared to publicly
funded research.354 Significantly, this apparent bias has not been
attributed to defects in the scientific quality of the research as some
authors have even suggested that the design of industry sponsored
trials are of a higher quality as compared to publicly funded
research.355 Among the various reasons356 forwarded to explain these
favourable results is that research trials supported by the industry
354 See Sameer S. Chopra, "Industry Funding of Clinical Trials: Benefit or Bias?," JAMA 290, no.
1 (2003)., Benjamin Djulbegovic et al., "The Uncertainty Principle and Industry-Sponsored
Research," The Lancet 356, no. 9230 (2000)., Richard Davidson, "Source of Funding and Outcome
of Clinical Trials," Journal of General Internal Medicine 1, no. 3 (1986)., Roy H. Perlis et al.,
"Industry Sponsorship and Financial Conflict of Interest in the Reporting of Clinical Trials in
Psychiatry," Am J Psychiatry 162, no. 10 (2005)., Mildred K. Cho and Lisa A. Bero, "The Quality
of Drug Studies Published in Symposium Proceedings," Ann Intern Med 124, no. 5 (1996)., R.M.
Procyshyn et al., "Prevalence and Outcomes of Pharmaceutical Industry–Sponsored Clinical Trials
Involving Clozapine, Risperidone, or Olanzapine," Can J Psychiatry 49, no. 9 (2004).
355 Julio S. G. Montaner, Michael V. O'Shaughnessy, and Martin T. Schechter, "Industry-
Sponsored Clinical Research: A Double-Edged Sword," The Lancet 358, no. 9296 (2001). citing
Davidson, "Source of Funding and Outcome of Clinical Trials." and K. I. Kaitin, N. R. Bryant, and
L. Lasagna, "The Role of the Research-Based Pharmaceutical Industry in Medical Progress in the
United States," J Clin Pharmacol 33, no. 5 (1993).. See also Procyshyn et al., "Prevalence and
Outcomes of Pharmaceutical Industry–Sponsored Clinical Trials Involving Clozapine,
Risperidone, or Olanzapine."
356 Other reasons include, drug companies beings less willing to sponsor studies in the absence of
evidence of effectiveness of a compound, delays in publishing negative findings, inappropriate use
of statistical analysis or misleading presentation of data. See Chopra, "Industry Funding of Clinical
Trials: Benefit or Bias?.", Djulbegovic et al., "The Uncertainty Principle and Industry-Sponsored
Research." and Montaner, O'Shaughnessy, and Schechter, "Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research:
A Double-Edged Sword.".
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may be subject to methodological bias. This is to say that the study
question or the design of the trial may be structured in a way that
might affect the outcome of the research. For example, clinical trials
might use inappropriate controls such as inferior comparative
therapies or placebos. A study looking at trials of non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs in the treatment of arthritis, found that almost
half of industry-sponsored trials used dosing which favoured the
experimental drug.357 Enrolling relatively healthy patients into a trial
and extrapolating these results to the broader spectrum of patients
may be another way in which the design of the study might inject bias
into the results. For instance, a trial looking at the effectiveness of a
treatment for schizophrenia might only allow the enrolment of patients
with a very mild form of the disease and exclude patients with more
moderate or severe forms of the disease, or patients presenting with co-
morbidities. Assuming that schizophrenic patients typically suffer from
moderate forms of the disease or suffer from co-morbidities, the
favourable results of such a trial may not translate into an effective
treatment regime for the broader group of schizophrenic patients. This
then raises the question as to whether such a trial is ethically sound? If
the trial drug cannot be safely or effectively administered to the
general patient population, the time and money spent, and more
importantly, the risks borne by trial subjects cannot be justified.
Having regard to the fact that virtually all trials run in the country are
industry-sponsored, it is essential that all protocols be carefully
reviewed to minimise the risk of methodological bias.
Scientific validity vs. scientific value
As pointed out earlier, the question of trial design would appear to be
more a question of scientific merit rather than one that raises ethical
concerns. This in turn raises the issue as to the proper remit of ethics
357 P. A. Rochon et al., "A Study of Manufacturer-Supported Trials of Nonsteroidal Anti-
Inflammatory Drugs in the Treatment of Arthritis," Arch Intern Med 154, no. 2 (1994).
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review and the appropriateness of using the vehicle of ethics review to
gauge the scientific merits of a protocol. The Malaysian Guidelines for
Applications to Conduct Drug Related Trials358 requires both ethics as
well as scientific review of every application. Each academic institution
in the country has a scientific review process in place that is separate
from its ethics review and the Research Review Committee of the
Ministry of Health reviews the scientific merit of trials run in
government hospitals. With these mechanisms for reviewing scientific
merit in place, it may well be argued that ethics committees should
eschew documents relating to the science of the trial and focus on
patient information sheets, informed consent forms, and information
about payments and compensation available to subjects. Focusing on
these documents would also mean that ethics committee members
would be able to spend more time examining these aspects in greater
detail resulting in better ethical review.
On the other hand, it is well established that if research on human
subjects is to be ethical, it must have scientific merit. 359 However,
there has been little discussion of what is required of ethical review in
this context, and given that research protocols are subject to prior
scientific review, ethics review of scientific merit seems superfluous.
Freedman360 in his illuminating explication of scientific merit in
research ethics makes sense of this apparent dilemma. He
distinguishes between what he calls readings of “validity” and “value”
and asks whether the ethical review of research should examine
scientific validity or value.
358 Guidelines for Application to Conduct Drug-Related Clinical Trials in Malaysia 2000.
359 Guideline 1Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, "International Ethical
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects.", Para 11 World Medical
Association, "Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human
Subjects."
360 Benjamin Freedman, "Scientific Value and Validity as Ethical Requirements for Research: A
Proposed Explication," IRB: Ethics and Human Research 9, no. 6 (1987).
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Validity is simply concerned about whether the “study is designed to
yield reliable information, according to accepted principles of research
practice, concerning the hypothesis being tested”361 and therefore only
involves judgments of intrinsic elements,362 and as such requires
expertise in the form of members with knowledge of research design,
statistics, and clinical and bench sciences. Value, on the other hand,
starts with an assumption of validity but proceeds to consider the
significance of the hypothesis itself.363 Is the hypothesis useful or
interesting? What is useful or interesting may depend on a variety of
factors including clinical or social implications and might even require
a trade-off with other elements of ethical research, such as the quality
of consent.364 Interdisciplinary expertise is thus required in making
judgments of scientific value.
A trial that might be scientifically valid may not be scientifically
valuable. The previous example of a clinical trial involving
schizophrenia treatment is a case in point. The trial protocol might be
scientifically valid in that it would provide information to support a
hypothesis that drug A is superior to a placebo for treating
schizophrenia by enrolling patients with mild schizophrenia and who
have no other pre-existing conditions into a double-blinded,
randomised trial. If this cohort of subjects does not represent the
general population of schizophrenic patients, the protocol may not be
scientifically valuable in that the hypothesis will have hardly any
practical clinical significance. The time and money spent, and risks
incurred by subjects might not be warranted, given its limited practical
applicability.
361 Ibid. at 7
362 Freedman contends that proposals contain two elements, those that are intrinsic and those that
are presumptive. The absence of an intrinsic element is fatal to a proposal, whereas the absence of
a presumptive element will, as a matter of judgment, make it less likely that a proposal will
succeed. Typical examples of presumptive elements include the experience and track record of the
investigator. Ibid. at 9
363 Ibid. at 9
364 Ibid. at 9
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Having established that the assessments of validity and value involve
different types of judgments, that validity is a necessary and discrete
condition of value, and that assessments of value need to be made in
the context of the other elements of the research; Freedman
convincingly argues that a prior technical adjudication of scientific
merit should only encompass judgments of validity as scientific review
committees are not made up of a broad enough range of expertise to
adjudicate on issues of scientific value, leaving this determination in
the hands of ethics review committees.
Trial design and scientific value
Accepting this argument that scientific review is rightly concerned
with judging scientific validity and that judgments of scientific value
are best left to ethics review; it is contended that the role played by
ethics review of scientific value in clinical trials is in fact a critical one.
Hence, what at the outset would appear to be an area requiring a
scientific evaluation by either a scientific review board or by members
of an ethics review board that are scientifically trained / qualified, is in
fact an area requiring a non-scientific review, i.e. an ethics review by
the combined members of the IRB (including in particular the lay
persons or ethics experts, i.e. the non-scientifically trained members).
This will ensure that the trial is of scientific value as well as being
scientifically valid.
This proposition is clearly demonstrated upon an examination of
clinical trials that potentially involve mentally incompetent adults.
Trials (e.g. clinical trials of psychiatric drugs / therapy) that meet the
highest standards of scientific validity are likely to adversely affect the
interests of mentally incompetent adult patients (and hence lack
scientific value) for two reasons. The first reason is based on the fact
that a successful trial is one that generates statistically significant
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findings, and this in turn is dependent on large numbers of subjects
completing the trial. If mentally incompetent patients are considered
unreliable and unlikely to complete, or if there are problems associated
with enrolling this cohort, they risk being excluded from the trial
altogether and the following section discusses how in the Malaysian
context in particular, this exclusion of mentally incompetent subjects
might not be a good thing. Second, the most scientifically reliable
results are those obtained from clinical trials that are able to minimise
any bias, and the best way to minimise bias in a clinical drug trial is to
run a randomised, double-blinded, placebo-controlled trial; preferably
with a washout period, if subjects are on any medication for the
condition that is being studied. This type of clinical trial, i.e.
randomised controlled trials (RCT), which are considered the most
scientifically reliable, and hence valid, have the downside of potentially
adversely affecting mentally incompetent adults where such subjects
are included in the trials, and hence, carries the danger of lacking
scientific value. The last section of this chapter will demonstrate the
manner in which RCTs potentially expose mentally incompetent adults
which are included in such trials to unacceptable levels of risk. In
addition to this, the greater problem identified in the Malaysian
context is that although mentally incompetent patients are as a rule
excluded from trials as described earlier; because of the lack of
consistent and clear standards for determining capacity, there is a very
real danger that they be inappropriately admitted into such trials
without the benefit of any extra safeguards.
Trial Design - Subject selection criteria and exclusion from
trials
In the Malaysian context, incompetent365 adults suffering from
psychiatric disorders are not enrolled into industry-sponsored clinical
trials and in fact, competency is as a rule, listed as an inclusion
365 The criteria for determining competency itself raise a number of concerns that are dealt with in
Chapter 3. The following discussion assumes that such determinations are appropriately made.
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criterion. So at the outset, the design of the trial excludes the
participation of mentally incompetent adult patients. One of the
reasons cited for excluding incompetent adults from psychiatric trials
is the great difficulty in ensuring compliance with treatment plans.
Incompetent patients by definition suffer from cognitive defects and
are unlikely to be able to understand the complex treatment regimes
required of them or the need for a greater number of follow-up sessions
with investigators. In the absence of caregiver or institutional support,
these patients are unlikely to be able to adhere to the strict regiments
prescribed by the protocols.
Another reason provided is that sponsors are unwilling to proceed
without informed consent. Sponsors are said to be
‘very, very keen and cautious about consent and everything must
be written by the patient….must be the patient’s own
handwriting and they are very, very strict about that.’ 366
This is rather surprising as the ICH-GCP guideline clearly envisages
proxy-decision making and makes provision for this by way of
recognising legally acceptable representatives.367 Moreover, if industry
players adopt the attitude of being unwilling to accept anything short
of informed consent, this will result in a smaller pool of potential
subjects, which in turn, will weaken the statistical significance of the
results. On the other hand, it is undoubtedly true that validly obtained
informed consent is ethically preferable to proxy consent. Ethically,
informed consent, is one, if not the most important tool in securing the
respect of human dignity of a competent adult, by allowing an
individual to give voice to the subjective value he places on his life368
Proxy consent is by far a much weaker and more ethically suspect
366 Interview with Psychiatrist/Investigator A, practicing at University A, 30 June 2008
367 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1)."
Guideline 1.37
368 For a discussion of the idea of respecting human dignity which is made of up subjective and
intrinsic values, see Chapter 3
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device369 and raises many questions such as who should decide, what
standards should apply and what factors should be taken into account?
Also, given the greater potential liabilities associated with proxy
consent,370 this stance may be partially attributable to the risk adverse
nature of commercial entities. However, it does not explain why trials
run in other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and United
States are not routinely subject to such strict restrictions.
A more likely explanation is that in Malaysia it is difficult if not
impossible, to ascertain who might be considered a legally acceptable
representative as defined by the ICH-GCP. The guideline defines a
legally acceptable representative as “an individual or juridical or other
body authorized under applicable law to consent, on behalf of a
prospective subject, to the subject’s participation in the clinical
trial.”371 Until the Mental Health Act372 comes into force, there is no
law in Malaysia that authorises a proxy to make health care decisions
for an incompetent adult patient. In the event that a Malaysian court
is called on to determine a case involving the treatment of an
incompetent adult, it will most likely rely on the English decision in Re
F373 where the court recognised that in such cases, treatment
proceeded without any consent but did not invite any legal liability as
reliance was placed on the defence of necessity, requiring that the
doctor should act in the best interests of the patient. If this is the case,
there is currently no legal basis for authorising proxies to make health
care decisions on behalf of mentally incompetent adults. Given the
uncertainty regarding the legality of proxy decision makers in
Malaysia, it is not surprising that sponsors are unwilling to accept any
369 Some of the concerns raised by proxy consent are discussed further in Chapter 4
370 Questions may be raised regarding the appropriateness of an appointed proxy; standard
limitation periods for tortious liability do not apply when the claimant is considered of unsound
mind.
371 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1)."
Guideline 1.37
372 Mental Health Act 2001 (Act 615), Malaysia.
373 Re F (Mental patient: sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1
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form of proxy consent, which for all intents and purposes has resulted
in a blanket exclusion of this population from participation in clinical
trials.
Significantly, the exclusion of mentally incompetent patients is
achieved in this context by relying on subject selection criteria, that is
by either making incompetency an exclusion criterion or alternatively,
competency, an inclusion criterion. Inclusion and exclusion criteria are
important features of a trial design and if properly drawn up, help to
produce reliable results. These criteria are typically based on factors
such as age, gender, the type and stage of a disease, previous
treatment history, and other medical conditions.374 If the main purpose
of subject selection is to enhance the dependability of the results, there
must be some correlation between the criterion stated and its likely
effect on the data produced. It would also mean that subject selection
goes to the question of scientific validity and would therefore be more
appropriately considered during scientific review. However, in the case
of psychiatric trials in Malaysia, the exclusion of mentally incompetent
patients seems to be based on two factors unrelated to the question of
scientific validity. First, a broad and general assumption that
incompetent subjects will be unable to comply with the requirements of
the protocol, and second, a cautious approach to what appears to be the
uncertain legal authority of proxy decision-makers. Neither of these
reasons have any direct association to the question of the reliability nor
quality of the trial results. They do however seem to go to the issue of
scientific value, which falls under the remit of ethics review. The larger
social implications of designing trials that exclude mentally
incompetent adults as whole are not insignificant and require the close
consideration of ethics committees.
374 See US. National Institutes of Health write-up on Understanding Clinical Trials at
http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/info/understand (accessed 20 May 2008)
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Exclusion of mentally incompetent adults
While on the topic of exclusion from industry-sponsored clinical trials
of incompetent adults in the Malaysian context, it is useful to digress
briefly to examine the general issue of exclusion of mentally
incompetent adults. The exclusion of certain populations from clinical
trials has been the cause of some concern in the recent past.
Rothman375 suggests that while the flurry of regulations changed the
face of clinical research and that the horrors described by Beecher
could not now occur, they have had the unintended effect of patients
being denied access or fair opportunity to enter a protocol. “The
nightmare image has shifted from an unscrupulous researcher taking
advantage of a helpless inmate to a dying patient desperate to join a
drug trial and have a chance at life.”376
This debate came to a head in America in the early 1990s. Up till then,
American women of childbearing age were routinely excluded from
clinical research because of concerns about risks to foetuses in utero.
Investigators and sponsors were fearful of among other things,
incurring large monetary losses in the event of lawsuits being brought
against them. As a result of this, women were not only denied the
opportunity to receive new and innovative drugs, but there was also a
lack of adequate information regarding the metabolism of drugs in
women of child-bearing age. Similar arguments were raised in relation
to minority groups who claimed that they were being unfairly excluded
from participating in clinical research.377
375 Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside : A History of How Law and Bioethics Transformed Medical
Decision Making. at 251-252
376 Ibid. at 252. The view that research participation is something that is generally beneficial and
should be sought after is rejected by Menikoff in his book Jerry Menikoff and Edward P. Richards,
What the Doctor Didn't Say : The Hidden Truth About Medical Research (New York ; Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006).
377 In 1993, then President of the United States, Bill Clinton, signed the NIH Revitalization Act,
which directed the NIH to establish guidelines for inclusion of women and minority groups in
clinical research. It mandated the inclusion of minorities and women in clinical research unless
“clear and compelling rationale and justification establishes … that inclusion is inappropriate with
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These same arguments are also easily applied in the Malaysian
context. Blanket exclusions of mentally incompetent adults will deprive
them of new and innovative treatment. Also, as pointed out by a
psychiatrist at one of the larger psychiatric research facilities in the
country, patients that he would deem incompetent are more often than
not, those suffering from the severest forms of the disease. If these
severely ill patients are denied access to trials, there will be a paucity
of reliable data about the effectiveness and side-effects of the trial drug
on this group of patients.
This matter of excluding specific populations and denying them access
to certain treatments takes on an added dimension in relation to trials
run in developing countries. In developed countries, the debate
revolves mainly around access to new and innovative life-saving
treatments and while important, only affect a small proportion of
clinical trials.378 But in countries such as Malaysia, a significant
proportion of patients are unable to afford the high price of patented
drugs and as such in many cases, exclusion from trial participation
effectively means no treatment at all. This is especially true of the
patients who attend the institutions that carry out the research. As
pointed out earlier, clinical trials are only run in government hospitals
and academic institutions, which as a general rule serve the less
wealthy members of society. Despite the fact that Government-run
institutions379 provide most medicines at highly subsidised rates or at
no cost in some circumstances,380 this does not extend in many cases to
respect to the health of the subjects or the purpose of the research” and that the cost of inclusion is
not a permissible consideration in determining whether inclusion is appropriate.
378 Menikoff and Richards, What the Doctor Didn't Say : The Hidden Truth About Medical
Research. at 20
379 This is also true to a certain extent of the academic institutions.
380 For example, a patient may have to make a formal application to the Social Welfare
Department and prove that he or she falls below the poverty line and is unable to cover any
medical costs.
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new381 drugs. Additionally, a recent study382 noted a low availability of
medicines at government hospitals resulting in their patients having to
purchase medicines from private pharmacies or dispensing clinics.383
Patients who have to purchase their medicines privately have to face
the high costs of medicines in the country.384 For example, a popular
anti-depressant, Fluoxetine, costs about 26 days’ wages385 for one
month’s treatment.
Patients suffering from mental health problems are more likely than
others to face these problems. Many of the effective treatments for
psychiatric and neurological disorders are relatively new and most of
the drugs are still very expensive. Added to this, patients who are not
only just suffering from psychiatric or neurological disorders, but who
are mentally incompetent as well, are even less likely to have the
financial wherewithal to buy their own drugs, as most of them will
probably be unemployed. The reality is that for a considerable number
of mentally incompetent adult patients, their best chance of gaining
access to any effective treatment will be by participating in clinical
trials.386 It is important to recognise that the problem of patients in
developing countries not having access to standard drugs is far more
complex than is suggested here. Disputes about the use of placebo
controls in trials where effective treatment for a disease exists, and
post trial access to experimental therapy, also stem from the same root
381 The word “new” refers to drugs that are registered for use by the Drug Control Authority and
are protected by patents, as well as cutting-edge or innovative therapies that are only approved for
clinical trials.
382 Zaheer Ud Din Babar et al., "Evaluating Drug Prices, Availability, Affordability, and Price
Components: Implications for Access to Drugs in Malaysia," PLoS Medicine 4, no. 3 (2007).
383 In Malaysia, in addition to pharmacists, doctors are also allowed to dispense medicines.
Interestingly, this has regularly been a bone of contention between the two professions and the
current tide is of opinion is moving towards restricting the dispensation of drugs to pharmacists.
384 See discussion on page about the high costs of medicines in Malaysia due to the “free market”
system. Also see Babar et al., "Evaluating Drug Prices, Availability, Affordability, and Price
Components: Implications for Access to Drugs in Malaysia."
385 The study calculated affordability using the daily wage of the lowest-paid unskilled government
worker. Ibid.
386 There are a whole host of other ancillary problems that feed into this issue and I certainly don’t
mean to suggest that trial participation is a solution. In many ways, it raises as many problems as it
seems to solve. However, the wider discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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problem, and this line of argument does not mean to suggest that
ethics committees should always view participation as being in the best
interests of patients or that the enrolment of patients into trials is the
best solution. The discussion above is meant to draw attention to the
practical realities on the ground, which ethics committees should both
recognise and incorporate into their ethics discourse.
Trial Design – RCTs and mentally incompetent patients
Following from the previous argument that although scientifically
valid, the design of a trial can be used to unfairly exclude mentally
incompetent patients; scientifically valid trials that do land up
enrolling mentally incompetent patients may also be ethically
unsound. Therefore, when ethics committees review trials that might
potentially enrol incompetent patients, they need to consider how the
trial design might affect this population. This might seem like a rather
surprising comment as the earlier discussion suggests that the current
practice in Malaysia is to exclude mentally incompetent patients from
participating in clinical research trials. However, there are two
reasons why the issue of inclusion is also relevant. First, it is likely
that once the Mental Health Act comes into force and there is a
legislative basis for proxy consent, sponsors will no longer insist on
excluding mentally incompetent adults. It is also interesting to note
that it appears that ethics committee members are unaware of the
general practice of excluding mentally incompetent patients, as all the
ethics committee members who were interviewed, apart from a
psychiatrist,387 accepted the fact that some of the protocols they
reviewed would involve the participation of mentally incompetent
adults. If ethics committees are working on this assumption, they
should already be sensitive to the issues discussed below. The second
and far more worrying reason is that given the problems with the
387 Interview with Psychiatrist/Investigator B, University A, 28 January 2008
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assessment of capacity in Malaysia as discussed in Chapter 2, it is
conceivable that some patients are being wrongly assessed as having
the capacity to provide informed consent and are consequently being
entered into clinical trials. If this is in fact happening, the subjects
who are inappropriately deemed competent, will be assumed to have
understood the information concerning the trial procedures, risks and
benefits, and will not have had the benefit of any safeguard whatsoever
– no relative or doctor required to act in their best interests. This
makes scrutiny at the level of ethics committees that much more vital
because the second level of safeguards that typically exist for mentally
incompetent patients, i.e. proxy consent or doctors acting in the best
interest of the subject, are absent. Also, it highlights the fact that
ethics committees should pay close attention to methods of assessing
capacity.
The type of clinical trial that is considered the gold standard in terms
of scientific validity is the randomised placebo control trial (RCT).
Ironically, the two key features that make RCTs scientifically
important, randomisation and the use of placebo controls; are the very
same features that render them ethically suspect. Randomisation and
placebo controls are scientifically important because they enhance the
quality of trial results, as they are highly effective methods of
minimising bias. On the other hand, these concepts raise very real
ethical problems. First, the concept of randomisation has been
demonstrated to be incompatible with the ethical principle of acting in
a patient’s best interest. This argument, which is found in greater
detail in chapter 5, provides one of the most compelling reasons why
research should never be confused with therapy. Second, as described
below, the use of placebo controls especially when effective treatments
exist appears to violate the ethical principle of not harming patients.
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There are two types of situations where placebo controls may be used.
First where no current effective treatment exists for a condition and
the there is genuine uncertainty about the effectiveness of the
experimental therapy. In such cases, the use of placebos is ethically
justified as long as the concept of clinical equipoise is met. The concept
of clinical equipoise388 was devised by Freedman who describes it as,
“…a state of genuine uncertainty on the part of the clinical investigator
regarding the comparative therapeutic merits of each arm in a trial.”389
Because the investigator does not know whether or not the treatment
will help the patient at all and the only alternative is no treatment,
having a placebo arm should not, theoretically place the patient in a
riskier position just because he is enrolled in a trial.
The second type of situation, which is more ethically problematic, is
where a placebo is used even though there is an existing effective
treatment. The problem with using placebo controls when effective
treatments exist, is that subjects who are randomised to the placebo
arm are exposed to unacceptable levels of risk by being deprived of
treatment. In an ordinary doctor-patient relationship, if a doctor knows
that treatment A will relieve a patient of his symptoms, it is clearly
unethical for him offer his patient a placebo in place of treatment A. In
fact, any doctor who does this is likely to be face a negligence suit. In
the context of research, there appear to be two broad conceptual
frameworks390 that dominate the debate about whether or not these
trials are ethically acceptable: one that sees the problem as being
essentially a matter of weighing the risks and benefits of participation
388 This concept has been subject to a great deal of criticism from allegations that the standard is
too easily met (Menikoff and Richards, What the Doctor Didn't Say : The Hidden Truth About
Medical Research. ) to allegations that true clinical equipoise is never possible because a trial drug
has to demonstrate a certain level of effectiveness in the laboratory and in animal populations
before it can be introduced to the human population, and therefore, there cannot be genuine
uncertainty about its effectiveness as there will already be some evidence of this at the beginning
of the trial.
389 B. Freedman, "Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research," N Engl J Med 317, no. 3 (1987).
390 See Scott Kim, "Benefits and Burdens of Placebos in Psychiatric Research,"
Psychopharmacology 171, no. 1 (2003). at 13
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and if the risks are acceptable, favour placebo trials; and the other that
puts an ethical emphasis on the act on intentionally not providing a
proven treatment, and are in general, not in favour of these types of
trials. The current practice favours the former position and
significantly, the Helsinki Declaration, which originally391 prohibited
placebo trials in the absence of clinical equipoise, retreated from this
position in 2002 with the addition of note of clarification to paragraph
29, which allows for the use of placebos even when effective treatments
exist if there are compelling and scientifically sound reasons to think
the research is necessary to determine the efficacy or safety of a
medical method, or where the medical method relates to a minor
condition and the patients receiving placebos will not be subject to any
additional risk or serious or irreversible harm.
The following discussion focuses on the use of RCTs when effective
treatments exist in psychiatric research. This brings into sharp focus
the complexities of ethics review in this area and the depth of
understanding required of ethics committee members if they are to
engage in meaningful discourses. Three accusations can be brought
against the use of RCTs, the first two apply across the board to trials
carried out in most jurisdictions and the last, specifically relates to the
Malaysian context.392 First, RCTs as noted above, are intrinsically
ethically dubious because of their structure. Second, the current
framework used by ethics committees to assess the risks and benefits
of research, is inadequate. Finally, concerns regarding access to
treatment and assessments of capacity in the Malaysian context
exacerbate the first and second problems.
391 Paragraph 29World Medical Association, "Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles Ofr
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects."
392 Having said this, it is more than likely that the concerns raised here would also apply to many
other developing countries as well.
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As mentioned earlier, current practice regarding the use of RCTs
where effective treatments exist relies on weighing the risks and
benefits of participation and allowing such trials to be conducted if
risks are considered acceptable. This being the case, there are two
questions that follow: what are acceptable levels of risk, and what does
this have to do with ethics review of trials that might recruit mentally
incompetent patients? As to acceptable levels of risk, the only
guidance provided by the ICH-GCP regarding risk assessment is found
in para 2.2, which states:393
Before a trial is initiated, foreseeable risks and inconveniences should
be weighed against the anticipated benefit for the individual trial
subject and society. A trial should be initiated and continued only if the
anticipated benefits justify the risks.
The guideline merely suggests that as long as anticipated benefits
justify the risk, a risk is deemed acceptable. Notably, benefits here are
not only the benefits enjoyed by the subject, but also the benefits
enjoyed by society as well. This is another instance where the guideline
sets out a substantive duty, i.e. assessing risks and benefits of a trial,
and fails to provide detailed guidance or a framework for assessment.
Para 2.2 fails to take into account the complexities of risk assessment.
Take for example, a situation where a potentially deadly infectious
disease, Flu A, has just been discovered. Out of all the people who
receive the current antiviral therapy, AV1, only fifty percent are cured,
while the rest die. Scientists have developed BV1, which they hope
might be more effective than AV1 but are worried that the drug may
cause blindness, as animal studies have indicated that this might be
the case. They want to conduct a RCT using this drug and argue that
because AV1 is more often than not ineffective, they are unsure if it
393 Para 2.2 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline
E6 (R1)."
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has any therapeutic value and they need to run a placebo control trial
to ensure that BV1 is actually effective. Although subjects risk
blindness on the BV1 arm or death on the placebo arm, this is justified
because the anticipated benefits to society are much greater owing to
the fact that a great number of people will benefit from an effective
cure as Flu A is an infectious disease and is easily spread. Also, the
risk of blindness in some of the subjects is easily justified as a greater
number of the general population may be saved from a graver type of
harm, i.e. death. Some ethicists are concerned with the argument and
contend that it is unethical to balance the rights and interests of an
individual against society at large, it is wrong to expose a small
number of people to harm for the benefit of others; moreover, the risk
of blindness is too great a harm for any subject to be exposed to. Risk
assessment as shown in this example can based on several criteria, the
interests of the subject alone (the risks borne by him – death,
blindness; and the benefits he might obtain – an effective cure), this
risk might be measure in term of either the type of harm (blindness of
death) or likelihood of harm (fifty percent). Or risk assessment can also
be based on balancing the interests of the subject against the interest
of the population. In this case, the number of subjects that might
become blind or die against the number of people that might die if they
contract Flu A. If ethics committees in Malaysia are to engage in
proper risk assessments, they will need to be guided by more than para
2.2 of the ICH-GCP.
As demonstrated above, risk assessment is a vital part of ethics review
of RCTs and because it is a complex exercise, ethics committees must
be provided with adequate guidance and training. Ethics committees
must also be able to recognise and engage in debate about emerging
issues. In the case of risk assessment and RCTs in psychiatric research
(which potentially might recruit incompetent patients), recent moves
have been made to lower the bar for acceptable risks. While much of
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the concern about risks in psychiatric research trials to date has
revolved around the risk for suicide, where even proponents of placebo
control trials would consider the risk of death or serious permanent
harm unacceptable, Kim394 points out that recent moves have been
made to advocate a lower barrier by adding two further categories:
“reversible but serious harm” and “severe discomfort”. He flags the
danger of considering these sorts of risks as ethically unimportant and
demonstrates this by relying on studies that have demonstrated that
suffering from major mental illness is a terrible state that causes
immense suffering. Suicide is not the only terrible risk these patients
face; any delay or deprivation of treatment is likely to be a very heavy
burden on patients. An ethics committee reviewing an application to
run a RCT on schizophrenic patients, for example, should be careful to
note the level of risk attached to a schizophrenic subject receiving a
placebo and be able to understand what that level of risk would mean
to a schizophrenic patient.
Notwithstanding the worries about the ethical nature of RCTs and the
role of ethics committees as risk assessors, there is an argument to be
made that as long as subjects are provided with sufficient information,
they are in the best position to decide for themselves whether or not to
accept the risks inherent in the trial design.395 For this reason, as long
as the design is scientifically valid, and the risks are not too
disproportionate, it seems eminently reasonable to suggest that
informed consent is a sufficient protection for competent adults, and as
long as incompetent adults are provided with adequate safeguards,
there really is no need to obsess about the issue of risk. However, given
the situation in Malaysia, where assessments of capacity appear to be
made in a rather arbitrary manner and that only the very profoundly
incompetent seem to be excluded, it is submitted that there is a very
394 Kim, "Benefits and Burdens of Placebos in Psychiatric Research."
395 Note the very real problem of therapeutic misconception, which seems to suggest that this is not
true.
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real possibility that some incompetent persons are being enrolled as
competent subjects. Persons, who in all probability are unable to
provide real informed consent. If this is true, the risk/benefit
assessment made by ethics committees is extremely important and
should be conducted in as vigorous a manner as possible. Sadly, this
does not seem to be the case in practice. In fact it appears that ethics
committee members do not think very much about risk assessment at
all. From interviews conducted with ethics committee members, the
only person who raised the issue of risk assessment was a lay member,
whose only concern was insurance coverage, who said,
‘… we always try to clarify the risk factor and to make sure that
even if there is just using, there is very, very slim chance of some
adverse effect you do have to have enough of er… insurance and
all that to cover them’396
While it is clear that the duty of an IRB (as set out in the ICH-GCP
guideline) to safeguard the rights, safety and well-being of all trial
subjects, lies at the core of its responsibilities, it is also clear from the
discussion above that ethics committees cannot merely rely on the
ICH-GCP guideline alone if they are to achieve this objective. What
more then does an IRB need in order to be able to safeguard the rights
of subjects and in particular, mentally incompetent subjects? What
needs to be put into place to ensure that ethics review is an effective
safeguard? First, there is clearly a need for an ethical framework for
decision-making and as proposed in Chapter 3 the starting point of any
framework for decision-making should be the principle of respecting
human dignity. Nonetheless, ethics committees need more than this in
order to fulfil their responsibilities, i.e. they also need to be able to
appreciate the context in which research is carried out and how the
various aspects of a trial design, for example, might impact on the lives
of subjects of human research. These considerations are not static and
the needs and concerns of subjects will change with the flow of time.
Accordingly, ethics committees must be able to keep up with the
396 Interview with Member A, Ethics Committee A, on 21 December 2007.
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changing needs of trial subjects. Continuous training and collection of
empirical evidence are necessary if ethics committees are to keep
themselves current.
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5 Chapter 5
Ethics Committee Review and Conflicts of Interest
One vital aspect of ethics committee review that is not covered in any
detail by the ICH-GCP is the question of the independence of the ethics
committee. Notably, the issue of independence of ethics review of
research, which, as described below, was conceived primarily as
independence from the individual investigator, has evolved over time
into the larger notion of concern about conflicts of interest (CI). The
purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it is intended to demonstrate
how the informed consent process is mired in an environment that is
replete with conflicts of interests and that ethics committees must not
only be made aware of this, but should also have at their disposals
mechanisms which they can use to minimise the influence of conflicting
interests where possible. Second, it is to show that ethics committees
themselves operate in situations where they are faced with conflicting
interests, which may affect the way in which they make their decisions.
Historical context of independent ethics review
Historically, the idea of instituting a system of independent review of
research protocols can be traced back to the 1940s. Following the many
disturbing exposés of research misconduct during and shortly after the
Second World War, there was a growing realisation that the activities
of providing medical care and running clinical research were based on
very different goals. The provision of medical care was aimed at the
welfare of the individual patient, whereas clinical research trials were
primarily concerned with furthering scientific knowledge. “The bedrock
principle of medical ethics – that the physician acted only to promote
the well-being of the patient - did not hold in the laboratory.”397 More
397 Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside : A History of How Law and Bioethics Transformed
Medical Decision Making. at 89
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than this, the lessons of the past indicated that clinical researchers
were not always able to objectively separate their functions as
physician and researcher to make decisions that were ethically
appropriate. Review committees (IRBs) were thus set up in order to be
impartial reviewers of research protocols and to ensure the protection
of human subjects.398 Traditionally, the main role of the ethics
committee was to stand between the investigator and his potential
human subjects, to ensure that the welfare of research subjects would
be protected as investigators were seen as always operating from a
position of potential conflict of interest. The centrality of the notion
that ethics review should be independent of investigators was
emphasised by the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral Research in its report on IRBs
where it stated, "Investigators should not have sole responsibility for
determining whether research involving human subjects fulfils ethical
standards. Others who are independent of the research must share this
responsibility because investigators are always in positions of potential
conflict by virtue of their concern with the pursuit of knowledge as well
as the welfare of the human subjects of their research."399
Clinical research has since developed into a sophisticated and complex
enterprise involving extraordinarily large sums of money and
connecting numerous institutions and players the world over.400 The
players in modern clinical trials include sponsors, who are usually
either pharmaceutical companies or government agencies;401 clinical
research organisations (CRO); institutions where research takes place;
and investigators. There are far more parties and far more money
398 See Chapter 2 for a narrative of the history of ethics committees in the United States, and
Malaysia.
399 National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, "Institutional Review Boards: Reports and Recommendations."
400 See Chapter 1 at 14-16
401 In developing countries, such as Malaysia, national governments do not usually have the money
to sponsor clinical trials, and multi-national pharmaceutical companies sponsor almost all clinical
trials.
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involved in clinical research today as compared to when ethics
committees first came onto the scene and as result of this, there are
many more areas of potential conflicts of interests. Therefore, ethics
committee review today stands between not only the investigator and
the subject; rather it stands between the entire machinery of the
research enterprise and potential human subjects. The range and types
of competing interests faced by parties participating in this modern
research enterprise is considerable. Growing concern about the
harmful consequences of these competing interests has resulted in a
rising awareness of what is now commonly referred to as the notion of
conflicts of interest (CIs). In this environment, the notion of
independent ethics review is more vital than ever before.
The discussion in this chapter will focus on the two mechanisms that
provide for human subject protection in clinical trials: ethics review
and the informed consent process; and will demonstrate how the
players (physician/investigators and caregivers) in the informed
process are impossibly compromised. Consequently, the chapter will
show this makes the need for as independent an ethics review as
possible an urgent and compelling one.
To begin with, the chapter will examine the issue of CIs as a whole. In
this regard, it is instructive to consider how much of the discussion on
CIs to date, has over-emphasised the notion of economic interests and
the chapter will show how this paints only a partial picture of the
notion of CIs. Accordingly, if the idea of a CI is to be accurately
described and understood, there must be a careful unwrapping of the
concept and what it means to have a CI. Following from this, the next
part of the chapter continues by identifying the main players in the
clinical trial environment who are likely to be faced with situations
involving CIs and demonstrates the prevalence and insidious reach of
CIs in the clinical trial environment. Out of this discussion, it becomes
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evident that meaningful ethics review, and more importantly,
independent ethics review is vital to the protection of human subjects.
The last part of this chapter considers the sources of CIs in ethics
review committees.
Conflicts of Interest
History of Conflicts of Interest in the Research Environment
The concept of CIs as Krimsky notes,402 is not a new one and has in the
past, received a great deal of attention in areas of public ethics such as
the legal community and government service but the attention given to
CIs in the scientific and medical research community has been a
relatively new development, dating back to the 1980s.403 The impetus
for this was the injection of economic interests into the academic
research environment. The 1980s saw a great deal of interest in the
commercialisation of the research enterprise in America, as evidenced
by among other things, the passing of the Bayh-Dole Act, which has
been described as creating an environment where the “US government
provides incentives for scientists to hold conflicts of interest”.404 Before
the passing of this Act, the federal government owned the rights to the
results of any research sponsored by it, and companies wanting to
transfer these rights not only had to engage in tedious negotiations
with federal agencies, but also were rarely, if ever, given exclusive
rights to the patents. The result was that inventions and discoveries
“sat in warehouses gathering dust”.405 In 1980, of the 28,000 patents
owned by the American government, fewer than 5% had been licensed
to industry and there were only a small number of patents produced by
universities. One of the main reasons for the passing of the Bayh-Dole
402 Sheldon Krimsky, "The Ethical and Legal Foundations of Scientific 'Conflict of Interest'," in
Law and Ethics in Biomedical Research, ed. Trudo Lemmens and Duff R. Waring (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2006).63
403 Ibid. at 63, also see Dennis F. Thompson, "Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest," N
Engl J Med 329, no. 8 (1993)., which cites Relman AS. The new medical-industrial complex. N
Engl J Med 1980;303:963-970 and Relman AS. Dealing with conflicts of interest. N Engl J Med
1985;313:749-751.
404 Krimsky, "The Ethical and Legal Foundations of Scientific 'Conflict of Interest'." 67
405 The Economist, "Innovation's Golden Goose," The Economist, December 14, 2002 2002.
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Act was to address this problem and to “promote the commercialization
and public availability of inventions made in the United States by
United States industry and labor”.406 This is achieved by allowing
players, such as universities, the right to file for patents on the results
of research funded fully or partially by federal funds.407 Moreover,
when private companies supply monies, the statute requires that
profits resulting from any inventions be shared with the universities.408
The enactment of the said Act resulted in a significant increase in
industry relations with universities409 and by 2002, more than 3000
patents per year were awarded to universities with licensing revenues
surpassing $1.2 billion.410 University biomedical research programmes
in particular, have profited from this development and universities
stand to make significant profits under this regime as evidenced by the
$20 million in gross royalties earned by Columbia University when in
2000, it licensed its patent on a novel way to treat glaucoma to
Pharmacia, which went on to develop the blockbuster drug,
latanoprost.411
An unfortunate offshoot of the Bayh-Dole Act, however, has been a
change in the way academic research is now viewed as a result of the
marriage of academia and private enterprise. Prior to its passage, the
hallmark of the academic research environment was its independent
pursuit of the advancement of scientific knowledge. The
pharmaceutical industry on the other hand, has always had as its main
concern, commercial interests such as the success and profitability of
its products. The growing number of partnerships between these
406 Patents and Trademarks Amendments Act 1980 (the Bayh-Dole Act). §200
407 For a more in-depth discussion of the historical background to the Bayh-Dole Act, see David C.
Mowery et al., "The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of
the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980," Research Policy 30, no. 1 (2001).
408 J. P. Kassirer, "Financial Conflict of Interest: An Unresolved Ethical Frontier," American
Journal of Law & Medicine 27, no. 2-3 (2001). at 150
409 Ibid. pg 151
410 Aaron S. Kesselheim and Jerry Avorn, "University-Based Science and Biotechnology Products:
Defining the Boundaries of Intellectual Property," JAMA 293, no. 7 (2005). at 851
411 Ibid. at 851
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players has raised worries that academic institutions and their
researchers will no longer act independently in their research
endeavours as concerns for monetary gain may unduly influence their
behaviour. These concerns are not unfounded as a systematic review of
studies on CIs concluded that a “comprehensive review of literature
confirms that financial relationships among industry and scientific
investigators and academic institutions are pervasive;”412 and that,
“strong and consistent evidence shows that industry-sponsored
research tends to draw pro-industry conclusions.”413
Current Emphasis – financial conflicts of interest
While economic concerns were the primary impetus for the
development of CIs in biomedical research, economic concerns now
provide much of the concern surrounding the area of ethics review and
CIs. As such, much of the discussion on CIs to date continues to revolve
around the issue of financial CIs. This is to a large extent due to the
fact that clinical research has evolved into a billion dollar enterprise
that is primarily led by for-profit organisations involved in complex
relationships with governments, academic institutions and private
individuals, and this has resulted in the creation of an environment
where financial incentives offered to investigators and institutions are
becoming increasingly lucrative. Stirred by worries that economic
pressures and the use of clinical trials primarily as marketing tools
were compromising the integrity, quality, and intellectual rigour of
clinical trials, the editors of twelve of the world’s leading medical
journals414 issued a statement in 2001,415 revising and strengthening
412 Justin E. Bekelman, Yan Li, and Cary P. Gross, "Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of
Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review," JAMA 289, no. 4 (2003). at 463
413 Ibid.
414 Annals of Internal Medicine, Journal of the American Medical Association, The New England
Journal of Medicine, The New Zealand Medical Journal, Canadian Medical Association Journal,
Journal of the Danish Medical Association, The Lancet, MEDLINE/Index Medicus, Journal of the
Norwegian Medical Association, Dutch Journal of Medicine, The Medical Journal of Australia,
Western Journal of Medicine
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the rules on publication ethics found in the “Uniform Requirements for
Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals: Writing and Editing
for Biomedical Publications”.416 The revisions require authors to
disclose details of their own and the sponsor’s role in the study
particularly in respect of potential financial conflicts of interest. This
indicates the increased awareness in this area of the pressing need to
address the area of potential financial conflicts of interest in the
biomedical field
Another worrying feature of contemporary financial CIs is that they
involve complex relationships that are not easily discoverable by the
general public. A good example of this is the highly publicised case of
Jesse Gelsinger in America. Jesse Gelsinger, a young man who suffered
from a mild form of a very rare metabolic disorder, OTC,417 died while
participating in a gene transfer clinical trial conducted at the
University of Pennsylvania. Following his death, his father Paul, filed
a lawsuit against the three principal investigators, their institutions,
and their review boards.418 Among the many accusations levelled at the
defendants was the accusation that Jesse had not been fully advised of
the conflicting interests of the parties involved in the research. The
head investigator and director of the University of Pennsylvania’s
Institute for Human Gene Therapy, Dr James Wilson, was also the
founder of Genevo Inc, a company in which he and the University of
Pennsylvania had equal stakes in and which had invested in the
genetically altered virus used in the trial. Genovo had also at that time
contributed a fifth of the $25 million annual budget of the University’s
gene therapy institute and in return had exclusive rights over any
415 Frank Davidoff et al., "Sponsorship, Authorship, and Accountability," N Engl J Med 345, no.
11 (2001).
416 A document developed by the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE)
and widely used by individual journals as the basis for editorial policy
417 Ornithine transcarbamylase deficiency syndrome
418 Paul L. Gelsinger, "Uninformed Consent: The Case of Jesse Gelsinger," in Law and Ethics in
Biomedical Research: Regulation, Conflict of Interest, and Liability, ed. Trudo Lemmens and Duff
R. Waring (Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2006). at 30
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commercial product. Moreover, Wilson and another colleague had also
been awarded patents on certain aspects of the procedure contained in
the trial. After Jesse’s death, his father, Paul, brought a lawsuit
against all the parties involved in the trial intimating among other
things that the actions of some players were tainted by their financial
entanglements, none of which were patently obvious and were never
revealed to Jesse in the informed consent document.419 Although the
case never went to court as the Gelsingers were offered and accepted
an undisclosed amount in settlement, the claims made by Paul
Gelsinger regarding the tangled financial relationships of the
investigators and institutions drew added attention to the problem of
economic gains in CIs.
Finally, whilst the focus on economic gain in CIs is vital, it is
submitted that the notion of a CI is far more complex than the linear
notion of undue economic influence and has not be explored
sufficiently. This is attributed to the fact that focusing on economic
gain in CIs is more objective and fungible and therefore also easier to
regulate by impartial rules.420 However, this is inadequate and
Horton421 rightfully points out that to put financial conflict to the fore
is to “provide a smokescreen for more covert and possibly more
influential commitments”. The following section will demonstrate how
some conflicting interests exist at a far more fundamental level and are
in fact much more relevant in the Malaysian context. Moreover, if the
avoidance or eradication of CIs, as claimed earlier, is essential to the
issue of independence of ethics committees and the integrity of the
informed consent process, it is necessary to unwrap the notion of CIs so
as to be able to recognise its different manifestations in different
situations.
419 For a fuller account of Jesse Gelsinger’s story and issues of conflicts of interest, see Ibid. and
Krimsky, "The Ethical and Legal Foundations of Scientific 'Conflict of Interest'." at70-71
420 Thompson, "Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest."
421 Richard Horton, "Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Opprobrium or Obsession?," The
Lancet 349, no. 9059 (1997).
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What are Conflicts of Interest?
As noted by Lemmens and Freedman,422 it is hard to find a clear
definition of what constitutes a conflict of interest (CI). In the health
care setting, CIs have been defined broadly as situations in which legal
obligations or widely recognised professional norms are likely to be
compromised by a person’s other interests.423 They have also been
construed more narrowly as occurring when discrepancies exist
between the personal interests and professional responsibilities of a
person in a position of trust.424 The favoured definition in the current
literature appears to be that of Thompson, where he describes CIs as
“set of conditions in which professional judgment concerning a primary
interest (such as a patient's welfare or the validity of research) tends to
be unduly influenced by a secondary interest (such as financial gain).425
In seeking to draw up a unitary account of CIs, these definitions fail in
one way or another to capture the rich and complex nature of what it is
to have a CI. A useful counterpoint to these definitions is provided by
Erde who engages in a much more insightful and thoughtful reflection
of the notion of CIs. He states at the outset that CIs are so “pervasive
and varied that they defy unitary definition” and that attempts to
provide unified accounts merely lead to artificially narrow notions of
CI”. 426 He contends that CIs are in fact a “family, resemblance of cases
and criteria rather than a strictly defined uniform idea”427 and that
persons dealing with CIs must “develop a “moral sense” of what is
422 Trudo Lemmens and Benjamin Freedman, "Ethics Review for Sale? Conflict of Interest and
Commercial Research Review Boards," The Milbank Quarterly 78, no. 4 (2000). at 554
423 A.C. Shipp, "How to Control Conflict of Interest," in Biomedical Research Collaboration and
Conflict of Interest, ed. R.J. Porter and T.E. Malone (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press,
1992).
424 J. P. Orlowski and L. Wateska, "The Effects of Pharmaceutical Firm Enticements on Physician
Prescribing Patterns. There's No Such Thing as a Free Lunch," Chest 102, no. 1 (1992). at 273
425 Thompson, "Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest."
426 Edmund L Erde, "Conflicts of Interests in Medicine: A Philosophical and Ethical
Morphology," in Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Practice and Research, ed. Roy G Spece, David
S Shimm, and Allen E Buchanan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). at 12
427 Ibid at 12
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acceptable akin to the “clinical judgment” that guides practitioners in
their daily practice.”428 Regrettably, Erde’s final conclusion is less than
helpful in that firstly, if CIs are to be managed or monitored on any
sort of practical level, there needs to be, if not a unitary definition, at
least a workable framework for identifying situations involving CIs.
Second, the very reason why CIs are undesirable is because they are
apt to skew an individual’s moral compass - therefore, leaving such an
individual to his or her own “moral sense” will not go any way towards
relieving the problems surrounding CIs.
Notwithstanding this, Erde’s analysis takes a journey that is well
worth examining in some detail as it provides a thoughtful and
insightful picture of CIs. In order to put together a meaningful and
workable notion of CIs, the following section begins by using
Thompson’s definition as a foundation and builds on it by adding
relevant aspects of Erde’s analyses to finally construct a viable
framework of CIs which can be applied to the different parties
engaging in clinical research trials.
Conflicts of Interest as the Clash Between Primary and
Secondary Interests
As mentioned above, Thompson defines a CI as a situation where a
primary interest tends to be unduly influenced by a secondary
interest.429 A primary interest is determined by the professional duties
of the role-holder and although at times these may be controversial or
conflicting, Thompson argues that there is normally agreement that
they should be the primary consideration in any professional decision
made by the role-holder.
While Thompson’s idea of primary interests being unduly influenced by
secondary interests is a useful starting point for further exploration of
428 Ibid. at 12
429 Thompson, "Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest."
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the notion of CIs, his analysis fails to provide satisfactory answers to
the following questions:
First, what sorts of relationships give rise to primary interests as
understood in CIs?
Second, how are primary interests to be discovered, or in other words,
what are the primary interests of the parties involved? Thompson’s
suggestion that these interests although controversial are normally
discoverable by agreement, is unsatisfactory. He does not stipulate who
should be party to this agreement and if there is no single body that
sets the interests by agreement, primary interests are likely to be
subjectively determined; and if, as he admits, there are conflicting and
controversial interpretations of primary interests, there will
undoubtedly be various depictions of primary interests depending on
the wishes of different role holders. This in turn, would result in great
confusion.
Lastly, when can it be said that interests (other than primary
interests) amount to secondary interests? Are they determined by the
subject matter of the interest, the creation of a dilemma, the fact that
self-regard is involved? Thompson merely talks about the existence of
undue influence but does not examine what this concept of undue
influence actually entails.
The next section examines and answers each of the questions raised
above.
(1) What sorts of relationships give rise to primary interests?
– Erde’s social role
In presenting the case for primary interests, Thompson fails to take
into account an importance of primary interests; he fails to identify the
features of the relationships or social roles that lead to the creation of
Formatted: Bullets and
Numbering
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primary interests. Not all types of relationships can be said to involve
CIs. Erde430 provides an example in the case of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon,
where the only way Agamemnon could save his expedition was by
sacrificing his daughter Iphigenia to the gods. Erde changes the case
to one where Agamemnon is given a choice of saving either his
daughter or the bulk of the crew and points out that while the crew
might worry that Agamemnon might have a CI as their leader, it
would be very odd to suggest that Iphigenia could frame her concerns
in terms of a CI.
In describing the relationship that could lead to a CI, Thompson only
seems to go so far as to imply that there should be some sort of
professional relationship and makes reference to physicians, scholars
or teachers. It is submitted that this is a far too narrow interpretation
of the type of situation in which a CI might arise. Neither ethics
committees nor caregivers for example, can be said to be in professional
relationships with human research subjects. Erde on the other hand,
presents the relationships that might involve CIs as ones where role-
holders have a particular social role to play and lists four features of
such relationships:431
1. They are socially designed and elected, in contrast to those that
seem natural and unavoidable.
2. They exist to serve the welfare or vital interests of others.
3. They involve discretion and judgment as part of the role holder’s
function.
4. Either the beneficiaries of the role holder’s work or society in
general must be able to trust the role holder simply because he
holds the role. In other words, beneficiary must be in position of
reliance on the role-holder because of the position he holds.
430 Erde, "Conflicts of Interests in Medicine: A Philosophical and Ethical Morphology." at 24
431 Ibid.
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While there is much to recommend Erde’s social role, he fails to
explicitly point out one of the more important features of the social
role, which is that the role holder holds some form of power that is
used for the benefit of another and is in some way, akin to the idea of a
fiduciary.432 A more accurate formulation of the social role would
involve amending the second feature to state: They hold some form of
power or special knowledge that is used to serve the welfare or vital
interests of others.
With the abovementioned criteria in mind, return to the example of
Agamemnon. Erde points out that while Agamemnon could have
declined to lead the expedition, he could not have declined to be his
daughter’s father and that while Iphigenia was not compelled to trust
in her father’s leadership, the members of his crew were committed to
trust and follow their leader who was in a position of power. This
depiction of a certain type of social role paints a truer reflection of what
it means to have a primary interest as opposed to merely stating that it
is based on having a professional duty.
Which relationships in the research environment fulfil
Erde’s social role?
Social roles that fulfil Erde’s criteria and therefore attract the notion of
primary versus secondary interests are as submitted above, those that
exist for the benefit of third parties. This then begs the question as to
which parties in the clinical trial context, and in particular, clinical
trials that potentially enrol mentally incompetent adults, hold this
social role? Which parties are potentially in positions of CI? The
answer to this question must surely be the parties who are entrusted
with ensuring the protection of the rights of human subjects in clinical
trials; they would be participants in the mechanisms for safeguarding
432 Morin et al., "Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical Trials." at 79
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the rights of human research subjects. As stated in chapter 1,433 the
two main safeguards provided to human participants in clinical
research trials are (i) ethics committee review and (ii) the informed
consent process. The below discussion examines these two main
safeguards in greater detail. A greater part of the initial discussion
focuses on the informed consent process and the role of the
physician/researcher in this process. This is because as noted earlier in
this chapter as well as in the chapter before, the remit of ethics review
is clearly to protect the interests of people who take part in clinical
trials and therefore the role and primary interests of ethics committees
as far as CIs are concerned, are easily discoverable. However, scrutiny
of the current literature and practice suggest that the roles of the
parties involved in the informed consent process, and particularly, the
role of the informed consent facilitator has been largely misconstrued,
resulting in not only a misconception of the notion of CIs in relation to
informed consent but also in a weakened informed consent process.
(i) Parties involved in ethics review
People who are deciding whether or not to enrol into a trial need to be
able to trust that ethics committees have properly reviewed the trial
protocol. Ethics committees take it upon themselves to carry out this
task knowing that the beneficiaries are the potential human
participants (as the ICH-GCP clearly states that the responsibility of
the ethics review committee is to “safeguard the rights, safety and
well-being of all trial subjects”).434 When these participants might
include mentally incompetent adults, the role of the ethics committee
becomes even more vital. The role played by ethics committees clearly
fulfils the criteria set out by Erde as being a role that potentially
involves CIs.
433 Section 1.1.2
434 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1)."
Guideline 3.1.1
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(ii) Parties Involved in the Informed Consent/Proxy Consent
Process
The second tier of protection of human participants, the informed
consent process, relies on the premise that the physician/researcher
will present the necessary information to a potential subject in an
impartial manner and engage him or her in a meaningful discourse,
which will provide the subject with sufficient information that allows
him or her to make a free and informed decision.
It is important at this juncture to digress briefly and make two
observations, i.e. first, the importance of the informed consent process
in the protection of human subjects in clinical trials; and second, the
misguided notion that the role of informed consent facilitator (this
term is used to indicate the role of the physician/researcher when he is
engaged in the informed consent process) is somehow subsumed into
the larger role of the physician/researcher.
The informed consent process and roles of
physician/researcher/informed consent facilitator
As mentioned above, the first observation to be made is in relation to
the importance of the informed consent process in the protection of
human subjects in clinical trials. The informed consent process is a
vital safeguard in protecting the rights of human subjects and heavily
informs both national and international declarations on research using
human subjects. A former Secretary of Health and Human Services in
the United States435 when considering the principles that guide
biomedical research remarked that, “none of these principles is more
important than the protection of research subjects by informed consent
based on full disclosure of potential risks and benefits.”436 The level of
disclosure expected of an informed consent facilitator in the research
435 Donna Shalala, Secretary for Health and Human Services, United States of America, 1993-
2001.
436 Donna Shalala, "Protecting Research Subjects -- What Must Be Done," N Engl J Med 343, no.
11 (2000).
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environment is notably higher than that of a physician in a therapeutic
context. The duty in the research context is to inform subjects of all the
potential risks and benefits of a clinical trial. Full disclosure is a
necessary precondition to free choice, whereas in the therapeutic
context, physicians are able to rely to some extent on the idea of
clinical judgment when offering information about treatment choices to
patients.
The second observation to be made (again, as mentioned above), is in
relation to the misguided notion that the role of informed consent
facilitator is somehow subsumed into the larger role of the
physician/researcher. In the current clinical trial environment,
physicians/researchers play three separate tasks: they take informed
consent, carry out the research, and manage patients’ medical
conditions. These involve three very different roles but almost all the
literature has only focused on the latter two. Much has been written
about the tension between the roles of the researcher and physician
and how they might or might not be at odds with each other. In
contrast, very little has been said about the role and duties of the
informed consent facilitator. Most of the literature does not even
recognise a third role of the informed consent facilitator and the
informed consent process is subsumed into the larger
physician/researcher debate. It is submitted that this approach is
flawed as it fails to appreciate that in the research environment, the
informed consent process is a vital mechanism for protecting human
subjects. The purpose of informed consent is to ensure that subjects
fully understand and accept the risks of participating in clinical trials.
In cases that involve proxy consent, facilitators and proxy decision-
makers work together to make decisions in the best interest of the
incompetent adult. This means that when the facilitator is going
through the process of informed consent, his primary duty is to protect
the interests of the potential subject by ensuring that the subject is
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able to make a full, free and informed decision about the research. As
the discussion below demonstrates, the primary interests of physicians
and researchers are both incompatible with the primary interests of an
informed consent facilitator and that as long as the same person
carries out these functions, the informed consent facilitator remains
impossibly compromised. The discussion below also demonstrates how
physician/investigators as well as subject/patients find it very hard to
separate the roles of physician and researcher, and both tend to over
emphasise the therapeutic role in the context of research. This in turn
tends to contribute to an undermining of the informed consent process
because the facilitator is functioning with some very fundamental
opposing primary interests that, as evidence suggests, are still very
much unresolved.
Informed Consent Facilitator and Erde’s Social Role
Having established these preliminary observations about the role of
the informed consent facilitator, the question that arises now is
whether the role is one that invokes Erde’s social role? The informed
consent facilitator’s role clearly fulfils the first two criteria of Erde’s
social role, it is socially designed and exists to serve the welfare of the
person providing the consent. It is however disputable that this role
involves any discretion and judgment as part of its function. A closer
look at how the informed consent process works in practice today
reveals that, in fact, discretion and judgment do form part of the
process. This is clarified and elaborated on below.
The dispute (i.e. whether or not the role of an informed consent
facilitator involves any discretion or judgment) arises from the fact
that the informed consent model in the research environment, as
opposed to a paternalistic model, places the autonomous
patient/subject at the centre of the decision-making process with the
physician/researcher playing a peripheral role in supplying the
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necessary information. This model envisages that both parties operate
from positions of equal strength. As long as the physician/researcher
provides the patient/subject with the information, he has fulfilled his
duty and the latter is free to choose whether or not to enrol in the trial.
It is also important to remember that the process of taking informed
consent prior to enrolment in a clinical trial is very different from
obtaining consent for medical treatment. The patient/subject is
provided with a patient information sheet that has received the prior
approval of an ethics committee, which should contain all the relevant
information set out in a way that is easily understood.437 Theoretically,
the physician/researcher is not a position to hold back any information
or data from the patient/subject. If this is true, the
physician/researcher cannot be said to hold a social role that might
involve a CI as envisioned by Erde as the physician/researcher does not
act with any discretion or judgment and makes no decision about the
patient’s best interest. He merely offers him pre-approved information.
Consequently, the patient/subject is not placed in a position of reliance
on the physician/researcher. Moreover, given that the informed consent
is obtained for the purposes of a clinical trial, the physician/researcher
can be said to be operating primarily as a researcher and as recognised
by Brody and Miller, the researcher cannot be seen as having a
fiduciary relationship with research subjects, including those who have
a prior patient-physician relationship, as the researchers “cannot in
good faith promise fidelity to doing what is best medically for the
patient-subject”.438 Given these arguments, it seems plausible to
suggest that the question of CIs should not be raised in relation to
taking informed consent for clinical trials.
437 There is some doubt as to the readability of the patient information sheet. See Christopher et al.,
"Consent Form Readability and Educational Levels of Potential Participants in Mental Health
Research."
438 Howard Brody and Franklin G. Miller, "The Clinician-Investigator: Unavoidable but
Manageable Tension," Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13, no. 4 (2004). at 336
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This however is not true for two reasons. First, even in the best of
circumstances, the parties enter into this process from very different
positions of power and knowledge, and if patients/subjects are to be
informed, they must to some extent rely on the physicians/researchers
to provide them with the information they need. Second,
physicians/researchers cannot abrogate their positions as physicians
when taking informed consent, as patients are generally unable to
separate these roles and are likely to defer to or be influenced by the
views of their physicians when making treatment decisions. The
informed consent process relies on the idea that if a patient is supplied
with sufficient relevant information, he will be in a position to make a
choice that best reflects his values and interests. Most of time though,
patients/subjects are unlikely to have any prior medical and scientific
knowledge and because of this are provided with patient information
sheets, which provide a brief account of the trial process, its benefits
and risks in lay terms. They are never presented with the full
complement of scientific and medical information available in the trial
protocol and in all fairness, much of it is likely to be beyond the
comprehension of a patient/subject. In fact, evidence suggests that
many patients are unable to understand the information as set out in
the information sheets notwithstanding the fact that the sheets have
received prior ethics committee approval. This is particularly true of
mental health research, where poor readability of informed consent
forms have been a persistent problem. A study conducted at the
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health suggests that even by the
most conservative estimate, approximately 35% of patients would be
found to lack the educational level required to read the average
informed consent form.439
439 Christopher et al., "Consent Form Readability and Educational Levels of Potential Participants
in Mental Health Research." at 230
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Although ethics committees scrutinise patient information sheets to
ensure that the language is non-technical and easily understandable,
this does not necessarily produce the desired result. Most of the time
ethics committees rely on their lay members to carry out this task and
if committees are reviewing large numbers of trial protocols, lay
members are likely to become familiar with medical terms and
expressions very quickly, and are likely to be reading information
sheets with levels of understanding far beyond the ordinary
patient/subject. In fact, when asked about reading patient information
sheets, one lay member of an ethics committee remarked very quickly
‘That is the danger because now I don’t query them as much as
before because I have been exposed to all the jargon and I kind
of could understand even though not perfectly I could figure out
most of it.’440
If a patient/subject is unable to understand the information provided
in the sheets, he would need to rely on the explanation provided by the
physician/researcher and any subsequent discussion between them.
How this explanation is provided to the patient/subject and the shape
of the discussion that ensues is left to the discretion and judgment of
the physician/researcher. Depending on how the physician/researcher
presents the information, he may significantly influence the decision of
the patient/subject as there is some evidence that word choice, can
introduce framing biases that might influence the way in which a
patient/subject makes a choice.441
The other reason why the physician/researcher cannot escape Erde’s
social role is that when patients decide whether or not to participate in
research, they rely heavily on their physicians to guide their choice.
This is rooted in the belief held by many subjects that participating in
research will advance their individual best interests. This mistaken
440 Interview with Ethics Committee B, Institution A, 21 Dec 2007
441 R. M. Epstein, B. S. Alper, and T. E. Quill, Communicating Evidence for Participatory
Decision Making, vol. 291 (Am Med Assoc, 2004). at 2362
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belief is known as the therapeutic misconception442 and was first
observed by Appelbaum and colleagues when they interviewed
participants in several psychiatric trials.443 Their data indicated that
many subjects entering psychiatric trials, despite being given
comprehensive disclosure, believed that they would personally benefit
from the trials. Numerous subsequent studies have supported this
observation in other types of therapeutic trials. The therapeutic
misconception is so prevalent that is has been noted among
patients/subjects enrolled in Phase I chemotherapy trials. Phase I
trials are carried out with the sole purpose of establishing safe dosage
levels, but one third of patients interviewed by researchers from the
University of Chicago said that their main reason for participating was
to seek a cure or remission and nearly 90 percent said their goals in
joining the Phase I study were the same as if undergoing established
treatments.444 One of the offshoots of the therapeutic misconception is
that because patients/subjects view participation in research as the
same as conventional treatment, they are more likely to be influenced
by the opinions of physicians/researchers because they believe that
their physician have their best interests in mind.445 The Subject
Interview Study carried out by the Advisory Committee on Human
Radiation Experiments, which enrolled almost 1,900 outpatients to
determine their experiences with research, found that
recommendations of physicians were powerful factors influencing
patients’ choice.446 One subject was recorded as saying “there is not a
442 Also, see the discussion on the role of the therapeutic misconception at 187
443 Paul S. Appelbaum, Loren H. Roth, and Charles Lidz, "The Therapeutic Misconception:
Informed Consent in Psychiatric Research," International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 5, no. 3-
4 (1982).
444 R. Dresser, "The Ubiquity and Utility of the Therapeutic Misconception " Social Philosophy
and Policy 19, no. 02 (2002). at 275
445 Many studies have looked at the relationship between patients and physicians and how patients
make decisions about conventional treatment. Although many of the studies indicate that patients
have a strong desire for more information, the same patients rely heavily on their doctors when
making their decisions. See L. M. L. Ong et al., "Doctor-Patient Communication: A Review of the
Literature," Social Science & Medicine 40, no. 7 (1995).
446 N. E. Kass et al., "The Fragile Foundation of Contemporary Biomedical Research," Hastings
Cent Rep 26 (1996). at 26
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lot you can control when you are sick, so you have to rely on your
doctors … if he suggests that you should go into a research project, I
think you should take his advice or her advice … because if you take
the time to get yourself a good doctor and they’re involved in research,
they would never steer you wrong.”447 What is more, consent forms
appeared to have little influence on the choices made by subjects as
patients either assumed that they did not need to pay attention to the
information in the consent form; or that if they could not understand
the information, it did not matter because they had already made up
their minds.448.
In addition to this, in the Malaysian context, mentally ill patients are
likely to be at the end of their tether. This is because there is still a
perceived social stigma surrounding mental illness and recourse to
Western medicine is more often than not a last resort after traditional
remedies have been exhausted. Patients suffering from psychiatric
conditions are described as having tried,
‘… the bomoh449 first, the ustaz450 first, before they come to you,
and probably after they can’t really control the patient. They are
really aggressive and violent and then only they come back you.
“Okay doctor, now I am ready, I have depleted all my resources.
… and they are desperate. They will try anything.’451
Patients and their families are thus even more likely to be influenced
or led by the advice of their physicians.
The informed consent/proxy consent process and the
incompetent patient
It is therefore clear that, in reality, the role of the physician/researcher
as an informed consent facilitator fulfils the criteria of the social role as
described by Erde, which is potentially subject to CIs. However, the
447 Ibid. at 28
448 Ibid. at 28
449 This is the term used for a shaman in Malaysia.
450 Ustaz is a term used for a teacher of Islam.
451 Interview with Psychiatrist/Investigator B, Institution A, 28 January 2008
179
above argument has relied on the idea that the patient/subject is a
competent adult. In the event that the patient/subject is an
incompetent adult, informed consent cannot be obtained from him.
There are two common approaches to such a situation. The first is to
obtain advanced informed consent from the subject before he becomes
incompetent. This can be achieved by getting consent at an early stage
of a degenerative disease (such as Alzheimer’s disease) before the loss
of cognitive function; or during a period of remission from a disease or
disorder (for example, schizophrenia); or by allowing a competent
subject to appoint a research agent to carry out his will through the
execution of a written advance directive. At present, there is no
provision for any sort of advanced decision-making in the Malaysian
context and it is unlikely to change in the near future, as there is no
mention of it in the new Mental Health Act.452 Also, while advanced
informed consent raises a number of serious concerns;453 as far as CIs
are concerned, the players involved in the process and the social roles
they occupy are similar to the informed consent process.
The second approach is to provide for some form of proxy decision-
making.454 In England for example, the Medicines for Human Use
(Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, provides that if an adult is unable
by virtue of physical or mental incapacity to give informed consent,
consent can be obtained from a “legal representative” if certain
conditions are met. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is currently in
Malaysia, no clear legal authority for adult proxy decision-making in
health care matters. Because of this legal uncertainty and the
unwillingness of sponsors to enrol mentally incompetent adult
452 Mental Health Act 2001 (Act 615), Malaysia.
453 For a good analysis of advance directives, see R. Dresser, "Advance Directives in Dementia
Research," IRB: Ethics and Human Research 23, no. 1 (2001).
454 An in-depth discussion of the different types of advanced proxy consent models
and their respective merits and perils is beyond the scope of this thesis. For a good
discussion of the different models of proxy decision-making seeAdvisory Work Group on Human
Subject Research Involving the Protected Classes, "Recommendations on the Oversight of Human
Subject Research Involving the Protected Classes," (New York (State) Dept of Health, 2002).
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patients, the present policy is one of exclusion of all mentally
incompetent adults.455 This will, however, change when the Mental
Health Act 2001 comes into force as it allows for consent by a
relative456 or if there is no relative available or traceable, by two
psychiatrists, one of who shall be the attending psychiatrist.457
Therefore, at some point in the future, mentally incompetent adults are
likely to be enrolled in clinical trials via proxy consent. The next
section considers the informed consent process and the role played by
relatives of patients who are invited to enrol into clinical trials that
might potentially involve mentally incompetent patients, and
demonstrates that the role played by relatives also fulfils the criteria
set out in Erde’s social role.
Relatives & Proxy Consent and Erde’s Social Role
Relatives of patients and proxy consent – after the Mental Health Act
2001 comes into force
When the Mental Health Act comes into force, relatives will be
permitted to provide proxy consent for mentally incompetent adults to
enter in clinical trials. The consent process in such cases involves three
parties – the patient/subject, the physician/researcher and the proxy
decision-maker. In these cases, the role of the physicians/researchers in
the proxy consent process remains much the same as in the informed
consent process: to facilitate the decision-making process in a manner
that serves the vital interests of the incompetent subjects by ensuring
that the proxy decision-makers are fully informed about the benefits
and risks of the trial. The same arguments that have been raised above
455 The lack of certainty surrounding determinations of capacity would suggest that this might not
always be the case. (See discussion on page…) If this is true and patients are being erroneously
treated as competent adults, the fact that the physician/researcher is also the informed consent
facilitator cannot bode well for the interests of the subject as there is little hope of the informed
consent process achieving its aim of protecting the autonomy of the subject if he does not have the
capacity to provide an informed consent, as even in circumstances where assessments of capacity
are not called into question, physicians have been known to claim that they can get their patients to
“consent to virtually anything” (R Macklin, "Some Problems in Gaining Informed Consent from
Psychiatric Patients," Emory L. J. 31 (1982). at 353)
456 Section 77(1)(b)Mental Health Act 2001 (Act 615), Malaysia.
457 Ibid. Section 77(1)(c)
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regarding provision of information and the therapeutic misconception
hold true in relation to proxy decision-making. The
physician/researcher holds the same social role.
The role played by the relatives as proxy decision-makers falls squarely
within the conditions laid out by Erde.458 First, even though as
relatives they will be in natural relationships with the incompetent
adults, they are unlikely to be in unavoidable459 ones and as such
would have elected to undertake their social roles. Second, the Mental
Health Act confers on relatives the power to make decisions on behalf
of the mentally incompetent subjects in order to serve the welfare of
the subjects who are deemed incapable of protecting their own vital
interests. Third, their role involves using their discretion in making
judgments about whether or not to allow their mentally incompetent
relatives to participate in research trials and finally, mentally
incompetent subjects must trust their relatives to make decisions that
are in their best interest.
Relatives of patients enrolled into psychiatric clinical trials - the current
situation
As noted earlier, the current practice in Malaysia is to exclude all
mentally incompetent patients from clinical trials. Assuming that
determinations of capacity are correctly made, all competent subjects
should be capable of providing informed consent, that is to say they
should be able to understand the information provided to them and
make their own decisions based on their personal values and interests.
This being the case, there would be no reason to involve any third
party and relatives would not have any significant role to play in the
consent process. This is however, not the case at all. The current policy
of the Ministry of Health is that all competent psychiatric patients who
458 See section 5.4.1
459 While it may be seem as a moral failing, people are not required by law to take care of or
maintain adult relatives who are incompetent or incapacitated in any way.
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participate in clinical trials can only do so with the added consent of
their relatives or caregivers.460 This is also true of academic research
centres in Malaysia as noted by a senior psychiatrist/researcher who
pointed out that, “if the patient don’t sign and only the relative sign,
the consent is not accepted. The patient must sign and the relatives
must sign.”461 The current practice is that even if a competent patient
is willing to participate but his family is not keen, the patient is not
enrolled in the trial. The justification provided is that in an Asian
context, the role of family members is seen as being very important,
particularly in Phase II and Phase III trials with a placebo arm. An
interesting point to note is that Phase IV clinical trials that do not
employ the use of placebos are exempt from this rule, because these
trials are equated with the provision of treatment.462
There are many troubling aspects of requiring consent from a relative
of a competent patient (relative’s consent) and although a full
discussion of the concerns raised by this practice is beyond the scope of
this thesis, the following points are worth noting. First and foremost, it
undermines the patient’s fundamental right to autonomy and renders
the entire informed consent process a meaningless formality. It strips
the patient of his human dignity by undervaluing him as an individual
by dismissing his personal values as expressed by his decision.463 This
practice is also discriminatory and undervalues the human dignity of
psychiatric patients as a whole. It is clearly based on the assumption
that the cohort of patients suffering from psychiatric illnesses is
incapable of making decisions; that decisions made by this group are in
some way inferior to decisions made by patients suffering from other
disorders. Relatives’ consent cannot be justified by claiming that
460 Telephone interview with Dr Suaran Singh, Director, Hospital Bahagia, Ulu Kinta – Chief
Psychiatrist Malaysia. Wednesday, 2 January 2008, 9:30am
461 Interview with Psychiatrist/Investigator B at University A, 28 January 2008
462 The fact that post-marketing Phase IV trials are equated with treatment adds to the notion of the
therapeutic misconception.
463 See the discussion on undervaluation of the individual human life in Chapter 3 section 3.2.2.1
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families play a more important role in the Asian context. This line of
reasoning might perhaps be relevant to the manner in which the
informed consent process is carried out. It might be a good reason for
allowing family members to participate in the decision-making process,
and even then, only when a competent patient desires such
participation. It cannot serve as a justification for vetoing a patient’s
choice. If a patient is competent, his decision should be allowed to
stand.
There appear to be two other reasons for requiring relative’s consent
for competent patients: first, because of the uncertainty in the law,
researchers are concerned about their potential liabilities. A
psychiatrist when asked why relatives of competent patients were
asked for their consent remarked,
‘Because … there is no law on this, so we are not sure what
happened in the future. At least we, we get some of the [family]
members to be around and we try to explain to them as well.’464
The second reason seems to be linked to the issue of compliance as
another researcher pointed out that co-operation from relatives was
necessary to allay worries such as,
‘How often are these patients going to come for follow up? Are
they going to come regularly as required? Number one, number
two – if they are so of unsound mind, they are not going to last
the trial. Especially if they have the placebo or the lower dose
arm of the multi-arm study. So, we also want to take into
concern the sustainability of the trial.’ 465
Neither of these reasons warrants denying a competent patient the
right to make an informed decision about whether or not to participate
in a clinical trial. Both of these reasons are self-serving; the first is
464 Interview with Psychiatrist/Investigator B, University A, 28 January 2008
465 Interview with Psychiatrist/Investigator A, Insitution A, 30 June 2008
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aimed at protecting researchers from lawsuits and the second, to
protect the sustainability of the trial.466
Regardless of whether or not obtaining a relative’s consent is ethical,
the fact is that this type of consent is routinely obtained, which then
raises the question of the role of the relative in such a situation.
Accepting the justification provided by the Malaysian Chief
Psychiatrist that this consent is based on the importance of the role
played by relatives of mentally ill patients, and that it is limited to
trials involving a placebo arm, it is possible to infer that because Phase
II and III trials, especially those with placebo arms are riskier than
Phase IV trials, that the role of the relative providing relative’s consent
must be to protect the rights and interests of the patient/subject. This
in turn must be based on the belief, even if mistaken, that all mentally
ill patients are unable to assess the added risks associated with Phase
II and Phase III trials that have placebo arms. In other words, patients
suffering from mental illness are presumed to be incapable of providing
informed consent and what is obtained from them is merely assent and
that in reality, relatives are providing some form of proxy consent. If
this it the case, then the role played by the relatives would fulfil the
criteria of Erde’s social role for the same reasons as relatives who are
proxy decision makers.
From the above discussion, three groups of players, ethics review
committees, informed consent facilitators (physicians/researchers), and
relatives, are in relationships with patients/subjects that fulfil the
criteria of Erde’s social role, and are therefore potentially subject to
CIs.
466 Interestingly, both these are examples of secondary interests that might or in this case; actually
do unduly interfere with primary interests.
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The next step is to consider the nature of the primary interests of each
group and whether or not there exists at the same time, secondary
interests that might unduly influence these primary interests.
(2) How are primary interests to be discovered?
The physician/researcher
In determining the primary interests of the physician/researcher, an
important point to note is the difference between role holders that only
play a single social role as opposed to role holders who might play a
number of different social roles. This difference is clearly demonstrated
by comparing the roles played by ethics committees and
physician/researchers. Ethics committees are set up for one single
purpose: to review research protocols to ensure the protection of the
rights and safety of trial subjects. Regardless of the different roles
played by individual members in their personal or professional
capacities, when they sit as an ethics committee, the remit of their
review is human subject protection. The primary interest of an ethics
committee is solely to protect the welfare of human research subjects.
Similarly, when relatives act as proxy decision-makers, they have a
clear singular purpose: that is to ensure that the interests of the
patient/subject are protected. On the other hand, the
physician/researcher wears a number of hats simultaneously and it is
very difficult, if not impossible for the physician/researcher to separate
these roles. As a physician, he is entrusted with the role of providing
the best care and treatment for his patient. As a researcher, he is
called upon to serve the interests of furthering scientific and medical
knowledge to benefit society at large, and as an informed consent
facilitator he must ensure that the patient/subject/relative is able to
make an informed decision.
Deleted: ¶
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Given the fact that the physician/researcher is called to play a number
of roles simultaneously, there are two approaches that can be taken in
determining the primary interests of the physician/researcher in the
informed consent process.467 The first and most common approach is to
focus on the roles of physician and researcher, to compare and contrast
the different primary interests of each role and determine how best to
reconcile the differences in order to come up with an agreed primary
interest. In this approach, the third role mentioned above, the role of
the informed consent facilitator is not seen as a separate role with any
special attributes. It is contended, that this is the wrong approach. To
begin with, as described below, the primary interests of the roles of
physician and researcher are impossibly conflicted and it is not
possible to reconcile the roles. What is more, this approach fails to
recognise the importance of the informed consent process as a tool for
human subject protection. As long as this remains the dominant
approach, the informed consent process is unlikely to achieve its
purpose. The second approach proposed in this thesis is to view the role
of the informed consent facilitator as a separate role, i.e. a role with a
clear and uncompromised primary interest: the protection of the rights
and interests of patients/subjects. Any other interest must therefore be
seen as a secondary interest and should not be allowed to unduly
influence the primary interest. However, given the manner in which
informed consent is currently obtained and the fact that the
therapeutic and research roles are so closely enmeshed, it is hard to see
how it is achievable in the current context. While unravelling this
dilemma and proposing a solution is beyond the scope of this thesis, it
does highlight the importance of the notion of an independent ethics
467 Resnick offers the ‘contextual approach’ as an alternative to the two traditional approaches,
where he describes the extent of investigators’ obligations as varying from situation to situation.
This approach is rejected at the outset as it creates even more uncertainty about the role played by
the physician/researcher and opens the door to a relativistic approach to moral duties. See Resnik,
David. "The Clinical Investigator-Subject Relationship: A Contextual Approach." Philosophy,
Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 4, no. 1 (2009): 16.
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review, seeing that in the present climate, the informed consent
process is riddled with CIs.
The first approach - reconciling the roles of the physician and
the researcher
The conflict of roles between the physician and researcher seem
irreconcilable468 and much debate has centred on this. In general there
are two lines of argument that have been forwarded regarding this
intersection of roles: the similarity position and the difference position.
According to the similarity position, the ethics of clinical research is
just a simple application of the ethics of clinical medicine and the
ethics of the physician-patient relationship is assumed also to govern
the investigator-subject relationship. Brody and Miller469 contend that
the adoption of this position has resulted in what they see as
incoherence in the research ethics literature. This position, as they
rightly argue, is an intractable one. Attempts at subsuming the role of
the researcher into the larger role of the physician have only resulted
in logical incoherence. Take for example the principle of clinical
equipoise470 used by proponents of the similarity position to rationalise
the use of randomisation in clinical research. The argument is that
although the practice of randomisation is clearly inconsistent with the
physician’s duty to act in the best interests of an individual patient, it
is permissible in cases where there is clinical equipoise, where there is
genuine uncertainty about which of the two treatments is better. The
principle is aptly described as placing two different treatments on two
ends of a seesaw and if somehow magically weighed, their respective
net benefits and risks would result in a seesaw that is perfectly
468 DuBois provides a number of vignettes that illustrate the types of conflicts that can arise as a
result of the conflicting roles, see James M. DuBois, Ethics in Mental Health Research, Principles,
Guidance, and Cases (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). at 207-208
469 Brody and Miller, "The Clinician-Investigator: Unavoidable but Manageable Tension."
470 For a more detailed discussion on clinical equipoise and randomisation in clinical trials, see
Chapter 5 section 5.4.3.1
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balanced.471 If a physician/researcher is in a position of clinical
equipoise, he is said not to violate his primary role as a physician. This
argument is flawed. Even if a physician might view the two arms of a
trial as being in perfect balance, an individual patient with specific
ideas about risks and benefits may not feel the same way. If a
physician/researcher is to fulfil his role as a physician, he must be in a
position to take into account the individual preferences of his patient.
Menikoff472 offers the example of the landmark studies where women
with breast cancer were randomised to either mastectomies or breast-
sparing surgeries. Even though doctors were in true clinical equipoise
about the effectiveness of the treatments; women were generally
unwilling to participate in the study as the differences between the
treatments mattered a great deal to most women regardless of the fact
that there was genuine uncertainty in the medical profession regarding
the effectiveness of the procedures in eliminating the cancer. The
problem with the principle of clinical equipoise is that it proceeds from
the assumption that the risks and benefits of a clinical trial apply
equally to all subjects across the board but this is simply not true
because every patient/subject is an individual with distinct preferences
and notions of acceptable risks. The two ideas are incompatible as are
the roles of physician and researcher.
The difference position on the other hand claims to provide a sounder
basis for research ethics as it recognises that research and clinical
practice are “distinct activities with very different goals”473 and one
“should not expect that the same ethical principles would necessarily
apply in both of these distinct settings”.474 The only duty owed to a
subject, they argue, is non-exploitation and four measures are
suggested as being necessary to manage the ethical tension. The first
471 Menikoff and Richards, What the Doctor Didn't Say : The Hidden Truth About Medical
Research. at 32
472 Ibid.
473 Brody and Miller, "The Clinician-Investigator: Unavoidable but Manageable Tension." at 330
474 Ibid. at 330
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and perhaps most important measure being that physician/researchers
must face the inherent ethical tension and recognise it for what it is;
followed by the need for the physician/researcher to work especially
hard to educate the patient/subject on how the research context differs
from the patient context. This approach is one that assumes that
naming the beast for what it is, will take away its bite. While the
difference position is undoubtedly more honest and transparent than
the similarity position, it does not offer any realistic or practical
solutions to the problem. Realistically, evidence suggests strongly that
physicians/researchers do not or are unable to separate their roles as
researchers and physicians and in fact, believe that their patients
benefit directly from participating in clinical trials. Results of an
investigation475 carried out by researchers from Harvard University
into the informed consent process for clinical research of cancer
therapies demonstrated that physician/researchers often “deal with
moral tensions inherent in their role by adopting the perspective of the
pure clinician”476 and that physicians often recommend that patients
with cancer enrol in trials because they feel that trials represent the
best therapeutic option. Similarly, Miller contends that researchers
may also be subject to a form of therapeutic misconception. Using an
example of an article477 where three psychiatrists rationalise the ethics
of using a washout period478 in schizophrenia research by conflating
the language of medical care with that of research, he demonstrates
how they not only reinforce the therapeutic misconceptions of patients
but also fall prey themselves to this idea.479 This attitude appears to
hold true of Malaysian physicians as well; a psychiatrist at an
475 Steven Joffe et al., "Quality of Informed Consent in Cancer Clinical Trials: A Cross-Sectional
Survey," The Lancet 358, no. 9295 (2001).
476 Ibid. at 1776
477 W. T. Carpenter, Jr., N. R. Schooler, and J. M. Kane, "The Rationale and Ethics of Medication-
Free Research in Schizophrenia," Arch Gen Psychiatry 54, no. 5 (1997).
478 Washout periods are when patients are taken off an existing drug for a period of time before
starting a clinical trial. This is to ensure that the effects of the prior medication do not contaminate
the results of the trial. The use of “washout periods” in mental health research is especially
contentious.
479 Franklin G. Miller, Donald L. Rosenstein, and Evan G. DeRenzo, "Professional Integrity in
Clinical Research," JAMA 280, no. 16 (1998) at 1451
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academic medical centre considered the benefits of participation as
being -
“…just different aspects of total treatment. Because when a person
enrols in a study, they also tend to benefit from different aspects.
More time spent on them, lesser waiting time, easier medication
dispensing, closer monitoring, whereas if you were to sit in the
government clinic, it is just not physically possible to spend half and
hour on each patient, because you have fifteen to twenty patients to
see in three hours. So there is a benefit for patients.”480
In fact, in a telephone interview with the Chief Psychiatrist of
Malaysia, he noted that Phase IV trials were regarded as a form of
treatment.481
Miller ascribes this phenomenon to the “deep socialisation of
investigators as clinicians and the blurring of clinical medicine and
clinical research in the academic medical center”.482 It is hard to see
how the socialisation of the investigator as clinician can be reversed as
most physicians/researchers will have received their primary training
as physicians and in practice, will function primarily as physicians.
The only true solution to this problem is to completely separate the role
of the physician from the researcher.
It is obvious that the position of the physician/researcher is an
uncomfortable one where primary interests themselves appear to
conflict. It is thus ironic that the duty to obtain informed consent,
which is a vital part of human subject protection, is entrusted to the
very person who is in such a conflicted position. More than this, it is
surprising that the role played by the physician/researcher as an
informed consent facilitator in the informed consent process in
480 Interview with Psychiatrist/Investigator A, University A, 30 June 2008
481 Telephone interview with Dr Suaran Singh, Director, Hospital Bahagia, Ulu Kinta – Chief
Psychiatrist Malaysia. 2 January 2008, 9:30am
482 Miller, Rosenstein, and DeRenzo, "Professional Integrity in Clinical Research."at 1450
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therapeutic clinical trials has received so little attention.483 Much of
the literature, as noted above, has only concentrated on the physician-
researcher dichotomy. Approaching the issue in this way is to fail to
recognise the singular importance of the informed consent process in
the research environment as a means of protecting human subjects.
And as long as the debate continues to revolve around the
physician/researcher dichotomy, the informed consent process will not
be an effective protection for human subjects.
Second Approach – Informed consent facilitator as a separate
role
What is needed is a different approach where the informed consent
process is viewed as separate from therapy and research, and where
the role of the informed consent facilitator is distinct from physician
and researcher. Informed consent is not consent for therapy and is not
part of the treatment process. Neither is it part of the research trial
itself. It is a process that is taken prior to the initiation of a research
trial in respect of an individual patient. In many ways it is the same
sort of creature as the ethics review process; it exists to protect human
subjects and it is taken prior to the trial. The difference between the
two is that ethics review is carried out to protect the interests of all
potential research subjects who might enrol in a particular clinical
483 Habiba and Evans (Marwan Habiba and Martyn Evans, "The Inter-Role Confidentiality Conflict in
Recruitment for Clinical Research," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27, no. 5 (2002).) provide a novel
approach to the physician-researcher role conflict and its relationship to the issue of informed consent by
claiming that it results in an inter-role breach of confidentiality. This occurs when a physician utilises
confidential information obtained within the therapeutic relationship beyond its primary object. They offer
the concept of preliminary consent, which is obtained prior to being treatment, where patients are asked if
they would ever be willing to be approached about the possibility of treatment. While this approach is an
interesting one, it fails to appreciate that the real danger of the conflict is that it undermines the fundamental
purpose of the informed consent process, the protection of human dignity. An excellent critique of their
approach and the problems with the notion of preliminary consent is provided by Iltis in Iltis, A. S. "Timing
Invitations to Participate in Clinical Research: Preliminary Versus Informed Consent." Journal of Medicine
& Philosophy 30, no. 1 (2005): 89.
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trial; whereas the informed consent process exists to protect the
interests of each individual potential subject. As such they are both
taken prior to the trial itself and are distinct from treatment or trial.
The centrality of informed consent as a means of human subject
protection can be traced back to what is now generally accepted as the
point of conception of a discourse on research ethics; the World War II
experiments on human subjects carried out by the Germans and the
articulation of the Nuremberg Code. The very first principle of the
Code states that484
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to
give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free
power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force,
fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of
constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and
comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to
enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision.
This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an
affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be
made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the
experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted;
all inconveniences and hazards reasonable to be expected; and the
effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his
participation in the experiment.
Beginning with the Nuremberg Code; every subsequent articulation of
the ethical and legal standards required of research involving human
participants has included the notion of requiring the informed consent
of subjects. Significantly, the development of the doctrine of informed
consent in the research setting has been driven by incidences of
research misconduct.485 Misconduct in this context includes instances
where human subjects were enrolled into trials where there were not
fully informed of the risks of the procedures; where they were lied to
regarding the treatment they were receiving; and in some instances
484At http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html accessed 15 September 2008.
485 For an overview of the history of research misconduct and the articulation of research ethics
guidelines, see the discussion in Chapter 3, section 3.1
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where they were completely unaware that they were taking part in
clinical research.486 Moreover, the trials were never intended to benefit
the subjects, they were intended at best, to serve the greater good of
society. The subjects in these trials were given inadequate information,
misleading information, false information, and some were never
informed of anything at all. These persons were treated inequitably
and deprived of their human dignity because they were treated as
means to an end and were never given the choice or opportunity to
decide whether or not to bear the risks of the research trials they were
subjected to. The doctrine of informed consent addressed these issues
directly. Potential subjects would be provided with full disclosure of the
trial methods, risks, benefits and any other pertinent information,
which would allow them to make decisions that would serve their
individual interests. Ethics review is only able to consider the question
of the interests of potential subjects at a more general level. Ethics
committees scrutinise patient information sheets and informed consent
sheets to access accuracy and sufficiency of information, as well as lay
readability. They do not and cannot be expected to have each
individual patient in their contemplation. The test of whether a
subject’s consent is in fact informed will depend on the exchange
between the subject and the informed consent facilitator. It is a vital
mechanism for human subject protection and for reasons stated earlier;
patients/subjects/relatives rely very heavily on informed consent
facilitators. For this reason, the role of the informed consent facilitator
should never be seen as a role that is subsumed into the larger role of
the physician or researcher. The informed consent process must have
at its heart, the interests of the subject/patient. Therefore,
notwithstanding the dichotomy of the physician role and the researcher
role, when taking informed consent, the physician/researcher is acting
486 For an excellent overview of the history of human research trials and the many ways in which
misconduct has occurred see, J. Goodman, A. McElligott, and L. Marks, Useful Bodies: Humans
in the Service of Medical Science in the Twentieth Century (Baltimore Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2003).
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as an informed consent facilitator and his primary interest must be in
accordance with Erde’s second criteria: to serve the welfare or vital
interest of the patient/subject. All other interests and roles are
secondary to this and to the extent that they are in conflict with this
interest, place physician/researchers in positions of CIs.
A more detailed consideration of the conflict of roles of the
physician/researcher/informed consent facilitator in the informed
consent process is beyond the scope of this thesis but the conflict above
raises two very important points. First, as long as the role of the
informed consent facilitator is inextricably tied into the roles of
physician and researcher, the informed consent process will remain
compromised as very the primary interests of the physician,
researcher, and informed consent facilitator are at odds with each
other. And this in turn this highlights the importance of the role of
ethics review: that it must not only be independent, but that ethics
committees must also be aware of and seek to minimise this conflict
whenever possible.
Relatives
This section is concerned with exploring the role and primary interests
of third parties that are involved in the enrolment of mentally
incapacitated subjects into research projects. Although the following
discussion is concerned primarily with the relative/carer/legal
representative taking on the role of the third party, it is recognised
that there are other players that might be drawn into this process as
third parties.487 As noted earlier, the role played by relatives fall
squarely within Erde’s social role, as incapacitated adults must rely on
these proxies to make decisions or act on behalf of them. Also, unlike
the physician/researcher, a person who acts as a proxy decision maker
487 For example – independent MCA advocates, independent third party assessors, etc …
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takes on a single social role, that of acting on behalf of the
incapacitated adult. This being the case, it would seem logically
obvious to conclude that in such cases the proxy decision maker is
required to serve the welfare of the incapacitated adult and that there
should be no difficulty in locating the primary interests of the relative
or proxy decision maker and all is required is a straightforward
application of Thompson’s notion of primary interests. Thompson, as
described earlier, asserts that primary interests are determined by the
professional duties of the role-holder and that there is normally
agreement that they should be the primary consideration in any
professional decision made by the role holder. Because the inclusion of
third parties into the process of enrolling incapacitated adults into
clinical trials in both Malaysia and England are governed by statutes,
the primary interests of such parties should be discoverable by looking
at the statues. If Thompson is correct, there should be some agreement
in the law regarding the primary considerations that should guide the
actions of proxy decision makers.
The discussion below reveals that it not the case and that while
legislation is silent in Malaysia, the English legislation prescribes very
different duties for third parties involved in the enrolment of mentally
incapacitated adults in research projects. In fact, a perusal of the
English statutes that provide for enrolment of incapacitated adults into
research projects,488 provides a surprising picture with the Mental
Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) found wanting and the Medicines for Human
Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004 (MHUR) providing a more
satisfactory basis for proxy decision making.489
488 Mental Capacity Act 2005. and The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations
2004 (as Amended by S.I 2006/1928 & 2984).
489 The result is surprising given the general ethos of the MCA, which is based on a set of laudable
principles articulated in Section 1 of the Act. This is compared to the MHUR, which is based on
GCP principles that are often more concerned with scientific accuracy and administrative
efficiency rather than the protection of human subjects. For a more in-depth discussion of the
relevant legislative provisions governing research with adults who lack capacity, see Biggs, Hazel.
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This leads to two possible conclusions, first, that the primary interests
of relatives are simply different depending on the different rules that
apply to different research projects. This position is as demonstrated
below, untenable given the absence of any rational justification for the
different rules. The second conclusion is that it is not sufficient to look
to either standards prescribed by law or professional bodies to
determine the scope of primary interests of role holders, particularly
when there is disagreement. The fact that certain role holders hold
social roles as described by Erde, places these parties in special
positions where certain obligations are placed upon them and these are
normative obligations that are described in terms of their primary
interests. Therefore in order to determine the proper remit of primary
interests, it is necessary to examine the underlying basis for the
creation of that particular social role.
Role of relatives in the Malaysian Context
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no legislation in Malaysia that
allows for any sort of proxy health care decision making for
incompetent adult patients. There is also no law that regulates the
running of clinical trials. It would thus seem that relatives have little
or no role to play in the consent taking process, but this, as evidenced
by interviews with psychiatrist/investigators, is not the case. Relatives
do in fact play a significant role in the enrolment process of mentally
incompetent patients. What then are the duties and responsibilities of
relatives in such situations? While there is no guidance to be found in
the existing law, there are two possible sources that may of some use.
First, the Mental Health Act 2001(MMHA), which will, when it comes
into force, allow relatives to provide consent on behalf of incompetent
Healthcare Research Ethics and Law: Regulation, Review and Responsibility. London: Routledge-
Cavendish, 2010 at 129-139
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adult patients to enrol into clinical trials; 490 and the ICH-GCP, which
recognises that ‘legally acceptable representatives’ may provide
consent on behalf of mentally incapacitated adults.491
The term relative is used to represent the role of the third party
involved in decision-making in the rest of this section, as it is the term
used in the MMHA to identify the person with proxy decision-making
powers in relation to a mentally incompetent adult patient. The terms
relative, carer, proxy decision-maker and legally acceptable
representative are used interchangeably in the proceeding discussion.
Unfortunately, there is little help to be found in either the MMHA or
the ICH-GCPs about the duties or responsibilities of relatives. The
MMHA is silent as to the duties and responsibilities of relatives of
mentally disordered persons and only provides for remedies where the
mentally disordered person is either not under proper care and
control;492 or is being neglected or treated cruelly by a relative or any
other person having charge of him.493 The ICH-GCP guideline494 makes
no mention as to the duties or responsibilities of proxy decision-
makers.495 In the absence of any guidance either in the Malaysian
context or the ICH-GCP, it is instructive to consider the duties of such
role-holders in the English context.
Role of relatives in the English context
490 Section 77(1)(b) Mental Health Act 2001 (Act 615), Malaysia.
491 para 1.37International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline
E6 (R1)."
492 Mental Health Act 2001 (Act 615), Malaysia. section 13(1)(a)
493 Ibid. section 13(1)(b)
494 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use. "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1)."
495 The guideline refers to a proxy decision-maker as a ‘legally acceptable representative’, defined
in para 1.37 as “an individual or juridical or other body authorized under applicable law to
consent, on behalf of a prospective subject, to the subject's participation in the clinical trial.”
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There are two pieces of legislation that provide for the participation of
mentally incapacitated adults in research trials in England: the Mental
Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) and the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical
Trials) Regulations 2004 (MHUR). Although clinical trials that enrol
incapacitated adults fall under the remit of the MHUR and not the
MCA, it is instructive to also consider the provisions of the MCA
relating to research and the roles of relatives/carers. This is because
even though both these Acts provide for some sort of proxy decision
making role, the primary interests of the carer under the MCA differ
significantly from the primary interests of the legal representative
under the MHUR.496 This in turn reveals the difficulty with
Thompson’s assertion that primary interests are normally discoverable
by agreement, or in this case, by reference to statutory requirements;
and as will be argued re-enforces the notion that the nature of the
social role played by a party should inform the determination of the
primary interests of the role holder.
Primary Interests and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA)
Under the MCA, there is oddly enough no provision for proxy decision-
making in relation to research involving mentally incapacitated adults.
Such research is permitted provided certain requirements are met. The
responsibility for meeting these requirements falls on the researcher
carrying out the research.497 Prior to enrolment, researchers are
required to do two things. First, obtain approval of ‘the appropriate
body’;498 and second, consult persons who are caring for or are
interested in the subjects’ welfare (carers).499 When consulting the
496 For a good discussion on the reform of English law in relation to adults lacking capacity who
participate in clinical trials, see McHale, Jean. "Law Reform, Clinical Research and Adults
without Mental Capacity - Much Needed Clarification of a Recipe for Further Uncertainty?" In
First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare, edited by Sheila Mc Lean. Aldershot: Ashgate
Publishing Ltd, 2006.
497 Section 32 Mental Capacity Act., para 11.8Code of Practice Mental Capacity Act 2005.
498 Section 31Mental Capacity Act. The ‘appropriate body’ in England is a research ethics
committee recognised by the Secretary of State, para 11.10
499 Ibid. Section 32. These persons cannot be working in a professional capacity.
199
carer, the researcher is required to provide the carer with information
about the project and ask for advice as to whether the subject should
take part in the research; and for the carer’s opinion as to the likely
wishes and feelings of the subject about taking part in the research.500
This requirement can be likened in some ways to the proxy decision-
making process in that the carer is asked to represent the likely wishes
and feelings of the subject. However, unlike typical proxy decision-
making processes where the role of the proxy is an active one, in that
he provides the consent on behalf of the subject; the role of the
carer/proxy under the MCA is passive as the carer/proxy only possesses
a form of veto power in that if he advises that the subject would be
likely to decline to take part in the process, the researcher is barred
from enrolling the subject.501
More importantly, the section does not impose any duties or
responsibilities on the carer. Moreover, given the passive nature of the
role played by the carer in this regard; that he is merely consulted on
his opinion as opposed to the active role placed on the researcher to
seek out the consultation and act upon it, it is contended that the carer
cannot be said to be ‘acting for or making a decision on behalf of a
person who lacks capacity’, and therefore he should not be subject to
the duty to act in the best interests of the subject.502 As far as
participation in research is concerned, the parties who appear to be
making decisions on behalf of and acting for incapacitated subjects are
research ethics committees503 and the researchers.504 Because research
ethics committees are only able to consider the interests of potential
subjects as a group, they are unable to act in the in best of individual
subjects, therefore the burden for ensuring the protection of the best
interests of subjects must fall on the shoulders of the researcher. This
500 Ibid. Section 32(4)
501Ibid. Section 32(5)
502 Ibid. Section 1(5)
503 Ibid. Section 31
504 Ibid. Sections 32-33
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as discussed earlier, is an unsatisfactory position as the researcher is
placed in an impossibly compromised situation. The absence of any
duty placed on a third party to act in the best interests of a person who
lacks capacity, leaves the person who lacks capacity in a most
vulnerable position.505 Moreover, under the MCA, researchers are only
required to act upon a carer’s opinion regarding the possible reluctance
of a subject to take part in research. If, as argued in Chapter 3, the
true basis of human subject protection is the respect for human
dignity, and that in respect of incapacitated adults, this embraces more
than just a negative duty to not harm them, the role carved out for
carers under the MCA leaves a great deal to be desired.
Primary Interests and the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials)
Regulations 2004 (MHUR)
The second piece of legislation, the MHUR, incorporates GCP
principles and as such recognises the notion of proxy consent which is
provided by a ‘legal representative’. It also spells out the principles
that apply to proxy decision-making in relation to an incapacitated
adult.506 Two of these principles relate to the role of the ‘legal
representative’, they are:
1) The consent provided by a legal representative shall represent the
adult’s presumed will;507 and
2) The interests of the patient always prevail over those of science and
society.508
Under the MHUR, the primary interests of the legal representative
appear to be twofold. First, to discover as far as is possible, the will of
the incapacitated adult and second, to ensure that the adult’s interests
prevail over the interests of science and society.
505 While the MCA does not provide specific insight into the primary duties of carers or proxy
decision makers, there is much to recommend it as a guide to making decisions for people who
lack capacity.
506 Paras 12 – 15, , Part 5, Schedule 1 The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations
2004 (as Amended by S.I 2006/1928 & 2984).
507Ibid. Para 12, Part 5, Schedule 1
508 Ibid. Para 15, Part 5, Schedule 1
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The MHUR provides a very different conception of the role and
primary interests of the relative509 as compared to the MCA, which
does not provide for any proxy decision making process and places the
burden of recruiting incapacitated adults on the researchers, who are
only required to act on the opinion of relatives about possible objections
of subjects. In contrast to this, the MHUR provides for proxy decision-
makers and prescribes the principles that they should be guided by.
Notably, there is no rational reason why the primary interests of
relatives under the MCA should be any different from those under the
MHUR. They both provide mechanisms, which allow people who lack
decisional capacity to participate in medical research projects. The only
difference between the research projects carried out under the MCA
and the MHUR is that research projects under the MHUR involve
testing medicinal products.510 Take for example a situation where two
research projects are being conducted at Hospital X: Project A, which
involves investigating the therapeutic potential of deep brain
stimulation (by implanting electrodes into targeted locations of the
brain) as a treatment for patients with moderate to severe Alzheimer’s
disease; and Project B, which entails investigating the therapeutic
effects of Memantine511 on patients suffering from moderate to severe
Alzheimer’s disease. Mr M, who is suffering from severe Alzheimer’s
disease and is a patient at hospital A is approached by Doctors A and B
from Projects A and B respectively, about participating in their
research projects. He can only choose to enter into one research project.
Both investigators conclude that Mr M lacks the capacity to decide for
himself. Mr M’s wife, Mrs M, has been dutifully taking care of him
throughout his illness and by all accounts they seem to share a loving
509 As stated earlier, the term relative is used to represent any party who has some sort of proxy
decision-making power and here would include the role of carer as well as legal representative.
510 Medicinal products are defined by reference to Article 1 of Directive 2001/83/EC or S 130 of
the Medicines Act 1968, see regulation 2, The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials)
Regulations 2004 (as Amended by S.I 2006/1928 & 2984).
511 Memantime is a new drug that is showing promising results in reducing the clinical
deterioration of patients suffering from moderate to severe Alzheimer’s disease. See Barry
Reisberg et al., "Memantine in Moderate-to-Severe Alzheimer's Disease," N Engl J Med 348, no.
14 (2003).
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relationship. Doctor A, whose project falls under the MCA, has a chat
with Mrs M. and asks for her opinion as to her husband’s wishes and
specifically whether she thinks that her husband would have objected
to participating in the trial. Doctor B, however, whose project falls
under the MHUR, tells Mrs M that she must decide whether or not to
enter her husband into the trial based on what she thinks he would
have wanted and that she must consider his interests above that of
society in general (she mustn’t make a decision based on ‘the right
thing to do’ because it would benefit other patients at a later date) and
that she will be required to sign a consent form on behalf of her
husband. Mrs M is uneasy about providing consent for Project B, as
she is unsure about where her husband’s best interests might lie and
she is also uncomfortable about the responsibility of signing a consent
form. Mr M is eventually entered into Project A by Dr A, as Mrs M
could not think of any specific objections that Mr M might have had
about taking part in the project, and she was in fact relieved that the
final decision to enrol her husband would be taken by his doctor, who
would surely act in her husband’s best interest. It is difficult to see any
reason why Mrs M’s role should be any different depending on whether
her husband enrols in project A or B. Both projects involve giving her
husband some form of treatment; they both have the potential to confer
some benefit on her husband; and both will involve subjecting her
husband to certain levels of risk.
Discussion
The fact is that under English law, the responsibilities (and as
Thompson would argue, the primary interests) of relatives differ
greatly depending on whether a research project falls under the MCA
or the MHUR. Therefore, Thompson’s assertion that primary interests
can be discovered by looking to practice or agreement cannot stand.
The better approach to determining the primary interests of relatives
is to consider the underlying basis of requiring some sort of input from
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a third party (in this case, relatives) in the consent taking process
involving adults who lack capacity.
As noted earlier, the informed consent process is a vital component of
human subject protection. A person needs to be able to understand the
nature of the research trial and the attendant risks and benefits
thereof, if he is to make an informed choice whether or not to
participate. To deny him that choice is to treat him as a means to an
end, and thereby fail to respect his human dignity. When a potential
subject lacks the capacity to understand the information provided,
someone else must make the decision for him and in a normal consent
process; the only other person involved is the investigator/physician.
This is by no means ideal as the investigator is already working from a
position where his interests as physician and investigator are in
conflict.512 This being the case, the function of admitting a third party
into the decision making process must be to ensure that the informed
consent process achieves its goal of human subject protection. How
exactly this should be achieved and what the precise role of the third
party/relative should be is beyond the scope of this thesis but the
relevant idea that emerges from this discussion is that the primary
interest of the relative should be the protection of the subject who lacks
capacity, and that the guiding principle that relatives should be led by
is that of respecting the human dignity of the subject.513
Research Ethics Committees
The determination of the primary interests of research ethics
committees is a much less contentious issue, as there appears to be
512 See the discussion in section 5.4.3.1
513 See the discussion in Chapter 3, section 3.3.2 and 3.3.3
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general agreement on the responsibility of the committees. The ICH-
GCP514 notes that
“…the primary responsibility of the committees is to ensure the
protection of the rights, safety and well-being of human subjects
involved in a trial and to provide public assurance of that
protection, by, among other things, reviewing and approving /
providing favourable opinion on, the trial protocol, the suitability
of the investigator(s), facilities, and the methods and material to
be used in obtaining and documenting informed consent of the
trial subjects.”
Similarly, Directive 2001/20/EC relating to the implementation of GCP
in the conduct of clinical trials in European Member States, states that
ethics committees have a responsibility “to protect the rights, safety
and wellbeing of human subjects involved in a trial and to provide
public assurance of that protection...”515 This has been implemented in
the United Kingdom by the MHUR. This view is also echoed by the US
Food and Drug Administration’s Rules and Regulations which state
that the primary purpose of ethics review if to “assure the protection of
the rights and welfare of the human subjects.”516
(3) When can it be said that interests other than primary
interests amount to secondary interests?
Not all interests other than primary interests will amount to secondary
interests. A secondary interest is an interest that unduly influences the
judgment of a role holder concerning a primary interest, resulting in a
CI. 517 Because one of the features of the social role held by the role
holder is that the beneficiary is required to rely on the role holder to
514 Para 1.37 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline
E6 (R1)."
515 Article 2(k) Directive 2001/20/EC, (4 April 2001).
516 21 CFR 56
517 Thompson, Dennis F. "Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest." N Engl J Med 329, no. 8
(1993): 573-76.
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use his powers in a way that serves the welfare of the beneficiary, the
beneficiary must be able to trust the person or the position associated
with the role. The existence of unrecognised and unchecked secondary
interests is detrimental to this relationship. Secondary interests are
therefore undesirable even though they may not cause any harm to
specific beneficiaries, because the harm that inevitably eventuates is to
the integrity of the social role. Thus it is important to be able to
recognise and name secondary interests for what they are and to
endeavour to minimise their impact on the role holder.
When then can it be said that an interest is a secondary interest? The
following section explores this question beginning with Thompson’s
account of secondary interests, which while insightful in some respects,
is on the whole, rather simplistic as it fails to recognise the
multidimensional nature of secondary interests. This multidimensional
nature is explored using Erde’s analysis, which considers how
secondary interests may be drawn from both individual motives and
social structures that may operate on their own or simultaneously.
This account of secondary interests provides a sounder basis for
management of CIs.
Thompson’s discussion
Thompson’s discussion on secondary interests focuses on what they are
not. He identifies two characteristics of secondary interests in this way;
first, that they are not usually illegitimate and in fact may be
necessary and desirable (for example, the preference for family and
friends).518 Second, he points out that CIs are not just another choice
between competing values and that regarding secondary interests as
just another set of competing values, dilutes the conception of CIs and
gives the impression that the conflict is inevitable and cannot be
518 Ibid.
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avoided. The highly charged abortion debate, in which entrenched pro-
life and pro-choice values are locked in an unavoidable and seemingly
irresolvable tussle is an example of a situation involving conflicting
values, but not conflicting interests. The problem in a CI situation, he
states, is that “both claims have a presumptive claim to priority and
the problem is to ensure that the [secondary] interest does not
dominate”.519 He locates the distinctive nature of CIs as being the
asymmetry between interests.
Although Thompson makes some important observations regarding the
characteristics of secondary interests, he fails to provide a satisfactory
answer to the question of when interests other than primary interests
amount to secondary interests. First, when he points out the fact that
secondary interests are not usually illegitimate but necessary and
desirable, he does not carry on to supply the necessary tools that will
enable accurate identification of secondary interests. Second, his
assertion that the existence of an asymmetry between interests lies at
the crux of CIs, while insightful, fails to explore the basis of the
asymmetry. What is it about the nature of an interest that transforms
it from being just a competing interest into a conflicting (secondary)
interest? Erde’s analysis of secondary interests provides a more three
dimensional picture of secondary interests.
Erde’s analysis
It is worthwhile to note at this juncture that Erde never talks about
the notion of primary and secondary interests and that the definition of
CIs he puts forward (albeit reluctantly) is that “[CIs] are either motives
that caregivers have and/or situations in which we could reasonably
think caregivers’ responsibilities … are or will be compromised to an
519 Ibid.
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unacceptable degree.”520 This tentative definition provided by Erde
when read as a whole is not very different from Thompson’s. However,
instead of the notion of secondary interests that unduly influence
primary interests, Erde offers up the idea of personal motives and
social structures that operate to compromise primary interests.521 By
exploring and incorporating Erde’s language of personal motives and
social structures into the larger more general notion of secondary
interests, it is possible to develop not only a richer understanding of
secondary interests, but also a sounder basis for designing tools to
identify these interests.
Motives
Motives according to Erde are either universal to the human condition
or personal to individuals. CIs are not concerned with universal
motives because they would apply to all people in all circumstances
with equal force and as they would always apply regardless of
circumstances, it would be pointless to include them. CIs are therefore
concerned with personal motives. He puts forward the argument that
personal motives arise from (1) ideals, (2) practical interests, and (3)
gut instincts or predilections.522 Ideals are “the values that provide a
person with a sense of calling or meaning”; they are intrinsic rather
than instrumental; and derive from religious, professional or personal
values.523 Practical interests on the other hand, are instrumental in
nature and represent a person’s sense of the worth of material
elements. Examples of practical interests are concern for personal
safety, emotional resources, financial well-being. Predilections are
dispositions to value something positively or negatively and might be
justified or prejudicial; rational or irrational. They include among other
things, hobbies, animosity, and the bonds of friendship.
520 Erde, "Conflicts of Interests in Medicine: A Philosophical and Ethical Morphology." at 33
521 Erde does not, as stated earlier speak of primary or secondary interests.
522 Erde, "Conflicts of Interests in Medicine: A Philosophical and Ethical Morphology." at 23
523 Ibid. at 20
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The benefit of adopting Erde’s discourse on personal motives into the
determination of secondary interests is twofold. First, it allows the
discussion to move beyond the previously discussed, often held narrow
view that CIs are only concerned with economic gain. In this model,
economic gain, which is a personal motive based on practical interests,
represents only one of the many possible sources of secondary
interests. More importantly, by breaking down and describing different
types of possible motives, it provides a starting point for constructing a
practically useful framework for identifying the sources of secondary
interests.
Not all personal motives, however, will amount to secondary interests.
What transforms a motive into a secondary interest524 is dependent on
whether or not that motive unduly influences the primary interests of
a person holding a particular social role. The fact that secondary
interests are said to ‘unduly influence’ primary interests must mean
that there is some level of influence that is considered legitimate and
only undue influence is to be rejected. The responsibilities of a role
holder do not “mandate forsaking all self-regard”,525 and that some
cases of self-regarding actions are tolerable. Erde offers the example of
a physician who because she has an incidental wound of her own,
refuses to put her ungloved hands into a patient’s blood for fear of
contracting HIV; and suggests that her refusal would not invite moral
censure. The problem with accepting this notion of tolerable self-regard
is that not all people are made up of the same moral fibre. What is
harmless to the heroic is great peril to the faint-hearted. Tolerability
must therefore be an objective standard set by the standard of a person
of normal fortitude; neither hero nor coward. The question then to be
asked is whether a person has a personal motive to act in a way that is
524 That is an interest that unduly influences a primary interest, or as Thompson would say, is
asymmetrical to the primary interest.
525 Erde, "Conflicts of Interests in Medicine: A Philosophical and Ethical Morphology." at 30
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unacceptable and inconsistent with the primary interests of the social
role he has undertaken? Does he have any ideals, practical interests or
predilections that might unduly conflict with his social role?
Erde makes a perceptive observation about the nature of the conflict in
this sort of situation when he points out that a conflict can exist in a
situation where observers might objectively question the objectivity of
a person even without the person feeling or knowing that he is in a CI
situation.526 Take for example, ethics committee member, Dr Q, who is
on a panel reviewing a protocol submitted by his best friend, Dr T.
Prior to the ethics committee meeting, Dr Q and Dr T have several
private discussions about the merits of the trial, during the course of
which, Dr T manages to persuade a sceptical Dr Q about the merits of
the research trial. At the ethics review committee, Dr Q has no
problems supporting the protocol because he now honestly believes in
the soundness of the trial. He does not experience any sense of
dilemma. However, an observer might feel that Dr Q’s close friendship
with Dr T has influenced his decision and whether or not he realises it,
Dr Q is in a CI situation. More importantly, regardless of whether or
not Dr Q’s judgment has been influenced by a personal motive (in this
case based on a predilection – friendship), an existing close friendship
between an ethics committee member and an investigator submitting a
protocol for review presents the appearance of a CI.
Social Structures
This leads to the second feature of secondary interests - that they arise
not only from personal interests, but can also be created by situational
or social structures. In the abovementioned example, the situational
structure where Dr Q and Dr T share a friendship, regardless of the
526 Ibid. at 25.
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influence of the friendship on the personal motives of Dr Q, results in
the creation of a secondary interest. Similarly, as discussed in greater
detail in later in the chapter, the appointments of senior faculty
members as chairpersons of academic ethics committees constitute CIs,
whether or not chairpersons themselves experience a sense of
dilemma.527
Secondary interests may thus operate at two levels: first, at an
individual level depending on the personal motives that drive
individuals; and second at a structural level, where the duties and
responsibilities attached to certain social positions infect their role
holders with secondary interests (regardless of whether or not they
have any personal motives or experience any dilemma). Accepting that
secondary interests are engaged at both these levels is to recognise the
importance of not only protecting against CIs that actually occur, but
also against the appearance of CIs. Erde maintains and rightfully so,
that the “distinction between having a [CI] and having the appearance
of a [CI] is most likely bogus, radically overdrawn or misused…”528 His
reasons, however, for making this assertion, which are based on his
claim that having a CI is not dependent on the existence of conflict,
and the general misconception that only individuals can have CIs, fail
to take into account a much more compelling reason, that is that the
social role upon which the CI operates is a relationship that is based on
trust. Beneficiaries, in this case, mentally incapacitated subjects, have
no choice but to place their trust in the social roles that have been
created to safeguard their interests. They must rely on the parties that
engage in the enrolment/consent process and ethics committees to act
in their best interests, to respect their human dignity. The mere
527 An interesting counterpoint to this is that the experience of a dilemma alone does not
necessarily point toward a COI. Erde uses the example of a physician struggling to decide whether
or not to feed an anencephalic baby who lacks a sucking reflex. In this case, there is no asymmetry
between the interests and this example would fall under Thompson’s description of competing
interests and not conflicting interests.
528 Erde, "Conflicts of Interests in Medicine: A Philosophical and Ethical Morphology." at 8
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appearance of bias or undue influence compromises the integrity of
these social structures and diminishes trust. The importance of the
social role of human subject protection requires that there is no
distinction between actual and perceived CIs. Consequently, this
realisation necessitates taking Thompson’s definition one step further
to say that secondary interests are not only those that unduly influence
primary interests, but also those that appear to unduly influence
primary interests.
Therefore, secondary interests are defined as motives and social
structures that unduly influence or might appear to unduly influence
the primary interests of a person holding a particular social role.
Secondary Interests and the Informed Consent Process
As the focus of this thesis is the role of ethics committee review as a
vehicle of human subject protection, a detailed discussion of the issue
of secondary interests that bedevil the participants in the informed
consent process is beyond the scope of this paper. It is however,
important to point out some of the types of secondary interests that
impact on physicians/researchers and relatives who participate in this
process as it serves as a strong reminder that the informed consent
process, as a mechanism for human subject protection is at best,
unsafe. There are two lessons that should be learned from this. First,
that ethics review is that much more vital given the CIs inherent in the
informed consent process and second, that ethics committees need to be
able to recognise the pervasive nature of CIs in the consent taking
process.
Secondary interests and the physician/researcher
As noted earlier, the role of informed consent facilitator in therapeutic
clinical trials is taken up by the physician/researcher, which results in
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an untenable position of clashing primary interests. Closely tied with
this issue is the prevalence of secondary interests that bedevil the
informed consent process. Significantly, these secondary interests are
generally present as a direct result of the multiple roles held by the
informed consent facilitator. Because the informed consent facilitator is
at the same time a physician and a researcher, the traditional areas of
conflict of interest associated with roles of physician and researcher
inevitably become attached to the role of the informed consent
facilitator. The section below describes some of the secondary interests
that are commonly associated with the physician/researcher in clinical
trials. The discussion considers secondary interests that arise from
motives as described by Erde and focuses on two types of motives,
ideals and practical interests.
Motive as a secondary interest
Ideals
As noted earlier, physicians/researchers are also subject to a form of
therapeutic misconception, arising from an “intensive and protracted
process of professional socialisation as clinicians”.529 Their propensity
to equate clinical trials with medical care, presents the danger of
undermining the informed consent process as they are no longer
functioning as impartial informed consent facilitators (their primary
interest), but as clinicians promoting a particular course of treatment.
Another secondary interest that arises from the ideals of a
physician/researcher, which has the potential to undermine the
primary interests of an informed consent facilitator, is the research
imperative. This has been noted by Levinsky,530 who notes that in some
cases, investigator zeal, namely the desire to advance knowledge can
also operate as a secondary interest. The physician/researcher in such
cases arrives at the informed consent process stage convinced of the
529 Miller, Rosenstein, and DeRenzo, "Professional Integrity in Clinical Research." at 1450
530 Norman G. Levinsky, "Nonfinancial Conflicts of Interest in Research," N Engl J Med 347, no.
10 (2002). at 759
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vital need for a particular type of research and this strong conviction is
likely to colour the discussion he will have with potential trial subjects.
Practical interests
Economic gain, unlike investigator zeal and the therapeutic
misconception, is instrumental in nature, and as such is a practical
interest. As noted in the earlier part of the chapter, CIs have been
traditionally associated with economic interests and as such, these
interests are often viewed as raising the greatest concern in the
research environment.531
There are two routes by which economic interests are injected into the
physician/researcher role. The first and the most common, is by way of
interactions with the pharmaceutical industry.532 Gifts, payment for
meals, attendance at lectures and conferences, scholarships, payment
for speakers, provision of ghost writing services, provision of
pharmaceutical supplies, grants for research projects and payments for
consulting relationships are cited as typical examples of interactions
with industry.533 Direct economic incentives are also commonly offered
to researchers by way of recruitment incentives.534 Because of the high
stakes involved in drug development, pharmaceutical companies are
constantly under a great deal of pressure to produce new drugs as
531 The International Committee of Medical Journal Editors has identified this as the most
important conflict of interest. Sheldon Krimsky and L. S. Rothenberg, "Financial Interest and Its
Disclosure in Scientific Publications," JAMA 280, no. 3 (1998). at 225
532 An excellent article that examines the relationships between physicians and drug companies at
the turn of the 21st century, which portrays how it begins in medical school and continues
throughout the physicians’ careers is David Blumenthal, "Doctors and Drug Companies," N Engl J
Med 351, no. 18 (2004).. Also see Kassirer, "Financial Conflict of Interest: An Unresolved Ethical
Frontier."
533 Troyen A. Brennan et al., "Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of Interest: A Policy
Proposal for Academic Medical Centers," JAMA 295, no. 4 (2006). at 430. The pharmaceutical
industry is estimated to spend approximately $12 billion annually on gifts and payments to
physicians. D Katz, AL Caplan, and JF Merz, "All Gifts Large and Small: Towards an
Understanding of the Ethics of Pharmaceutical Industry Gift-Giving," American Journal of
Bioethics 3, no. 3 (2003).
534 J Bryant and J Powell, "Payment to Healthcare Professionals for Patient Recruitment to Trials:
A Systematic Review," BMJ 331, no. 7529 (2005). at 1377.
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quickly as possible and as such are willing to pay researchers for the
rapid recruitment of sufficient numbers of patients into trials.535
Evidence536 suggests that industry focuses more attention on certain
groups of physicians, notably, academic researchers. An Australian
survey537 of medical specialists found a significant correlation between
research collaboration and an increasing number of ties538 with
industry. One of the reasons forwarded for this phenomenon is that
academic researchers are perceived to be opinion leaders who are likely
to influence the behaviour of other physicians. Their opinions are also
more likely to be positively received by medical students they have
come into contact with and in addition to this, prescribing patterns
practiced by academic physicians/researchers are likely to be mimicked
by students as there is some evidence that physicians establish their
prescribing patterns while still at university. Therefore, researchers in
general, and academic researchers in particular are more likely than
not to have had substantial interactions with industry that involve
economic interests. The extent to which these interactions exist is well
illustrated by an article on psychotropic drugs in the New England
Journal of Medicine, where declarations of financial conflicts of
interests of the authors consumed nearly three single-spaced
typewritten pages.539
The question to be asked then is whether interactions with industry
have any effect on physician/researcher behaviour? An oft cited article
notes that physicians who interacted with pharmaceutical companies
535 Manufacturers are said to offer investigators US$2000 to $5000 per patient in certain
cases.Morin et al., "Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical Trials." at 81
536 Eric G. Campbell et al., "A National Survey of Physician-Industry Relationships," N Engl J
Med 356, no. 17 (2007).
537 David Henry et al., "Ties That Bind: Multiple Relationships between Clinical Researchers and
the Pharmaceutical Industry," Arch Intern Med 165, no. 21 (2005).
538 Ties were defined as specific interactions that were likely to involve a degree of reciprocity.
Ibid. at 2943
539 Kassirer, "Financial Conflict of Interest: An Unresolved Ethical Frontier." at 154 referring to
the article
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were nine to twenty one times more likely than other doctors to have
requested a drug made by the company. 540 In the research arena, a
review of the literature on financial relationships between industry,
scientific investigators and academic institutions carried out in 2003,541
found that not only were these relationships pervasive; but that where
such relationships existed, research results tended to be pro-industry
and were likely to be subject to publication delays and withholding of
data.
Admittedly, not all interactions between physician/researchers and
industry involved large gifts or sums of money and some physicians
contend that small gifts fail to influence their behaviour.542 However, a
number of compelling research findings demonstrate that this is a
fallacy.543 Social science research has demonstrated that even small
gifts can exert powerful influences on recipients to reciprocate whether
or not they are conscious of it.544
There is clear and compelling evidence that interactions between
industry and physicians/researchers have the potential to distort and
disrupt the scientific validity of clinical trials. How then does this
translate into a CI in the informed consent process? Apart from the
direct financial interest in receiving recruitment incentives, the impact
540 MM Chren and CS Landefeld, "Physicians'behavior and Their Interactions with Drug
Companies: A Controlled Study of Physicians Who Requested Additions to a Hospital Drug
Formulary," Obstetrical & Gynecological Survey 49, no. 8 (1994).
541 Bekelman, Li, and Gross, "Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical
Research: A Systematic Review." 463, also see Joel Lexchin et al., "Pharmaceutical Industry
Sponsorship and Research Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review," BMJ 326, no. 7400 (2003).
who confirmed and extended the study by adding another 16 studies to the 5 studies identified by
Bekelman et al.
542 Anita Damle, "Build Rather Than Burn Bridges," BMJ 338, no. feb24_1 (2009).
543 Blumenthal, "Doctors and Drug Companies.", Katz, Caplan, and Merz, "All Gifts Large and
Small: Towards an Understanding of the Ethics of Pharmaceutical Industry Gift-Giving.", M
Chren, "Interactions between Physicians and Drug Company Respresentatives," The American
Journal of Medicine 107, no. 2 (1999).
544 Katz, Caplan, and Merz, "All Gifts Large and Small: Towards an Understanding of the Ethics
of Pharmaceutical Industry Gift-Giving." The article describes how the success secret of the
world’s record holder for car sales was to send mass-produced greeting cards to his customers
every month printed with the phrase “I like you” (at 41)
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of industry interactions with physicians/researchers on the informed
consent process is that it affects the ability of physicians/researchers to
be objective in relation to clinical trials that are sponsored by industry.
Regardless of whether the interactions involve large or small sums of
money, physicians/researchers are drawn into relationships of
reciprocity within which they are likely to view participation in clinical
trials as something that is to be encouraged.
The second route by which economic interests might operate as
secondary interests is when physicians/researchers have equity
interests in either the pharmaceutical companies sponsoring the trials,
or the trial drugs. In practice, this is not really an issue in Malaysia, as
almost all patents for trial drugs are held by researchers or companies
in developed countries.
Apart from economic interests, another type of practical interest that
has been described as “potent” is the desire for career advancement.
Publications of research results and maintaining grant support are
viewed as “academic currency that buys prestige and promotion”.545 A
report published by the Forum for Institutional Review Boards in
Canada and the United States (FOCUS) pursuant to its 2004
International Conference on Conflicts of Interest, noted that the
“largest conflict in universities has to do with the process of promotion
in tenure”.546 For many physicians/researchers in Malaysia, running
pharmaceutical sponsored trials will provide them with the best
opportunities to publish in peer reviewed journals, which in turn will
enhance their prospects for promotion and as such, they may be very
keen to show sponsors how efficient they are at among other things,
recruiting the subjects needed for the trials. The prospect of career
545 Levinsky, "Nonfinancial Conflicts of Interest in Research." at 759
546 (Forum for Research Ethics Boards (REBs)/Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) in Canada and
the United States FOCUS, "Report on an International Conference on Conflict of Interest," in
FOCUS International Conference on Conflict of Interest (Washington DC, USA: National Council
on Ethics in Human Research, 2004). pg 15
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advancement and professional prestige is potentially a greater
inducement for researchers from countries such as Malaysia, where
significant financial gain through equity holdings is unlikely.
Secondary interests and caregivers/relatives
Caregivers/relatives of mentally incompetent adults may also be
subject to the influence of secondary interests. Like
physicians/researchers, the secondary interests that are likely to affect
caregivers will in all probability arise from motives rather than social
structures. However, unlike physicians/researchers, the secondary
interests of caregivers/relatives are more complex in nature and harder
to define as the interests of carers are so closely intertwined with the
interests of the incompetent adults, to the point that it is sometimes
almost impossible to separate them. Take for example a situation
where an elderly Muslim man suffering from severe dementia is
considered for recruitment into a clinical trial studying a new and
promising drug for the treatment of dementia. Because he is certified
as incompetent to provide consent, his daughter, who is his caregiver
and closest relative, is asked to provide consent on his behalf. When
reading the patient information sheet, the daughter notes that the
drug contains porcine material. Although the daughter is aware that
her father, if competent, would have been vigorously opposed on
religious grounds to taking such a drug, she herself does not feel
strongly about the Muslim religion and feels that it is far more
important that her father participate in the trial because it might
improve his condition. In this case, the secondary interests that
operate on the daughter stem from first, her personal ideals about the
importance of Islam, which are very different from her father’s
personal ideals.
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In addition to this, she has practical interests in the possibility that the
treatment might improve her father’s condition. (In fact, research has
shown that when proxies are asked the reasons for enrolling
incompetent adults into clinical trials, they almost always include hope
for direct benefit or a sense of desperation in finding some way of
relieving the patients’ conditions.547) An improvement in her father’s
condition would be likely to relieve her of some of the stresses of caring
for him. Individuals that care for others suffering from diseases and
conditions that affect cognitive function, are recognised as being in
danger of suffering what is called ‘caregiver strain’. Caregivers such as
the daughter in the abovementioned example are likely to suffer from
significant financial, social and economic strains.548 Research549 has
demonstrated that where patients suffer from chronic disorders such
as Parkinson’s Disease,550 the level of strain experienced by caregivers
increases significantly as the disease advances and patients are less
able to care for themselves. In addition to this, caregivers themselves
are also at risk of developing mental health problems551 and suffering
from general poor health.552 Therefore in the example given above,
secondary interests in being relieved of her ‘caregiver strain’ and
547 See Jeremy Sugarman et al., "How Proxies Make Decisions About Research for Patients with
Alzheimer's Disease," Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 49, no. 8 (2001)., Jason H.T.
Karlawish et al., "How Do Ad Patients and Their Caregivers Decide Whether to Enroll in a
Clinical Trial?," Neurology 56, no. 6 (2001)., P. Elad et al., "Demented Patients' Participation in a
Clinical Trial: Factors Affecting the Caregivers' Decision," International Journal of Geriatric
Psychiatry 15, no. 4 (2000).
548 See Frank D. Gianfrancesco, Ruey-hua Wang, and Elaine Yu, "Effects of Patients with Bipolar,
Schizophrenic, and Major Depressive Disorders on the Mental and Other Healthcare Expenses of
Family Members," Social Science & Medicine 61, no. 2 (2005). This article provides an overview
of the literature that demonstrates the effect of care giving.
549 J. H. Carter, B. J. Stewart, P. G. Archbold, I. Inoue, J. Jaglin, M. Lannon, E. Rost-Ruffner, M.
Tennis, M. P. McDermott, D. Amyot, R. Barter, L. Cornelius, C. Demong, J. Dobson, J. Duff, J.
Erickson, N. Gardiner, L. Gauger, P. Gray, B. Kanigan, B. Kiryluk, P. Lewis, K. Mistura, T.
Malapira, M. Pay, C. Sheldon, L. Winfield, K. Wolfington-Shallow and K. Zoog, "Living with a
person who has parkinson's disease: The Spouse's perspective by stage of disease" (1998) 13
Movement Disorders 20-28.
550 This account holds true for most mental health and neurological conditions that result in
cognitive dysfunction
551 In particular, depression and anxiety - estimates of the prevalence of depression in caregivers
range from as high as twenty-five to fifty percent.Jason H. T. Karlawish and David Casarett,
"Addressing the Ethical Challenges of Clinical Trials That Involve Patients with Dementia," J
Geriatr Psychiatry Neurol 14, no. 4 (2001). at 224
552 Gianfrancesco, Wang, and Yu, "Effects of Patients with Bipolar, Schizophrenic, and Major
Depressive Disorders on the Mental and Other Healthcare Expenses of Family Members."
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prudential concerns may influence the daughter’s decision to enrol her
father in the trial. However, given the manner in which their interests
are linked, it may very well be the case that the furtherance of the
daughter’s practical interests are linked to the best interests of the
father as “there is no way to detach the lives of patients from the lives
of those who are close to them”553. There will undoubtedly be a direct
correlation between the levels of strain experienced by the daughter
and the standard of care offered to her father. So it is not so easy to
declare these interests as forming secondary interests that must be
excluded from the decision making process.
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to delve into the intricacies of
the interests of caregivers and their wards, what is evident from the
discussion above is that caregivers who act as proxy decision makers
are potentially acting from positions where they might have secondary
interests that conflict with their primary interests. As the above
discussion has demonstrated, both parties to the informed consent
process: the physician and the caregiver, are likely to be in positions of
conflicts of interest. Therefore, it is clear that the consent process as it
stands cannot be considered an effective way of protecting the interests
of a mentally incompetent adult. There needs to be a radical rethinking
of the way in which the informed consent process is carried out in
relation to clinical research. The question that needs to be answered
now is whether anything can be done to improve the level of protection
provided by the informed consent process given the systems and the
mechanisms that are currently in place? The arrow then must surely
point to the ethics review process, as it is the only other mechanism for
protecting the rights of human subjects. If the ethics review process is
to provide some level of redress, two things must be present. First and
foremost, ethics committee members must be cognisant of these
matters, and this goes to the issue of how members are trained and
553 John Hardwig, "What About the Family?," The Hastings Center Report 20, no. 2 (1990). at 5
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whether or not they are able to engage in meaningful discussions about
the ethics of human subject research.554 In addition to this, there must
also be a spirit of independence and engagement whereby committees
are willing and able to impose obligations on researchers such as
requiring independent third party assessors to be present during the
informed consent process.
Secondary Interests and Research Ethics Committees
The final portion of this chapter considers whether research ethics
committees themselves are subject to secondary interests, which
compromise their independence. The importance of having an
independent research ethics committee cannot be overstated. First, as
pointed out at the outset of this chapter, the raison d’être of
establishing a system of ethics review was to inject an independent
evaluation of proposed research projects, as investigators were no
longer trusted with the sole responsibility for protecting human
subjects. If ethics committees are not independent, they lose the very
reason for their existence. Also, having recognised that the informed
consent process is mired in an environment replete with conflicts, the
burden of recognising and acting against these conflicts must lie with
ethics committees and to fulfil this task, they must in turn be
independent themselves.
The following section will describe the types of secondary interests that
ethics committee members are likely to have. Secondary interests as
far as ethics committees are concerned are likely to arise from both
personal motives as well as social structures.555 The first part of this
section will consider the types of secondary interests that originate
554 This goes to the argument that at present, ethics committees are engaged not in meaningful
ethics discourses, but rather in administrative ‘ticking of boxes’. One reason for this being the
inaccessibility of current ethical guidelines and principles. This is then remedied by applying the
notion of respecting human dignity. See discussion in Chapters 3 and 4.
555 For a discussion of the types and sources of secondary interests, see section 5.4.4
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from personal motives and the second part will discuss the social and
institutional structures which create these secondary interests.
Secondary Interests based on personal motives
As noted earlier, personal motives can arise from three sources: ideals,
practical interests and predilections.
Ideals as personal motives
Ideals are among other things, formed by the values that individuals
hold to be important. People may learn or come to adopt certain values
depending on the societies they live in, the religions they believe in, the
experiences they share and in this instance, perhaps most vitally, the
education and training they receive both prior to becoming ethics
committee members as well as after their appointments. While ethics
committee members are expected to act impartially when making their
decisions, it is impossible to imagine that their ideals will not in some
way influence their deliberations. Given that the task of ethics review
is to consider the interests of subjects, and that subjects are likely to be
drawn from many different cultural, religious and educational
backgrounds; it stands to reason that ethics committees should also be
made up of people from different walks of life, who are able to bring
their different experiences and values to the discussion. It is important
to bear in mind that the different ideals that different people bring into
the ethics review process are not necessarily sources of secondary
interests.556 Just because a situation may involve competing values,
556 However, Eckenwiler makes a valuable observation that IRB members are as a whole, likely to
be drawn from more privileged social groups as compared to subjects and as such, their
imaginings with respect to subjects interests are likely to be ‘faint depictions’. Lisa Eckenwiler,
"Moral Reasoning and the Review of Research Involving Human Subjects," Kennedy Institute of
Ethics Journal 00011, no. 00001 (2001). at 46-47. Also see Department of Health, "Report of the
Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Operation of NHS Research Ethics Committees," (Department of
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does not mean that the situation involves a CI. For a secondary
interest to exist, it must be shown that it unduly influences or might
appear to unduly influence the primary interests of a person holding a
particular social role.557 Therefore the ideals or values held by ethics
committee members will only constitute secondary interests insofar as
they unduly influence the primary interest of ethics committee
members, which is the protection of human subjects. In the situation
above, this is not necessarily the case as an ethics committee that is
made up of a good balance of people who hold different values, where
competing ideals are discussed and debated, is likely to provide better
protection to human subjects and consequently, these different ideals
cannot be said to be secondary interests.558
What is however, a potential source of secondary interests in this
respect is the fact that the membership of ethics committees in
Malaysia is heavily skewed in favour of scientific/clinically-trained
persons.559 The Medical Research Ethics Committee that oversees all
clinical research trials carried out under the aegis of the Ministry of
Health has a membership of 18 people, 17 of which are either clinicians
or scientists and a single lay person. The research ethics committees
at academic medical centres are of much the same ilk. At the
University of Malaya, seven out of ten members are scientists or
clinicians; at the National University of Malaya (UKM),560 sixteen out
of eighteen members are scientists or clinicians; at University Putra
Health, 2005). 10, which points out that in the UK, RECs are not sufficiently representative of
community diversity
557 For a fuller discussion of secondary interests and the notion of competing interests, see the
discussion section 5.4.4
558 This is in fact recognised in American federal regulation, 45 CFR 46. 107, which requires that
“each IRB shall have at least five members, with varying backgrounds to promote complete and
adequate review of research activities commonly conducted by the institution”
559 The ICH-GCP regulation provides very basic guidance on the constitution of ethics committees
it merely requires that the committee should consist of at least five members and that only one
member should have a non-scientific primary area of interest. International Conference on
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use,
"Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1)." Para 3.2.1
560 http://www.ppukm.ukm.my/index.php?menuid+MN09050066 accessed 21 January 2010
223
Malaysia (UPM),561 eleven out of twelve members are scientifically or
clinically trained; and at University Science Malaysia (USM),562 eleven
out of thirteen members are clinicians or scientists.
This is significant for two reasons. First, the high proportion of
scientifically trained members reduces diversity in the board, which is
important (as discussed above). Second, scientific study relies to a large
extent on establishing or extending the frontiers of knowledge by the
experimental testing of hypotheses. Scientists are trained to place a
high value on the research process and as such are likely to view the
research agenda as being primarily a good thing.563 This being the
case, they are likely to approach the review process with a bias towards
the benefits of research and unlikely to be able to assume the subjects’
point of view and understand the vulnerabilities of subjects.564
It is also worth considering the primary reason for establishing ethics
review in the first place: that review was necessary because individual
researchers were believed to be unable to impartially assess the risks
to human subjects as they were too committed to their research
projects. Similarly, scientists may also be unable to impartially assess
the risks to human subjects as they may be committed to idea of the
advancement of useful knowledge by way of observation and
experimental testing. However, just because some people may come to
the table with certain biased views, (as pointed out earlier) this does
not render the entire review process illegitimate. In fact, the review
561
http://www.medic/upm.edu.my/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=819&item=437
accessed 21 January 2010
562 http://research.kk.usm.my/borang/jepem_ethical_members_09.pdf accessed 21 January 2010
563 Daniel D. Federman, Kathi E. Hanna, and Laura Lyman Rodriguez, eds., Responsible Research
: A Systems Approach to Protecting Research Participants (Washington, D.C. ; [Great Britain]:
National Academies Press, 2003). 84, C. A. Schuppli and D. Fraser, "Factors Influencing the
Effectiveness of Research Ethics Committees," J Med Ethics 33, no. 5 (2007). at 297, Eckenwiler,
"Moral Reasoning and the Review of Research Involving Human Subjects." at 47
564 Emily E. Anderson, "A Qualitative Study of Non-Affiliated, Non-Scientist Institutional Review
Board Members," Accountability in Research: Policies and Quality Assurance 13, no. 2 (2006).at
136
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process is enhanced by the injection of competing values.565 What does,
in this case create a situation of potential CIs is that on average, 86%
of ethics committee members are scientifically trained persons.566
Moreover, there is some evidence that scientist members tend to
dominate the discussions and are not always receptive to the opinions
of lay members. A study carried out in 2000567 where lay members of
IRBs were asked open ended questions about their interactions with
scientific members, 88% reported having negative experiences that
were associated with feeling that “scientists disrespected their
opinions, did not understand them, or did not take them seriously.”568
Similarly, a 2005 study carried out on the effectiveness of research
ethics committees in Canada569 found that the preponderance of
scientist members was a source of concern to lay members who felt that
their views carried little weight in discussions as the scientists
outnumbered them. In Malaysia, there also appears to be a culture of
deference to medical opinion in ethics committees. In an interview with
the immediate past chair of the MREC, he noted “... in our country,
…doctors tend to hold sway sometimes over the discussions. … we have
one or two PhDs [who] are well versed in research… but there are
others who are too frozen, who don’t speak up.”570
The review process is thus tainted with bias at the outset, given that
the majority of ethics committee members bring to the table a
565 This was recognised by a UK Department of Health Report which stated that RECs should be
broadly representative of the community. (Department of Health, "Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory
Group on the Operation of Nhs Research Ethics Committees." at 10
566 The American National Bioethics Advisory Commission recommended that non-scientific
members should represent at least 25% of the membership of IRBs. See United States. National
Bioethics Advisory Commission., "Ethical and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human
Participants," (Bethesda, Md. (6705 Rockledge Drive, Suite 700, Bethesda, 20892-7979): The
Commission, 2001). at xvi
567 Sohini PhD M. P. H. Sengupta and Bernard M. D. Lo, "The Roles and Experiences of
Nonaffiliated and Non-Scientist Members of Institutional Review Boards," Academic Medicine
February 78, no. 2 (2003).
568 Ibid. at 215.
569 Schuppli and Fraser, "Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Research Ethics Committees."
570 Interview with Ethics Committee Member A, MREC, 25 November 2008
225
scientifically value-laden discourse. This bias is not adequately
addressed by appointing lay members because first, there are too few
lay members; and second, evidence seems to suggest that the few lay
voices that are present are either dismissed or stifled by scientifically
trained members.
Practical Interests as Personal Motives
Practical interests include personal financial interests and interests in
the prospects of personal career advancement. While much has been
said about the financial interests of investigators, it is also important
to recognise that ethics committee members are just as likely to have
financial ties with industry as well. A survey of 893 IRB members at
100 academic institutions in the US571 concluded that ethics committee
members sometimes participate in decisions about protocols sponsored
by companies that they have financial relationships with. Given that
almost all clinical trials that are run in Malaysia are sponsored by
industry, it is more than likely that committee members who are
investigators will at some point have to make decisions on protocols
sponsored by companies with whom they have worked with.
In addition to this, given the current climate of the research
imperative, committee members who are also researchers will be under
some pressure to carry out their own research projects. The career
advancement prospects of these individuals will to a large extent be
dependent on their research work and publications. In Malaysia, where
almost all clinical trials are sponsored by the industry, it is not
unreasonable to imagine that researchers may want to keep industry
sponsors happy and interested in investing their time and money in
the local clinical trial industry, which will in turn afford these
researchers opportunities to take part in clinical trials. Moreover,
571 Eric G. Campbell et al., "Financial Relationships between Institutional Review Board
Members and Industry," N Engl J Med 355, no. 22 (2006).
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because many committee members are likely to want to run research
trials in their own institutions as well, they have a personal interest in
the standards that are being set by their review process. Therefore,
there is a danger that committee members may be influenced by these
practical considerations when making their decisions.572
It is important to point out at this juncture that the problem of conflict
that arises here, while often associated with the fact that these
individuals have institutional affiliations, is not necessarily linked to
the institutional structure. This is not an issue of institutional conflicts
of interests. The argument is that individual committee members who
are also researchers are likely to have personal reasons first, for not
wanting to discourage sponsors from running trials and as such, these
reasons may influence their decisions; and second, because committee
members are also likely to be researchers within the institution who
will themselves at some point need to submit protocols for review, they
may not want to set precedents that they may impede their own
research.
Predilections as Personal Motives
Predilections as described above, are dispositions to value something
positively or negatively and might be justified or prejudicial; rational
or irrational. They include among other things, hobbies, animosity, and
the bonds of friendship. There is some evidence573 that suggests that
ethics committee members with institutional affiliations may view
favourably the research protocols submitted by their colleagues, as
they “must live with any disappointed applicants whose protocols they
have rejected”.574 When interviewed, one of the members of the MREC
572 See also Adil E. Shamoo and Felix A. Khin-Maung-Gyi, Ethics of the Use of Human Subjects
in Research : Practical Guide (London: Garland Science Pub, 2002). at 67
573 See Federman, Hanna, and Rodriguez, eds., Responsible Research : A Systems Approach to
Protecting Research Participants. at 84, Lester Francis, "Irbs and Conflicts of Interest," in
Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Practice, ed. Roy G Spece, David S Shimm, and Allen E
Buchanan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). at 425,
574 Harold Edgar and David J. Rothman, "The Institutional Review Board and Beyond: Future
Challenges to the Ethics of Human Experimentation," The Milbank Quarterly 73, no. 4 (1995).
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remarked, “… there are many other institutes having their own
projects coming in for review and approval, and we basically joke about
it. Come on, this is your fellow sister’s project; take it easy, man, you
know? … I think we do take it easy.”
Moreover, as far as the appointment of lay persons are concerned, a
systematic study in the US575 showed that lay members tend to be
appointed by relatively high-level institutional officials often through
friendship with “little or no effort … to recruit outside members from
community or patient advocacy groups”. There is some evidence that
this also holds true in the Malaysian context as a lay member of
Institution A, a retired science teacher, remarked that she had been
appointed by the chair of the committee because “her mother knows me
personally and she was looking out for a member of the public and her
mother mentioned my name to her and so she approached me”.576Also,
the immediate past chair of the MREC noted that it was very difficult
to find lay members and “quite often we fall back on our ex staff
members or hospital staff who are not doctors”.577 The selection of lay
members drawn from a rather selected pool of either retired employees
or people from the same social circles as other ethics committee
members (mid to high-level employees) makes it likely that these lay
members will be sympathetic to the interests of researchers and the
institutions . More than this, the appointment of members in this way
makes it highly unlikely that lay members are likely to represent the
research subject population.578
at492, Lemmens and Freedman, "Ethics Review for Sale? Conflict of Interest and Commercial
Research Review Boards." at 576
575 See Francis, "IRBs and Conflicts of Interest." at 429. Similar results were reported in
Anderson, "A Qualitative Study of Non-Affiliated, Non-Scientist Institutional Review Board
Members." at 141
576 Interview with Ethics Committee Member B, Institution A, 21 December 2007
577 Interview with Ethics Committee Member A, MREC, 25 November 2008
578 See D. Evans and Evans M, A Decent Proposal, Ethical Review of Clinical Research
(Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1997). at 110
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Secondary Interests based on Social and Institutional
Structures
As noted earlier, secondary interests may also arise at a structural
level, that is, the duties and responsibilities attached to certain social
positions infect their role holders with secondary interests regardless of
whether or not they have any personal motives or experience any
dilemma. Because the role holders themselves may not necessarily
experience any dilemma in situations where secondary interests arise
from institutional structures, the question is not necessarily whether
CIs are present, but rather whether the institutional or social structure
creates an appearance of a CI. Two main areas of concern are discussed
below in relation to secondary interests based on institutional
structures: the appointment of institutionally affiliated chairpersons,
and the fact that many members of ethics committees are also mid-
level or senior employees of the institution.
Chairpersons of ethics committees
The chairperson of the ethics committee plays a very important role.
Generally, members see the chairperson as being particularly
important in maintaining an atmosphere where all views are accepted,
and playing a neutral role in participating in the discussion and
helping the committee reach a consensus.579 All the chairpersons of
academic ethics research committees in Malaysia are appointed from
senior faculty members of the institutions, and the chairperson of the
MREC is the Director General of Health of the Ministry of Health.
These individuals are not only affiliated to the institutions where the
research is to be carried out, they are senior members of the
institutions and often hold senior administrative posts in their
institutions in addition to being chairs of their respective ethics
committees.
579 Schuppli and Fraser, "Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Research Ethics Committees."
at 295
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As discussed in chapter 2, the clinical trial industry in Malaysia is
viewed by the government as an important source of revenue and job
creation and various institutions and programmes have been put into
place to encourage sponsors to run their trials in this country. Almost
all of these institutions and programmes fall under the purview of the
Director General of the Ministry of Health. His position as Director
General requires him to actively promote the clinical trial industry in
the country. However, as the chairperson of the MREC (which reviews
all trial protocols from Ministry of Health institutions), his primary
interest must be the protection of human subjects, which may be in
conflict with the interests of the industry. The fact that the chairperson
of the MREC is also the Director General of the Ministry of Health,
creates at the minimum an appearance of a CI.
In a similar vein, academic institutions in Malaysia are keen to present
themselves as research centres and actively promote their institutions
as being ideal centres for running clinical trials. Clinical trials are
important to universities as they represent sources of revenue, new
equipment and training opportunities for staff. Universities also have
an interest in acquiring reputations for bringing in large amount of
research money, as this attracts more students and top researchers.580
Chairpersons appointed from senior faculty members who also hold
institutional administrative positions (most of the chairpersons are
either heads of departments or hold administrative positions in
relation to research activities in their universities.), inevitably appear
to face CIs. Their positions as senior administrative officers with
interests in furthering institutional policies that favour research
projects (secondary interests) clearly appear to be potentially in conflict
with their roles as chairpersons of ethics committees.
580FOCUS, "Report on an International Conference on Conflict of Interest." at 3
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Ethics Committee Membership
All the ethics committees in Malaysia are affiliated to the institutions
that carry out the clinical trials being presented for review. The
majority, if not all of their members are drawn from mid-level to senior
employees of the institution. The members of the ethics committee of
the University of Malaya,581 for example, include the Dean of the
Faculty of Medicine, the Deputy Director of the hospital; and the
Heads of the departments of medicine, psychological medicine, surgery,
pharmacology and pharmacy.
As heads of departments, they will be aware that the research monies
that come into their departments are likely to improve the facilities
and prestige of their departments. Because they have a vested interest
in the success of the departments they lead, there is a danger that
when members of their departments present protocols for review, their
interests in seeing these protocols approved may unduly influence
them.582
The membership of the MREC on the other hand, includes the
directors of the Institute for Medical Research, the Institute for Public
Health and the Network of Clinical Research Centres (CRC). As in the
case of heads of departments in academic institutions, directors of
institutes are able to understand and appreciate the value of research
to their institutions and these secondary interests may very well alter
their judgments. A member of the MREC pointed out that because
individuals are appointed to the committee based on their posts, “they
might be interested in managing research but not interested in ethical
issues”.583 Morevoer, the conflicts faced by these individuals was
readily admitted by the Director of the Network of Clinical Research
Centres, who very honestly pointed out that
581 http://www.ummc.edu.my/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=842&Itemid=1430
accessed on 7 Feb 2008
582 There is some evidence for this, see Lemmens and Freedman, "Ethics Review for Sale?
Conflict of Interest and Commercial Research Review Boards." at 576
583 Interview with Ethics Committee Member A, MREC, 25 November 2008
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“To a larger extent, my role is conflicted. … as Director of CRC I
have many responsibilities… and many of these responsibilities
actually conflict. On the one hand, I am supposed to promote
clinical research, right? Then on the other hand, I am supposed
to promote Malaysia as a research hub … I go out there and rub
shoulders with all the key decision-makers and key stake-
holders and say “Come on bring your trials to Malaysia.” … The
CRC also allocates funding, so there are some accountability
issues there… then finally, there is of course, human subject
involvement.
… So me sitting in the ethics committee on one hand I say – hey,
I have a job to protect the human research subject. But on the
other hand I say - hey, I have to take it easy on this guy if this
project is to be done in Malaysia. And on the other hand I say -
hey, I have just allocated a millions bucks in this research
project, don’t screw it up for me mate, just pass the research so
we can carry on with this project. You can imagine the several
conflicting interests, and we just have to deal with that.”584
584 Interview with Ethics Committee Member B, MREC, 26 November 2008
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6 Chapter 6
Conclusion
It is clear that there are problems with the way in which ethics review
is conducted in Malaysia, especially with regard to clinical trials
involving mentally incapacitated adults. The thesis focuses on two
main areas that are essential to meaningful ethics review: first, the
process by which decisions are made; and second, the issue of the
independence of ethics committees. This by no means suggests that
these are the only issues relating to ethics review worth exploring, but
it is suggested that these issues strike at the heart of the ethics review
process, which is to provide independent review of trial protocols to
ensure that the rights and interests of human subjects are protected.
While it would be unfair to make sweeping generalisations about the
nature of the clinical trial industry in Malaysia, some general points
may be drawn out from the discussions in Chapter 2. The one single
factor that has had the largest impact on the size of and the way in
which clinical trials are run in developing countries such as Malaysia
is the ICH process. This project has brought together the regulatory
authorities of the United States, Europe and Japan; and has changed
the face of drug development by opening the clinical trial industry to a
global market. This in turn has created an environment where
countries like Malaysia compete against other developing countries for
a piece of the market. To this end, the government of Malaysia has
instituted a number of policies and set up several institutions to attract
sponsors to its shores. The danger created by this is that the
government in bending over backwards to attract foreign investment
might be less vigilant about providing adequate systems of human
subject protection. This is evidenced by the absence of any statutory
measures aimed at protecting human subjects.
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This is, however, not to say that there are no mechanisms for
protecting human subjects. Because trials need to be compliant with
the ICH process, which includes the ICH-GCP585, all clinical trials that
are conducted in Malaysia have to be subject to prior ethics review as
stated in the ICH-GCP guideline. Whether ethics committees acting
under the ICH-GCP guideline are providing meaningful protection to
trial subjects, however, is another issue, and this was dealt with in
Chapter 4.
As far as the issue of the treatment of mentally incapacitated adults
who participate in clinical research is concerned, the outlook is gloomy.
There is no legislation that provides for proxy decision-making. As a
result of this, the official position taken by sponsors and investigators
is that mentally incapacitated adults are not permitted to participate
in trials even if trials provide the only opportunity for some patients to
receive drugs that they would otherwise not have access to because of
the high costs of those drugs. Ethics committee members, on the other
hand, seem unaware of this practice, and routinely consider trial
protocols that they believe might involve the participation of mentally
incapacitated adults. However, a more troubling observation is that
even patients who are judged to be competent are not permitted to
enrol in clinical trials without the consent of relatives.586 This is a clear
violation of patient autonomy. It is evident that the practice that has
emerged in relation to the enrolment of mentally incapacitated adults
is highly unsatisfactory.
This is therefore the context in which ethics committees must operate
and bearing in mind these matters, a number of conclusions can be
drawn from the preceding chapters as to whether ethics committees
provide meaningful protection to mentally incompetent adults who
enrol in clinical trials. There are, as mentioned earlier, two broad areas
585 International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, "Good Clinical Practice: Consolidated Guideline E6 (R1)."
586 See Chapter 5 at 179
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of enquiry: the process by which ethics committees make decisions –
whether they engage in meaningful ethics discourse, and whether
ethics committees are independent.
Are ethics committees independent?
The importance of independent ethics review cannot be overstated.
Conflicts of interests abound in the modern clinical trial industry and if
ethics committees are to function as protectors of human subjects, they
must stand apart from the other players who have vested interests.
More so, because as demonstrated in chapter 5,587 the only other
vehicle for human subject protection in the research arena; the
informed consent process, is riddled with conflicts of interest.
The main sources of secondary interests as far as ethics committees are
concerned are the social and institutional structures of these
committees. Because these committees are made up primarily of
scientists and investigators, they inevitably bring to the discussion
values and personal interests that may influence their decisions. What
is needed is an injection of more lay members drawn from a larger and
more diverse pool of society. The fact that chairpersons are appointed
from senior members of staff who hold high positions in the
institutions create a danger that the committees might be led to make
decisions that favour the interests of the institutions. The institutions
that carry out the research under review should not at the same time
be the employers of chairpersons of ethics committees. Also, all
members of the committees save for the few lay members are
employees of the institutions carrying out the research. This again,
creates a potential situation of conflicts of interests where employees
may feel inclined to make decisions that favour the interests of the
institution. To remedy this, employees of the institution carrying out
587 At 169-176
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the research should comprise of less than half of the entire
membership of the committee.
Significantly, while examining the issue of the independence of ethics
committees and conflicts of interests (CIs), it became clear that the
notion of CIs in the field of bioethics has not been well defined in the
past, and that most commentators have focused on matters concerning
financial gain.588 It was therefore, important to attempt to construct a
meaningful and workable notion of CIs that could then be applied to
the parties engaged in clinical trials. This was achieved by combining
Thompson’s589 definition of CIs as a foundation and building on it by
adding relevant aspects of Erde’s590 analyses resulting in a viable
framework of CIs.591
Do ethics committees engage in meaningful ethical
discourse?
The question of whether ethics committees engage in meaningful
discourse encompasses several subsidiary questions. Do ethics
committees understand the role they are expected to play? What
principles if any do ethics committees use in their discussions? Do
these principles facilitate meaningful ethics discourse? What rules and
regulations must ethics committees adhere to? The answers to the
subsidiary questions help answer the ultimate question: does the ethics
review process provide meaningful protection to mentally incapacitated
adults?
The first three subsidiary questions were considered in Chapter 3.
First, while most ethics committee members appear to know that the
588 See Chapter 5, section 5.2.2
589 Thompson, Dennis F. "Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest." N Engl J Med 329, no. 8
(1993): 573-76.
590 Erde, Edmund L. "Conflicts of Interests in Medicine: A Philosophical and Ethical
Morphology." In Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Practice and Research, edited by Roy G Spece,
David S Shimm and Allen E Buchanan, 12-42. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
591 See Chapter 5, sections 5.3, 5.4, 5.4.1, 5.4.2, 5.4.3
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function of ethics review is to protect human subjects, they appeared to
have a very narrow view of what this protection should encompass, and
most of them seemed to think that they should focus on ensuring that
subjects were not made to pay for additional tests or drugs. Further,
when asked about the ethical principles or guidelines they use or think
that they should know, most ethics committee members could not
name any of the guidelines or declarations; and the few who named the
Helsinki Declaration were unable to list any of the principles contained
within it.592 In fact, none of the ethics committee members were
provided with any sort of formal training prior to their appointments.
Significantly, all the ethics committee members who were interviewed
appeared to recognise that they needed training because when asked
what would improve the ethics review process, they all expressed a
need for more training. Unless ethics committee members understand
what is required of them, and unless they are provided with the tools
that they need to engage in meaningful ethics discourse, the ethics
review process is not an effective means for protecting human subjects.
Because it was clear from the interviews that most ethics committee
members were not relying on any specific set of principles when
making decisions, the question that then needs to be asked is not
whether the principles they use facilitate meaningful ethics discourse,
but rather whether the guidelines and principles that are on offer
facilitate meaningful ethics discourse? An examination of three of the
most influential sets of guidelines: the Nuremberg Code, the Helsinki
Declaration and the Belmont Report, revealed a number of flaws that
render these documents confusing and ineffective at best; and at worst,
subject to manipulation. Consequently, little would be gained by using
these guidelines to train ethics committees. Because ethics committee
members come from a variety of backgrounds (scientists, clinicians,
investigators, lawyers and lay persons) they need to be provided with a
592 See Chapter 3 at 67 - 68
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common discourse in a language that is both coherent and easily
accessible to every member. But at the same time, this discourse must
be rich enough to reflect the complex nature of the issues raised by
medical research. The last part of chapter 3 is the first step in this
direction. A framework for ethics discourse based on the single
principle of respecting human dignity, and how this might work in
relation to mentally incapacitate adults is offered as an alternative to
the existing guidelines. While much more work remains to be done in
constructing a framework that applies across the board; this is an
important first step.
Chapter 4 continues with the enquiry into the decision-making process
of ethics committees by examining the ICH-GCP guideline. Several
conclusions may be drawn from this part of the enquiry. First, the
guideline itself provides very little specific guidance to ethics
committees as to how they should protect human subjects. Second, the
guideline is largely concerned not with substantive issues of whether
the decisions reached by ethics committee protect human subjects, but
focuses on the administrative processes that ethics committees should
adhere to. Therefore, compliance with the guideline does not
necessarily ensure the protection of human subjects. Third, in
requiring that investigators disclose an exhaustive amount of data for
every protocol they submit for ethics review, the guideline places a very
heavy burden on ethics committees who have to plough through an
average of 2,700 pages every month. Because of the volume of the data,
there appears to be a tendency for ethics committee members to focus
their attention on the aspects of clinical trials that they are most
familiar with, or that they understand most easily. By approaching
ethics review in this disjointed manner, ethics committees run the risk
of glossing over certain aspects of clinical trials that raise serious
ethical concerns. This is particularly true in respect of clinical trials
that enrol mentally incapacitated adults. By offering the example of
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how clinical trials are designed, what originally appear to be questions
of scientific merit best understood and examined by scientists, turn out
to raise very serious ethical concerns.593 If ethics review is to achieve
its purpose, ethics committees need to address these issues during
their review process. To do this, they need to understand the difference
between scientific validity and scientific value, they need to
understand certain scientific aspects of clinical trials, they need to
appreciate the context in which specific trials are carried out, they
need to be able to recognise the special needs of vulnerable populations
and they need to keep up with the changing needs and concerns of trial
subjects within their purview. Ethics committee members must
therefore receive sufficient training that will allow them to meet these
needs.
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer any specific and
detailed recommendations for reform of the ethics review process, it is
clear from the findings in chapters 3 and 4 that there is an urgent need
for formal training of ethics committee members. Training should be
approached at two levels: initial and continuous training. Ethics
members should have at the minimum in-depth knowledge of the
history and principles of human subject protection. They should be
familiar with the regulations and guidelines that govern clinical trials.
They should be aware of the specific needs and interests of vulnerable
populations such as mentally incapacitated subjects. And finally, ethics
committees should have an understanding of the local context in which
the research is being carried out; they should recognise the particular
issues raised by conducting research in a developing country that is at
the same time, multi-cultural and multi-religious.594 Without this, it
593 See Chapter 4 at 134 - 140
594 Given that there are examples of curricula for training research ethics committees that have been
developed in countries such as the U.S, it is possible to use these templates as a basis for developing
country specific training programmes. See Silverman, H., B. Ahmed, S. Ajeilet, S. Al-Fadil, S. Al-Amad,
H. El-Dessouky, I. El-Gendy, M. El-Guindi, M. El-Nimeiri, R. Muzaffar, and A. Saleh. "Curriculum Guide
for Research Ethics Workshops for Countries in the Middle East." Developing World Bioethics 10, no. 2
(2010): 70-77.
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cannot be said that ethics committees are committed to protecting the
rights of mentally incapacitated subjects.
Conclusion
Several conclusions can be drawn by looking at the evolution of the
Malaysian clinical trial industry and the way in which ethics review is
presently carried out. First, unlike the United States, which instituted
ethics review in response to specific instances of research misconduct,
and which has over time developed both legal regimes and institutional
mechanisms with the primary aim of protecting human subjects;595 the
Malaysian ethics review process was developed to bring the country’s
clinical trial industry within the rules of the ICH process. Because the
main impetus for creating ethics review committees was not human
subject protection, but rather economic gain, the ethics review
processes is based solely on the ICH-GCP guideline. Given the fact that
the ICH-GCP guideline was not drafted for the primary purpose of
human subject protection, but rather as part of a larger project to
standardise pharmaceutical development practices and procedures
across the U.S, Europe and Japan, it does not provide sufficiently for
human subject protection. If the ethics review process in Malaysia is to
truly reflect the idea of human subject protection, authorities need to
rethink the entire way in which the process is structured and the way
in which ethics committees conduct their reviews.
Second, because of the growing influence of the ICH process across
many countries, the issue of how far other countries rely on the ICH-
GCP principle to develop ethics review processes becomes very
important. It is very likely that other developing countries will also
have built up their local clinical trial industries in the same way as
Malaysia. If this is true, there is a danger that the ethics review
595 See the discussion in Chapter 2, section 2.4.2 about the U.S experience. The U.S regulations go
far beyond the GCP principles
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processes in many countries are similarly compromised. Very little
research has been done on how the ICH process has affected human
subject protection across developing countries and there is an urgent
need for more research into this matter.
Human subject protection lies at the heart of the ethics review process,
and unless ethics committee members in Malaysia understand what
this means, and until they are provided with the tools they need to
engage in meaningful ethics discourses, they will not be able to fulfil
their duties to potential research participants in general and
specifically to mentally incapacitated adults. The findings of this thesis
demonstrate an urgent need for reform of both the law relating to
mentally incapacitated adults as well as the way in which ethics
review is conducted in Malaysia.
While this thesis focuses on the ethics review process in Malaysia;
most of the discussions in the preceding chapters are also relevant to
the ethics review process in other jurisdictions. This is particularly
true of the discussions in chapter 4 that focus on the ICH-GCP
guideline. Two important and new ideas put forward in this thesis that
will merit further investigation and deliberation are: first, the idea
that the undervaluation of human life lies at the heart of research
misconduct and that this understanding is crucial to the construction
of a rational and effective basis of ethical research because it invites
the question of what is the appropriate value of human life, the answer
to which is presented as the principle of respect for human dignity.
Second, the idea that there needs to be a recognition of the role of the
informed consent facilitator which is not subsumed into the larger role
of the physician/researcher. Much has been written about the tension
between the roles of physician and researcher, but almost nothing
about the very important role of the informed consent facilitator.
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